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Abstract 
 
Governing boards of higher education institutions are responsible for 
governance actions such as appointing and evaluating the president, clarifying 
institutional mission, ensuring financial solvency, and preserving institutional 
independence.  Typically not included within these responsibilities is the 
oversight of intercollegiate athletics (ICA), which is primarily delegated to 
institutional presidents.  Thus, many trustees are uncertain about their role in the 
governance of ICA.  Semi-structured interviews with 29 trustees from 23 different 
governing boards were conducted to provide a first-hand account of trustee 
perspectives on their role in providing oversight to ICA.  Data were analyzed 
through an ad hoc approach where it was found that trustees were generally 
supportive of athletics while being concerned about the overemphasis compared 
to other aspects of institutional mission. They also had mixed viewpoints on the 
effectiveness of formalized board structures and processes around athletic 
governance, stressed the importance of trust in administrative leadership and 
informal consultation processes, and were challenged by the financial realities of 
supporting Division I athletics and the external spheres of power in college sports.  
The study contributed to the literature on stakeholder theory by examining how 
governing boards, as the stakeholders with ultimate fiduciary responsibility for 
institutions, provide oversight to an area of higher education with an extremely 
high profile and considerable financial and reputational risk.  The study also 
contributed to the understanding of shared governance in higher education by 
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analyzing how governing boards effectively assert authority in a high profile area 
of institutional governance.  Implications for policy and practice included the 
importance of governing boards developing clear expectations with presidents 
about which athletic issues require board consultation and which require formal 
board approval. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
Background 
 
The trustees of higher education governing boards are responsible for the 
strategic mission of their institutions, including academic prioritization, fiscal 
solvency, and maintenance of the public trust (Association of Governing Boards 
[AGB], 2010).  Governing boards are one component of the shared governance of 
higher education institutions in which the board, president, and faculty all have 
specific roles in institutional decision-making (AGB, 1998).  The shared 
governance of colleges and universities typically means the inclusion of various 
stakeholder groups, including trustees, administrators, and faculty, in the 
institutional decision-making process (Olson, 2009).   
One responsibility that falls outside of the standard prerogative of Board 
authority, but very much inside the public consciousness, is National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) intercollegiate athletics (AGB, 2004; Knorr, 2005; 
Frey, 1987; Oliva, 1988; Thelin, 2008).  A NCAA (2006) report outlined the ideal 
structure for the shared institutional governance of intercollegiate athletics as 
presidential control over athletic performance and operational matters, faculty 
oversight regarding student-athlete academic standards, and governing board 
involvement simply limited to certifying the institutional athletic program and 
supporting the chief executive.  Despite trustees limited role in this recommended 
governance structure, governing boards are clearly a stakeholder, or a group that 
affects or is affected by organizational actions, in that they are often responsible 
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for approving items associated with athletics, including personnel actions and 
construction projects (AGB, 2004; Freeman & Reed, 1983).   
Given that NCAA Division I1 athletics is an area of higher education with 
a myriad of visible issues such as financial insolvency, student-athlete crime, and 
academic and legal scandals (Branch, 2011), in addition to a lack of clarity on 
board role in the governance of athletics, it is conceivable that governing board 
trustees might struggle with understanding their stake in athletics issues.   An 
example of the challenges posed by intercollegiate athletics involved the Penn 
State University Board of Trustees.  The November 11, 2011 Board of Trustees 
meeting was to contain discussion of residential life cost changes for Fall 2012 
and a proposal to reorganize the departmental structure of the College of 
Agricultural Sciences (Penn State Board of Trustees, 2011).  Less than a week 
prior to the meeting, a grand jury report revealed a child sexual abuse scandal 
containing allegations of assault against a former football coach and perjury 
against two high-ranking university officials, including the Athletics Director 
(Hebel & Wolverton, 2011). In the wake of the grand jury report, the Board of 
Trustees met in an emergency session and voted unanimously to fire President 
Graham Spanier and legendary football coach Joe Paterno.  Instead of managing 
routine academic matters at the regularly scheduled meeting on November 11, the 
Board utilized the session to introduce an interim president and announce an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 NCAA Division I institutions are organized into three levels - the Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS), the Football Championship Subdivision (FCS), and institutions that do not sponsor football 
- which comprise 337 total member institutions (NCAA, 2011).  Institutions in all three levels will 
be included in this study. 
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official investigation into the sexual abuse scandal (Ganim & Frantz, 2011; Hebel 
& Wolverton, 2011).  
Penn State trustees described the situation as challenging because the 
parties responsible for the management of intercollegiate athletics, the president 
and the athletic director, were either suspended or terminated, and therefore 
unable to determine the fate of the most successful coach in the history of major 
college football (Thamel & Viera, 2012).  The decision to fire Joe Paterno, the 
coach for 46 seasons with 409 career victories and who had given over $4 million 
to Penn State, was made by a governing board that had no explicit authority over 
the management of intercollegiate athletics (NCAA, 2006; Thamel & Viera, 
2012).  Ultimately, the circumstances surrounding the sexual abuse scandal 
pushed the trustees into a situation in which neither policy nor precedent provided 
a guidebook for action.    
The example from Penn State is not introduced to identify a faulty system 
of higher education governance or pinpoint misplaced priorities on modern 
college campuses.  Rather, this case demonstrates that intercollegiate athletics, 
including the firing of a football coach, were not included in the standard duties of 
governing boards (AGB, 2004).  The Association of Governing Boards (2010) 
articulates the primary responsibilities of governing boards of colleges and 
universities in the United States as follows: 
The governing board should retain ultimate responsibility and full 
authority to determine the mission of the institution, in consultation with 
and on the advice of the president, who should consult with the faculty and 
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other constituents.  The board is also responsible for establishing the 
strategic direction of the institution or system through its insistence on and 
participation in comprehensive, integrated institutional planning. (p. 4) 
Aside from the overarching mission-related responsibility, governing boards are 
generally considered accountable for appointing and monitoring the chief 
executive, ensuring fiscal integrity, ensuring academic quality, and maintaining 
institutional independence from governmental control (AGB, 1998, 2007; Nason, 
1980).   
Despite a lack of agreement on the relative influence of athletics on a 
college or university, college sports are part of the higher education landscape 
(Brand, 2008; Lapchick, 2006; Sperber, 2001).  While the athletic enterprise of 
any college or university is influenced by a myriad of stakeholders, including 
coaches, athletic directors, student-athletes, alumni, and prominent boosters, 
university presidents have worked to restructure the organization and place 
athletics more under institutional control (Thelin, 1994).  In 1997, The NCAA 
reorganized its structure so university presidents controlled the governance of the 
organization (Naughton, 1997). An Executive Committee and a Board of 
Directors consisting solely of institutional chief executives were established 
(Copeland, 2009; Naughton, 1997; Smith, 2000).    
Since the 1997 restructuring, the NCAA (2006) has been unequivocal in 
declaring, “college and university presidents and chancellors have responsibility 
for the operation and administration of intercollegiate athletics” (p. 41).  Despite a 
recent restructuring that grants a minimal number of NCAA Division I Board of 
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Directors slots to non-presidents, the NCAA has maintained the need for 
presidential control of athletics (NCAA, 2014). AGB (2004) is in accord with this 
approach and asserts, “Boards should delegate direct responsibility for the 
conduct and control of the athletics department to the institution’s chief 
executive” (p. 4). 
Although presidents are delegated the authority by governing boards to 
fully manage the athletic department at most NCAA Division I institutions, the 
visible presence of intercollegiate athletics and the financial realities of supporting 
major college sports make governing boards an important stakeholder in the 
governance of an institution’s athletic department (AGB, 2007; Knorr, 2005; 
Oliva, 1988).  In order to examine the manner in which governing boards, as the 
ultimate fiduciaries of institutions, provide oversight to an area in which they 
have an explicitly limited stakeholder role, this study was framed from 
stakeholder governance (Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 2004; Mason, Kirkbride, & 
Bryde, 2007).  A stakeholder approach to governance holds that organizations 
should serve the interests of all stakeholders who contribute resources to achieve a 
common purpose, not just the shareholders who seek organizational profit (Balser 
& McCluskey, 2005; Dent, 2008; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman & Reed, 
1983; Letza et al., 2004; Mason et al., 2007; Ryan, 1990; Speckbacher, 2008; 
Vinten, 2001).  
In the nonprofit realm of higher education, the stakeholder approach is 
implemented through shared governance, which is interpreted as governing 
boards, presidents, and faculty members, among others, sharing the responsibility 
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of making key institutional decisions, including those related to intercollegiate 
athletics (Olson, 2009).  Despite recognition that governing boards are 
stakeholders in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, the literature on this 
subject is limited (AGB, 2007; Frey, 1987; Knorr, 2005; Oliva, 1988). This gap in 
the literature was somewhat rectified when AGB (2012) recently undertook the 
first comprehensive study of the manner in which governing boards were 
involved in intercollegiate athletics.  The survey of 143 Division I institutions 
found that more than 75 percent of the boards surveyed have a policy on athletics, 
more than 67 percent delegate responsibility for athletics to the chief executive, 
and 52 percent have a standing committee on athletics (AGB, 2012).  In the area 
of athletic finances, 19 percent of respondents indicated that their athletic 
departments are self-supporting with revenue sources other than state 
appropriations, student fees and tuition, and other institutional funds.  In addition, 
the full board or board committees generally received adequate information 
related to athletic finances in the areas of revenues and expenditures, self-
sufficiency, and the financial performance of revenue generating sports.   
While the AGB report (2012) provided the first real landscape study of 
governing board practices, it did not venture into trustees’ perspectives about the 
governance of athletics at their institutions.  For example, although the AGB 
report provided understanding of how common it is for governing boards to have 
a policy on athletics, there remains little understanding of what the presence of a 
policy means to trustees as they fulfill a stakeholder role in the governance of 
their institutions.  Similarly, although the report (AGB, 2012) provided 
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information on the percentage of boards that have a standing committee on 
athletics, the study failed to examine whether this manifestation of board 
oversight leads to effective governance or a lack of clarity in stakeholder 
responsibilities.  
Statement of Purpose 
Framed from stakeholder theory (Letza et al., 2004; Mason et al., 2007; 
Ryan, 1990; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Vinten, 2001), this study examined 
NCAA Division I trustees’ perspectives on intercollegiate athletics and how their 
governing boards participate in the shared governance of athletics. 
Research Questions 
The following research questions guided this study: 
1. What are trustees’ perceptions of the governance of their institutional 
athletic departments? 
2. What are trustees’ perceptions about the stake governing boards have 
in contributing to the shared governance of intercollegiate athletics?  
3. What challenges do governing boards face in contributing to the 
shared governance of intercollegiate athletics?  
Significance of the Study 
This study contributed to the literature empirically, theoretically, and in 
practice. Empirically, the study built upon the work of AGB (2012) in examining 
the appropriate role of governing boards by providing a first-hand account of 
trustee viewpoints on governance issues related to intercollegiate athletics.  The 
study also contributed to the understanding of higher education shared governance 
     	  
 
8	  
by focusing on the role of governing boards in the oversight of athletics, which 
added to the existing literature on the athletic governance roles of the faculty 
(Kuga, 1996; Lawrence, 2009) and institutional presidents (AGB, 2004; Bouchet 
& Scott, 2009).  In addition, this study added to the comprehension of how 
governing boards effectively assert authority in a high profile area of institutional 
governance by confirming the importance of informal consultation in 
implementing a shared governance system (Birnbaum, 2004; Kezar, 2005).  
Finally, the study contributed to stakeholder theory literature, particularly through 
an examination of the manner in which boards, as institutional fiduciaries, are 
limited as stakeholders because of the delegated authority to presidents to manage 
intercollegiate athletics.     
The study provided several implications for governing board policy and 
practice as related to the governance of intercollegiate athletics.  The study 
revealed that governing boards should engage with institutional presidents on 
developing clear expectations for the role of the board in providing oversight.  
The study also indicated that governing boards must understand that formalizing 
board oversight of intercollegiate athletics through athletics committees or 
approval of coaching contracts do not always strengthen governance practices.  
Finally, governing boards must ensure that board oversight of intercollegiate 
athletics is at the appropriate governance level and does not delve into 
micromanagement, thereby weakening the authority of institutional presidents. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purpose of this study, the following terms are defined as follows: 
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Board professional.  Staff members that provide assistance to governing 
boards in fulfilling their governance responsibilities.  This role may either be a 
direct report to a governing board or a dual report to a governing board and an 
institution’s chief executive officer (Cieslak & Mersereau, 2008).  
Governing board.  The group of individuals selected, elected, or 
appointed to hold a higher education institution, or system of institutions, in trust 
for the people that it serves (Nason, 1982). 
Intercollegiate athletics.  Athletic competition that is conducted between 
different institutions of higher education and governed by the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA, 2014a).   
Power conference.  One of the following NCAA Division I athletic 
conferences: Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big Twelve 
Conference, Pacific Twelve Conference, Southeastern Conference, which have 
the most resources to fund athletic programs (Gemmell, 2014).   
President.  The chief executive officer of a higher education institution 
that has ultimate accountability for the operation of a department of 
intercollegiate athletics (Hoffman, 2013; Nason, 1982).    
Private board.  A governing board of an institution of higher education 
that does not receive any direct operational funding from governmental sources 
and is populated by members that are internally perpetuated (Longanecker, 2006). 
Public single institution board.  A governing board of an institution of 
higher education that receives direct operational funding from governmental 
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sources and is populated by members that were selected, elected, or appointed 
through a public process (Longanecker, 2006).  
Public system board.  A governing board that is populated by members 
that were selected, elected, or appointed through a public process and that governs 
a group of higher education institutions that operate as a system within a single 
state, is managed by a chief executive officer, and receives direct operational 
funding from governmental sources (Longanecker, 2006).  
Statewide coordinating board.  A governing board that is populated by 
members that were selected, elected, or appointed through a public process and 
that governs a group of higher education institutions in a state that operate 
independently and receive direct operational funding from governmental sources 
(Longanecker, 2006).  
Trustee.  An individual member of a higher education governing board 
(Nason, 1982).   
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework 
This chapter describes the theoretical foundation of the study, a 
stakeholder theory of governance.  The implementation of stakeholder theory in 
higher education, shared governance is examined through a description of the role 
of governing boards.  The manner in which intercollegiate athletics is typically 
governed is described by focusing on the responsibilities of various stakeholders 
and the challenges associated with, and the importance of, maintaining a 
competitive athletic program.    
A Stakeholder Theory of Governance 
The traditional approach to corporate governance has been centered on the 
belief that the management of a firm has the sole purpose of acting as the agent 
for the ownership or shareholders in order to maximize investment returns 
(Cooper, 2004; Freeman & Reed, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Letza et al., 
2004). In the past quarter century, a new view on corporate governance has 
emerged that espouses corporations serving the interests of all stakeholders, not 
just those of shareholders, because groups such as employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, and society-at-large are integral to the achievement of the 
organizational mission (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Letza, et al., 2004; Mason, et 
al., 2007; Ryan, 1990; Vinten, 2001).  Stakeholders are all of those individuals or 
groups who have a “stake” in the actions of the corporation and contribute to or 
receive value from mission-related activities (Kangas, 2011). 
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Letza et al. (2004) argued that there are two primary types of stakeholder 
governance theories.  The first is social entity theory, which justifies stakeholder 
interests on the basis of social justice and the belief that the corporation is an 
instrument for the common good. In this regard, social justice is maintained 
through attention to the societal effects of corporate action.  The challenging part 
of the social entity approach to stakeholder theory is defining the common good 
as related to corporate performance (Argandona, 1998).  The common good could 
be the maximization of economic values for as many stakeholders as possible or, 
alternatively, mutually beneficial relationships among stakeholders.  Argandona 
(1998) defined the common good as not related to the volume of sales, profits, job 
creation, or the prestige of its directors, but rather the fulfillment of institutional 
purpose to create the conditions that will enable its members to achieve their 
personal goals.   In higher education, the common good is often characterized as 
the producer of knowledge through the allocation of public and private resources 
to scholarship and research (Pusser, 2006).   
A second approach is instrumental stakeholder theory, which values 
stakeholders as effective partners in improving efficiency, profitability, 
competition, and economic success (Letza et al., 2004).  One method of 
implementing this approach is establishing a culture of trust and responsibility 
among employees within a firm so that organizational success becomes the 
paramount goal for all stakeholders (Jones, 1995). The instrumental approach is a 
mutually beneficial approach for all stakeholders because the benefits run in both 
directions.  Each stakeholder contributes something to a corporation, but also 
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receives something in return (Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002).  For example, 
stakeholder interests are not viewed as an “ends”, but instead as an effective 
instrument or “means” for improving efficiency, profitability, and economic 
success (Letza et al., 2004; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
While it is accepted that the term stakeholder is a contested concept, the 
definition in this study will draw from Freeman and Reed (1983), who wrote that 
a stakeholder is “any identifiable group or individual who can affect the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the 
achievement of an organization’s objectives” (p. 91).  Despite the fact that some 
components of colleges and universities seek to maximize revenue, the preceding 
definition is appropriate for this study because of the nonprofit status of higher 
education institutions, which in principle are focused on a mission related to the 
advancement of knowledge (Rosenstone, 2003).  Ryan (1990) asserted that a 
stake is any claimed or real interest, whether legal or moral, in any organizational 
undertaking.  Ryan (1990) also maintained that internal stakeholders are those 
with formal or contractual relationships with the firm, and secondary stakeholders 
constitute all other actors (e.g., owners, employees, and shareholders as internal 
stakeholders and suppliers as secondary stakeholders).   
Critics suggest that a stakeholder theory to governance is limited because 
of the challenge in determining the importance of stakeholder claims, whether 
they derive from internal or secondary sources (Charron, 2007; Phillips, 2003; 
Ryan, 1990; Sternberg, 1997).  As the definition of stakeholder has broadened to 
include a wider sphere of peripheral actors, the relationship to the original firm 
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and the potential impact of individual stakeholders is difficult to ascertain.  
Sternberg (1997) argued that a broad definition results in impractical management 
by writing: 
Its definition as anyone who ‘intentionally or consequentially’ participates 
in the corporation by experiencing effects of corporate activity makes all 
current and future humans participants.  This criterion is so broad as to 
nullify the scope or responsibility. (p. 13)   
Sternberg also contended that accountability to all stakeholders comes at the 
expense of being accountable to the most important stakeholder, the corporate 
ownership.  
 The definition of stakeholders is complicated even further when 
discussing nonprofit organizations, like college and universities, because of the 
absence of the clear goal of profitability (Speckbacher, 2008).  In contrast to the 
corporate sector, the achievement of a nonprofit organizational mission is 
measured by an interconnected group of stakeholders coming together and 
contributing resources to achieve a common purpose (Balser & McCluskey, 2005; 
Speckbacher, 2008).  In the nonprofit higher education sector, which includes 
both comprehensive public and private research universities and liberal arts 
colleges, stakeholders may come from a wide variety of areas, including 
government, internal individuals and groups, and others from outside of the 
organization (Jongbloed, Enders, & Salerno, 2008).  For this study, stakeholders 
will include those groups or individuals that contribute resources, including time, 
expertise, or money, to the shared governance of institutional intercollegiate 
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athletics.  Such stakeholders include trustees, athletic administrators, presidents, 
faculty, students, and donors.  
Shared Governance: Stakeholder Theory in Action 
Shared governance in practice and theory.  Governance within higher 
education can be defined as the structure and process of authoritative decision-
making across issues that are significant for external and internal university 
stakeholders (Gayle, Tewarie, & White, 2003).  Externally, stakeholders such as 
federal and state governments, regional accreditation agencies, and business 
communities all have an interest in the effective governance of higher education 
institutions (Tierney, 2006a).  On the internal side of the issue, Birnbaum (2004) 
argued that there are two different, yet equally valid, systems of organizational 
control and influence in higher education.  The first system is the legal authority 
granted to governing boards and administrators, which is dictated by policies and 
procedures for organizational decision-making.  The second system is the 
professional authority bestowed upon the faculty, which grants rights to academic 
decision-making in the areas in which faculty are considered experts. Based on 
the research of Gayle et al. (2003), it is determined that a successful merger of 
these two systems, and the related agreement concerning institutional mission, 
will often yield an effective governance model. 
Power sharing and deliberations as to who makes which decisions are 
central to university leadership and decision-making (Bess & Dee, 2008; Gayle et 
al., 2003; Hirsch, 2001; Lazerson, 1997; Mortimer & Sathre, 2007). The standard 
approach to the power-sharing dilemma of higher education since the middle half 
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of the twentieth century has been a shared governance model (Hirsch, 2001).  
Shared governance typically means the inclusion of various groups in the making 
of important decisions and allowing certain groups to retain primary responsibility 
for specific areas of decision-making (Olson, 2009).   
Shared governance was bolstered by the American Association of 
University Professors’ (AAUP) 1967 Statement on Government of Colleges and 
Universities (Hirsch, 2001).  The AAUP Statement specifically delineated the 
roles of the governing board, the president, and the faculty in achieving a shared 
model for institutional decision-making.  The governing board determines the 
strategic vision for the university and acts as the final institutional authority on 
matters of importance.  The president is responsible for all administrative actions, 
and the faculty retains authority for determining educational policy (AAUP, 
1967).  The AAUP (1967) suggests that interdependence among governing 
boards, administrators, faculty, and students, and the relationship between these 
components must be cultivated through communication and joint planning efforts.   
Given that the advancement and dissemination of knowledge is the 
primary mission of higher education institutions (Rosenstone, 2003), the 
preference for shared governance among institutions of higher education is based 
on the argument that stakeholders with expertise in an area, the faculty, should be 
a part of the governance process (Birnbaum, 2004).  A second, and related, 
argument is that shared governance avoids a structure in which one group 
dominates the decision-making of a specific area, even when they might have the 
most expertise in that area (Simplicio, 2006).  For example, faculty members have 
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the best foundation for determining the academic direction of an institution and 
often exercise their influence with primary authority through policies related to 
admissions, curriculum, and instruction.  However, the development of formal 
policies and procedures within a college or university is conducted with input 
from administrators, and the standard approach is to have final approval of 
academic programs by the governing board (Gayle et al., 2003; Rhodes, 2001; 
Simplicio, 2006). 
Birnbaum (2004) offered an analysis of governance with two separate 
approaches.  The first is “hard” governance, which refers to the organizational 
structures, policies, and processes that define authority relationships.  Examples 
of hard governance include a governing board policy that delegates specific 
authorities to a president, a faculty senate that formally approves academic 
policies and programs, or even a student government body that approves student 
fee allocations.  The second approach is “soft” governance, which refers to the 
social connections and interactions within an organization that maintain group 
norms.  An example of this form of governance is the expectation of consultation 
and communication between the president, board leadership, and the leaders of 
the faculty senate on matters of institutional importance (e.g., strategic planning, 
institutional budgets, hiring a football coach).  Birnbaum maintained that soft 
governance is more effective than hard governance because the vast majority of 
important decisions made in higher education occur outside the formal system.  
Tierney and Minor (2003) expanded on the soft governance concept by 
surveying institutional actors (academic administrators, faculty leadership, and 
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department chairs) from four-year colleges and universities to address the ways 
that faculty participate in governance, the effectiveness of the participation, and 
overall faculty attitudes about governance.  The study found that confidence in 
institution-wide governing bodies such as faculty senates was low, but that a 
significant level of communication and trust occurred between faculty and 
administrators.  In addition, respondents considered many areas as effective 
vehicles for carrying out shared governance, including academic departments, 
standing and ad hoc committees, faculty senates, and collective bargaining units.  
Tierney and Minor’s (2003) study bolstered the arguments of Brown (1999) and 
Duderstadt (2004) that shared governance appears in many forms, not solely in 
the form of a faculty senate. The general sentiment of the majority of scholarly 
research surrounding university governance is that the most important factor in an 
effective shared governance system is the development of a culture of cooperation 
and trust (Del Favero, 2003; Gayle et al., 2003; Kaplan, 2004).  
Responsibilities of governing boards. Utilizing a theoretical framework 
devoted to stakeholders, it is critical to identify the typical responsibilities of the 
important stakeholder group of governing boards.  The United States has a unique 
system of higher education in which the individual institutions at the private level 
and individual states at the public level are granted tremendous freedom to 
organize and govern higher education (Kerr & Gade, 1989; Lingenfelter, 2006; 
Zwingle, 1980).  Governing boards of private institutions are usually self-
perpetuating and choose their own members, many of whom have a connection to 
the institution or are financial contributors (Kerr & Gade, 1989).  By way of 
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contrast, public boards generally are appointed by a governor or legislature and 
are typically structured in one of the following three ways: a statewide 
coordinating board overseeing an entire state system; a board overseeing multiple 
campuses in a university system; or a board governing a single institution 
(Lingenfelter, 2006). 
Despite the differing constitutions of private and public institutional 
governing boards, overall they hold similar responsibilities (AGB, 2010). Nason 
(1980) contends that governing boards’ primary responsibilities relate to the chief 
executive and deal with appointing, supporting, and evaluating the president.  
Other responsibilities include clarifying the institution’s mission, approving long-
range plans, overseeing the educational program, ensuring financial solvency, 
preserving institutional independence, enhancing the public image, and 
interpreting the community to the campus (AGB, 2010; Nason, 1980). 
To better understand the role of governing boards in relation to this study, 
it is important to examine some specific governing board responsibilities – 
clarifying the institutional mission, supporting the president, and ensuring 
financial solvency.  Establishing an institutional mission is often listed as the first 
priority for a board, and entails describing the purpose of the institution, who it 
serves, and what makes the institution unique (AGB, 2007). For most institutions, 
the mission established by the governing board is a living statement that requires 
review on a regular basis (Fisher, 1991).  In addition to being reviewed by the 
Board, educational scholars point to the importance of utilizing the mission in 
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governing board decisions (Carver, 1997; Chait, Holland, & Taylor, 1991).  Chait 
et al. (1991) stated: 
The overall or superordinate goals of a college are typically embodied in a 
mission statement that provides guidance and direction to all members of 
the campus community, from students to trustees.  Effective boards 
understand that mission especially well and rely on it as the essential 
context for major decisions.  Less effective boards do not. (p. 13)   
Although the job of selecting the president is a major responsibility for 
governing boards, providing support to the president is equally critical (AGB, 
2007; Fisher, 1991; Nason, 1980).  A board sets a strategic direction for the 
institution, selects a president to implement the board’s vision, and then monitors 
the president’s ability to do so.  Sample (2003) stated, “The best board of trustees 
is the one that recruits the best president possible, tells him what it wants, and 
then lets him do it while actively assisting him and monitoring his performance” 
(p. 16).  Nason (1980) pointed out that emotional support for the president is 
critical, especially in times of intense criticism or institutional crisis, which are 
not infrequent at nearly every institution.  In regard to intercollegiate athletics, it 
is clear that the athletic enterprise can be at odds with the academic mission and, 
therefore, governing board support for a president regarding athletic issues is 
critical (Cowen, 2005; NCAA, 2006). 
Management and administration of a college or university are universally 
considered to be outside the domain of governing boards (de Russy, 1996; 
Sample, 2003).  However, boards are increasingly being called upon to ensure 
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that universities are managed well and accountable for implementing the 
institutional mission (AGB, 2007).  The AGB Statement on Board Accountability 
(2007) maintains that boards should be accountable for “the mission and heritage 
of their institutions; the transcendent values that guide and shape American higher 
education; the public interest and the public trust; and the legitimate and relevant 
interests that various constituencies represent” (p. 2).  Trustees must avoid micro-
managing institutions while at the same time ensuring that administrators carry 
out the policies of the board (Abbott, 1970; de Russy, 1996; Kearns, 1998; 
Sample, 2003).   
An important board responsibility related to accountability is the attention 
paid to financial solvency (AGB, 2007; Fisher, 1991; Reed, 2001; Wellman, 
2002). Public support for higher education has decreased dramatically in recent 
years, with state and local support per full-time equivalent student in 2010 at its 
lowest point in 25 years (State Higher Education Executive Officers, 2012).   One 
of the results of this public disinvestment has been a privatization model being 
adopted by some public universities in which the proportion of state-appropriated 
funds has been shifted to other sources such as tuition and fees, grants, contracts 
for services, and private gifts (Whitney, 2006).  Private colleges, which 
historically have relied on tuition and endowment earnings, have been troubled by 
investment losses during the recession that started in 2008.  In fiscal year 2009 
alone, college and university endowments lost 18.7 percent of their value 
(Lavelle, 2010).   
     	  
 
22	  
Whether it is the decrease of endowment resources due to investment 
losses or waning state support for public institutions, colleges and universities of 
all types and sizes are faced with substantial financial challenges, and the final 
budgetary decisions are vested in governing boards (Reed, 2001).  AGB (2007) 
stated: 
Among the responsibilities of governing boards, maintaining fiscal 
integrity is fundamental.  Boards bear ultimate legal responsibility for 
approving the institution’s annual budget and monitoring the institution’s 
fiscal welfare.  The board is the ultimate fiduciary of the institution, even 
though day-to-day operations are properly delegated to the administration. 
(p. 3)   
This governance responsibility is amplified when considering the financial 
situation of intercollegiate athletic departments throughout the United States.  The 
most updated data from the NCAA demonstrated that of the 120 colleges and 
universities at the top level of NCAA football competition, only a minimal 
amount were profitable from 2004 to 2012 (Fulks, 2013).  Governing boards must 
understand the financial condition of the athletic department and the manner in 
which institutional funding flows to the athletic department (AGB, 2012).    
Governance of intercollegiate athletics.  As mentioned previously, the 
primary responsibility for the conduct and control of the athletic department is 
held in the office of the president (AGB, 2007; Moore, 1992).  The standard 
approach to presidential leadership since first being proposed by the Knight 
Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics in 1991 has been the “one-
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plus-three” model of athletic governance (Bouchet & Scott, 2009).  The “one” of 
this approach refers to presidential authority for all aspects of the athletic 
department, including policies, personnel, and operations.  The “three” of the 
model refers to academic integrity, fiscal integrity, and a standardized 
certification process (Bouchet & Scott, 2009; Moore, 1992).  Not only has 
presidential control been endorsed by the NCAA at the institutional level, but 
since the mid-1990s the organization itself has been governed by presidents after 
historically being led by coaches and athletic directors (“The NCAA”, 1996).   
 The role of faculty, in particular the faculty athletic representative, in 
athletic governance is also well defined by the NCAA (Cooper, 1992).  The 
faculty athletic representative is the faculty member assigned the formal 
responsibilities of representing the institution and its faculty in their relationships 
with the NCAA and athletic conferences (Cooper, 1992).  Such responsibilities 
include monitoring student-athlete academic performance, advising the president 
and athletic director on athletic issues, and serving as a delegate to the NCAA 
convention (NCAA, 1998).  The responsibility of the faculty as a whole is 
typically defined as ensuring the academic integrity of intercollegiate athletics 
(Bailey & Littlejohn, 1991).  Former NCAA President Myles Brand (2007) 
summarized the role of faculty: 
The single most important role of faculty members in intercollegiate 
athletics is establishing and maintaining academic standards.  Faculty 
members are responsible for the creation and development of the 
curriculum, teaching within this curriculum, and certifying learning 
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through course grading and degree requirements.  These responsibilities 
must be met with integrity.  For individual faculty members, for academic 
institutions, and indeed for the entire enterprise of higher education, 
academic integrity is the central value. (p. 1)   
Lawrence (2009) made several observations about faculty perceptions of 
intercollegiate athletics when he surveyed more than 2,000 faculty members at 23 
institutions at the highest level of NCAA Division I, the Football Bowl 
Subdivision.  The study found that 42 percent of respondents were dissatisfied 
with the manner in which faculty input affects administrative decisions and 44 
percent were dissatisfied with the range of faculty opinions considered by 
administrators when formulating institutional positions on intercollegiate 
athletics.  In addition, approximately half of the respondents articulated that 
institutional decisions on intercollegiate athletics were driven more by the 
entertainment industry than institutional academic mission.  Kuga (1996) 
surveyed 240 faculty members at a Big Ten conference institution and found that 
the majority of individuals who participated in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics do so for the purposes of reforming athletic operations to make them 
more consistent with the academic enterprise.   
A significant gap in the scholarly literature on the subject of 
intercollegiate athletic governance has been the stakeholder role of governing 
boards.  Frey (1987), who compiled a summary of research related to the roles of 
various groups in controlling athletics at the institutional level, wrote this of the 
role of trustees: 
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There is usually a clique of trustees who seem to have a special interest in 
the campus athletic programs but we do not have any idea how this small 
group works in relation to the athletic program and to the chief 
administrative officers of the institution.  Trustees are often members of a 
booster coalition that supports the athletic program and this may augment 
the power of the athletically-oriented trustee.  Our ignorance of the role of 
trustees in athletic governance is a major gap in research on this topic. (p. 
54)  
Twenty-seven years after Frey (1987) published these words, the role of 
governing boards in providing oversight to intercollegiate athletics remains a 
significant gap in the research devoted to intercollegiate athletics and higher 
education. 
In recent years, however, there has been some attention paid to the 
intercollegiate athletic governance role of trustees (AGB, 2004; Knight 
Commission, 2001).  A report of the Knight Commission (2001), which called for 
a closer alignment of college sports with the traditional educational values of 
higher education, only mentioned trustees in stating: 
Presidents and trustees must work in harness – not wage the battles so 
commonplace today over control of the athletic enterprise.  Presidents 
cannot act on an issue as emotional and highly visible as athletics without 
the unwavering public support of their boards. (p. 24)   
Likewise, a report from the NCAA’s Presidential Task Force on the Future of 
Division I Intercollegiate Athletics (2006) emphasized the institutional control of 
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presidents in administering athletics, while at the same time stressing the 
importance of governing boards supporting presidents in managing athletic 
operations. 
AGB, working in association with the Knight Commission on 
Intercollegiate Athletics, released its first formal statement in 2004 on the role of 
governing boards in dealing with athletic issues entitled, Statement on Board 
Responsibilities for Intercollegiate Athletics.   This statement, which was updated 
in 2007 and 2009 and applies most directly to governing boards of institutions 
with major football and basketball programs, focused on best practices and 
recommendations for boards in the areas of general oversight responsibilities, 
presidential leadership, athletics department mission, fiscal responsibility, 
academics and student-athlete welfare, compliance, personnel, and 
communications.   
AGB (2012) released a comprehensive report that provided the first data 
on operational governance of boards of trustees in dealing with athletics.  The 
report delivered information on the prevalence of institutional policies and 
committees related to athletics, whether chief executives are delegated the 
authority to manage the athletic department, and how governing boards deal with 
the challenging subjects of athletic budgets and personnel contracts.  In addition, 
specific recommendations were made regarding governing boards maintaining 
ultimate accountability for athletics oversight and policy. 
An important component of the governance discussion is the rationale for 
governing boards to desire a stakeholder role in the oversight of intercollegiate 
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athletics (AGB, 2012). It is not hard to imagine a trustee asking, “Why should we 
care about intercollegiate athletics?” or “Are we placing too much of an emphasis 
on this one area of the organization?”  The following paragraphs examine the 
effect of athletics on institutional metrics and performance and explore the 
rationale for governing boards and trustees to maintain a stakeholder role in 
intercollegiate athletic governance. 
From a financial perspective, the recent past has brought considerable 
financial challenges to higher education in the form of decreased public funding 
and stagnant endowment earnings, thereby resulting in budget cuts, employee 
layoffs and furloughs, substantial tuition increases, and higher student debt loads 
(Knapp & Siegel, 2009).  The disparity between the institutional financial health 
and the growth in athletic budgets is important for governing boards to understand 
(AGB, 2012).  As institutional budget growth lags compared to athletic 
department funding, a corresponding circumstance has been increased 
institutional resources directed to the athletic department (Fulks, 2013).  In 
recognizing this situation for many institutions, AGB (2012) observed that boards 
must generate an understanding of where athletic funding originates and whether 
general institutional dollars are directed to athletics.  
Between 2004 and 2012, the median annual revenue for institutions at the 
NCAA Division I FBS level, which is comprised of the largest athletic 
departments, increased from $28.2 million to $56 million, a nearly one hundred 
percent increase during that timeframe (Fulks, 2013).  A more important metric 
related to athletic finances is the ability of an athletic department to be self-
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sustaining, or capable of completely funding their operations from athletic sources 
without any institutional subsidy.  The most recent data from the NCAA for 2012 
demonstrates that of the 120 colleges and universities at the FBS level, only 23 
were self-sustaining, with a median surplus of $5.4 million (Fulks, 2013).  For the 
remaining FBS level institutions that are not self-sustaining, the median deficit 
was $14.6 million. Denhart and Vedder’s (2010) study of 99 public institutions at 
the FBS level demonstrated that while subsidies as a percentage of total athletic 
department revenues only grew from an average of 30.21 percent in 2004-05 to 
31.01 percent in 2008-09, breaking down the numbers by conference affiliation 
add depth to the analysis.  Institutional subsidies at a percentage of total athletic 
revenues for 2008-09 were at 3.6 percent for the Big Ten Conference, 5.4 percent 
for the Southeastern Conference, and 6 percent for the Big Twelve Conference.  
For the Sunbelt Conference and the Mid-American Conference, both non-power 
conferences, the percentages were 60.7 and 72.3, respectively (Denhart & Vedder, 
2010).   
Despite the fact that the majority of NCAA Division I athletic departments 
are not self-sustaining and require institutional funding, the pressure to increase 
athletic spending with the goal of enhanced success in competition is prevalent 
(Dunn, 2013; Hoffman, 2013; Toma, 2010).  Given the financial constraints 
imposed on higher education institutions and the escalating costs of supporting 
athletics, it is important for governing boards to have an understanding of what 
athletic success does or does not bring to the institution (AGB, 2012).  The 
research on the relationship between athletic success and institutional 
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performance metrics has yielded mixed results, with some studies (Baade & 
Sundberg, 1996; Grimes & Chressanthis, 1994; Humphreys & Mondello, 2007; 
McCormick & Tinsley, 1987; Mixon & Trevino, 2002; Murphy & Trandel, 1994; 
Toma & Cross, 1998) demonstrating a link between success in athletic 
competition and metrics such as alumni giving, application numbers, academic 
profile of incoming students, and freshmen retention rates.  Other studies disputed 
the notion that athletic success leads to improved metrics (Fisher, 2009; Litan, 
Orszag, & Orszag, 2003; Staurowsky, 2003; Stinson & Howard, 2004; Turner, 
Meserve, & Bowen, 2001).  
Despite the myriad results related to the effect of athletic success on 
institutional metrics, the spending associated with intercollegiate athletics 
continues to escalate at a greater pace than institutional spending (Denhart & 
Vedder, 2010; Fulks, 2013).  Given that governing boards are ultimately 
responsible for the financial health and strategic direction of institutions, they 
must, at the very least, seek to understand the manner in which athletics is 
governed and administered at their institutions and engage in the discussion of 
advantages and disadvantages of supporting a Division I athletic program (AGB, 
2012).   
Theoretical Framework Rationale 
A stakeholder theory of governance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Letza et 
al., 2004; Mason et al., 2007; Ryan, 1990; Vinten, 2001) was an appropriate 
model for examining the role of governing boards in providing oversight to 
intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level.  Disregarding athletics, typically 
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universities at the NCAA Division I level have unique organizational missions 
that distinguish them from for-profit corporations.  A stakeholder theory (Vinten, 
2001) best described the governance approach in the nonprofit and public sectors, 
where there are no shareholders and the specific beneficiaries of effective 
organizational performance are numerous.  The stakeholder approach most 
appropriate for my proposed study was that of Argadona (1998), who argued that 
organizational performance should be measured on the fulfillment of the common 
good of enabling organizational members to achieve their personal goals.  Rather 
than focusing on single goals such as profitability or shareholder return, 
institutions of higher education work toward the multi-varied mission of teaching, 
research, and outreach, which encompasses numerous individual stakeholder 
goals (AGB, 2007).   
In the same regard, the principle of shared governance (Hirsch, 2001; 
Mortimer & Sathre, 2007) was a suitable model for this study.  Not only is shared 
governance the standard model in higher education, but the general approach of 
governing intercollegiate athletics involves the participation of multiple 
stakeholders, including presidents and other administrators, athletic department 
officials, compliance officers, and faculty (Cooper, 1992; Lapchick, 2006; Moore, 
1992).  Although presidents are granted authority to provide institutional control 
for intercollegiate athletics, the advisory role of faculty athletic committees and 
the management responsibilities of athletic departments combine to provide the 
overall governance structure (NCAA, 2006; Lapchick, 2006; Thelin, 2008).  
Determining the appropriate role of governing boards in this area, especially when 
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considering that trustees have the ultimate responsibility for institutional 
academic integrity and financial solvency, is a critical component to the shared 
governance paradigm. 
An example of how stakeholder theory can be applied to intercollegiate 
athletics is the academic performance of student-athletes.  Stakeholders such as 
student-athletes typically desire to do well in the classroom in order to stay 
eligible, which is also a primary concern of coaches (Boyd, 2012).  Athletic 
administrators generally aim to create a setting where academic excellence can be 
attained, and therefore often accommodate student-athletes with services not 
available to the general student population (Thamel, 2006).  As the NCAA has 
imposed more penalties in recent years on departments for poor academic 
performance, the impetus is present for athletic administrators to seek academic 
improvement (Wieberg, 2008).  The faculty are interested in maintaining 
academic integrity, protecting institutional reputation and ensuring that student-
athletes are held to the same standards as all other students (Brand, 2006).  
Externally, fans and boosters, especially in the high profile sports of football and 
men’s basketball, sometimes care only about whether teams are winning and not 
mired in scandals (Duderstadt, 2000; Sperber, 2000).  
The oversight of student-athlete academic performance is a practical 
application of shared governance and a logical connection to stakeholder theory. 
Faculty advisory committees for athletics are typically involved directly in such 
issues as student-athlete eligibility, participation standards, and student-athlete 
degree progress (Cooper, 1992; NCAA, 1998; Lapchick, 2006).  This application 
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of the shared governance model provides protection from coaches and 
administrators simply working to defend their own stakes in student-athlete 
academic performance.  Although presidents have institutional control over 
athletics, the shared governance model with faculty governing the academic 
component is the standard (Brand, 2006).  The dissertation study added to existing 
literature by examining the role, or stake, that governing boards have in 
contributing to the shared governance of intercollegiate athletics.  
Summary 
This chapter presented the theoretical framework used to construct the 
study.  A stakeholder theory of governance was introduced as the foundational 
theory for the study.  Shared governance, which constitutes a stakeholder 
approach to governance in higher education, was summarized in order to profile 
the role of governing boards in institutional governance.  The oversight structures 
surrounding intercollegiate athletics were profiled to explain the role of presidents 
and faculty and explore the previously minimal discussion on the role of boards.  
Finally, the chapter presented a rationale for applying a stakeholder theory of 
governance to a study on the role of governing boards in providing oversight to 
intercollegiate athletics. 
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Chapter Three 
Methods 
This chapter describes the methods used for the study.  A qualitative 
research approach was implemented through the use of semi-structured 
interviews.  The role of the researcher, development of the sample, data collection 
and analysis, and trustworthiness are explained.  The chapter also describes a pilot 
study and how it influenced the design of the study.     
Qualitative Design 
The study employed a qualitative approach (Creswell, 2008).  Basic 
qualitative research is a broad approach to the study of social phenomena through 
a variety of methods of inquiry (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).  Research of this 
manner generally assumes that individuals have an active role in the construction 
of social phenomena and that research methods capture this activity (Boeije, 
2010).  Qualitative research is typically undertaken to step beyond the known to 
better understand the perspectives of participants in order to add to the empirical 
knowledge of a subject (Strauss & Corbin, 2008).   
An important attribute of qualitative research relatable to this study was 
the ability to examine an issue in depth without constraint to predetermined 
categories of inquiry (Patton, 1990).  The study’s purpose was to provide an 
opportunity for trustees to convey their viewpoints on the governance of athletics 
at their institutions.  A quantitative approach to addressing this purpose might 
include surveying trustees from different institutions using a Likert Scale about 
how strongly they agree with viewpoints on athletic governance (Carifio & Perla, 
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2008).  The responses and resulting analysis from those predetermined questions 
would be insightful, but the depth of the study would be contained solely within 
the survey, thereby limiting the emergence of new ideas and inquiry.  Qualitative 
research is typically reflexive in that the researcher is granted the opportunity to 
reflect upon the research process and allow for the inquiry to go in a natural 
direction without constraint to predetermined processes (Bailey, 2007).   
The strongest rationale for engaging in qualitative research for this study 
was the nature of the research questions (Morse, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 2008).  
The literature on the topic provides limited understanding of trustee perspectives 
of the role of intercollegiate athletics on their campuses and the manner in which 
governing boards should contribute to athletic governance (AGB, 2012).  For 
example, AGB (2012) documented that more than 75 percent of surveyed 
governing boards of NCAA Division I institutions had an athletics oversight 
policy.   Without additional inquiry through qualitative research, there is no 
capacity for understanding what the presence of an athletics policy means to 
trustees as they carry out their fiduciary responsibilities. The research questions 
for this study could not adequately have been answered without an open-ended 
investigation that provided an opportunity for first-hand accounts and detailed 
discussion that extends beyond basic statistical inquiry.    
Researcher’s Role 
The personal and professional elements of any research study are 
important to acknowledge before commencement of the research process (Strauss 
& Corbin, 2008). Marshall and Rossman (2011) argued the success of qualitative 
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research depends on the researcher possessing such interpersonal skills as 
awareness of organizational politics and sensitivity to human interaction.  The 
importance of the researcher is magnified in interview studies because the 
interviewer is the primary instrument in the creation of knowledge (Kvale, 1996).  
There are two primary areas of consideration related to the role of the researcher 
in qualitative research, technical and interpersonal (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). 
Technical considerations.   The technical aspects of the researcher’s role 
involve the deployment of the researcher’s time and resources, negotiating entry 
to the study sample, and ensuring ethical compliance (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011).  Marshall and Rossman (2011) observed that the researcher’s time devoted 
to the study often varies in intensiveness and extensiveness, or degrees to which 
the researcher is in the study setting on a daily basis.  While the study was 
conducted completely by the researcher, including the scheduling of interviews, 
the collection of data, and data analysis, I would argue that the study was neither 
overly intensive nor extensive in time commitment due to the limitations of my 
full-time employment as a higher education administrator and data collection 
methods that consisted solely of telephone interviews with participants.   
Entry to the participants was provided by board professionals acting as 
formal gatekeepers for the study (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Seidman, 1991).  
The gatekeepers determined potential interviewees, ascertained interest, and 
facilitated initial communication with the participants. From an ethical standpoint, 
this study was conducted in compliance with the rules of the Institutional Review 
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Board (IRB) of the University of Minnesota and approved by the IRB as an 
exempt study (Reference Number 1305E33022). 
Interpersonal considerations.  The interpersonal element of the 
researcher’s role involves building trust with the study participants, maintaining 
good rapport as the study progresses, and respecting norms of reciprocity 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011).  One way that trust was established with 
participants was through continual assurance that their participation would remain 
entirely confidential throughout the process.  Not only was confidentiality 
highlighted in initial communications to board professionals and gatekeepers, it 
was emphasized in the opening statement of each interview and when transcripts 
were sent to participants for their review.  The development of rapport with 
participants was fostered, in both email communications and recorded interviews, 
by attempting to relate to their governance role by communicating my 
professional experience working for both a governing board and a president.  The 
continuity of rapport was established through opportunities for participant 
involvement after the initial interview.  This included an invitation to review and 
revise the transcripts and to provide comments and observations on an executive 
summary of findings.   
Marshall and Rossman (2011) observed that because people are giving of 
their time to be interviewed or participate in a qualitative study in other ways, the 
researcher should plan to reciprocate.  Participants were notified that they would 
receive no compensation for their participation, and no expectations were 
established except their involvement in a telephone interview.  The only tangible 
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benefit offered to the participants was an opportunity to receive a copy of the 
dissertation upon completion.  Seidman (1991) argued that often the only 
reciprocity that can be offered to interview participants is a sincere interest in 
their experiences, paying close attention to their words, and honoring their 
observations in an accurate way when presenting the study findings.  Given the 
limited ability to provide tangible benefits to the interview participants outside of 
the completed study, I focused on the approach offered by Seidman and attempted 
to respect the time they provided to me by accurately capturing and appropriately 
using their perspectives in the study.  
Positionality. At the University of Minnesota, I worked as a board 
professional in the Office of the Board of Regents for over seven years and an 
administrator in the Office of the President for over two years.  I have 
considerable understanding of issues related to higher education governance.  I 
have spent extensive time interacting with trustees both at the University of 
Minnesota and at AGB national conferences.  These experiences have contributed 
to my understanding of the organizational and interpersonal politics of governing 
boards and my comfort level of interacting with people in positions of authority.   
My work at the University of Minnesota in both the Office of the Board of 
Regents and the Office of the President has involved extensive interaction with 
the Department of Intercollegiate Athletics on policy issues.  For example, I have 
assisted on athletic department presentations to the Board of Regents, helped 
facilitate the hiring of an athletic director, and engaged with a University of 
Minnesota campus on options related to NCAA membership.  In addition, I am a 
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former student-athlete at the NCAA Division III level and have been an avid 
follower of college sports for nearly my entire life.  Although my personal 
background has led to an understanding of the issues, challenges, and intense 
public interest in intercollegiate athletics, I do acknowledge that these experiences 
possibly affected how data were collected and analyzed.  For example, my 
professional experiences and related exposure to the intercollegiate athletics 
issues at my institution certainly influenced how I interacted with trustees from 
other universities, which issues I chose to address in the interviews, and how the 
data were analyzed. 
The researcher has a scientific responsibility to the academic profession to 
make certain that the research is conducted in an effective, controlled, and 
verifiable manner (Kvale, 1996).  My academic coursework in research methods 
and independent studies conducted with my dissertation advisor on implementing 
a qualitative research project provided an understanding of the methods that I 
employed and analysis completed.  In addition, the completion of a pilot study 
demonstrated the effectiveness of an interview approach in gathering and 
analyzing data from trustees.   
Sample 
The sample was developed purposively, which entails development of a 
sample based specific criteria determined by the researcher (Gobo, 2004) related 
to addressing the research purpose and related questions.  The sample for this 
study was built according a central characteristic, being a trustee of a governing 
board overseeing one or more NCAA Division I institutions.  The process of 
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recruiting trustees was developed primarily through my professional experience 
and knowledge that access to governing board members is typically coordinated 
through board professionals.  In this regard, the selection process utilized formal 
gatekeepers in facilitating access to trustees (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; 
Seidman, 1991).  Board professionals were identified through searches of 
institutional websites and contacted via email to ascertain if they knew of any 
trustees on their boards that might be willing to participate in the study (see 
Appendix B).  I started with emailing board professionals for all governing boards 
overseeing institutions from the power conferences, followed by emailing board 
professionals from other categories of boards, making certain to include both 
public and private boards from all three categories of NCAA Division I 
participation.  
Sample size was based solely on saturation of information, which occurs 
when an interviewer hears the same information and nothing new is gleaned from 
the responses (Akerstrom, Jacobsson, & Wasterfors, 2004; Boeije, 2010; 
Seidman, 1991).  For this study, the wide variety of perspectives conveyed by 
trustees crested after reaching a sample size of 29 participants, thereby leading to 
the assumption that saturation had occurred.  However, the condition of saturation 
may have been correlated with a limited collection of information during the 
interviews.  The average length of interview was only 29 minutes, thereby leading 
to the conclusion that the data collection was potentially scant on content.  This 
study limitation could have resulted from a variety of factors, including the 
inexperience of the researcher in conducting interviews or the time limitations of 
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the interview participants.  Regardless of whether the interviews contained 
enough content, the completion of 29 interviews led to the conclusion that a 
sufficient sample size had been achieved because no additional themes or ideas 
were being communicated. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample of 29 interviewees, including trustees 
from an assortment of different types of institutions with varying levels of 
experience.  Trustees served on four types of boards including public system 
boards, public single institution boards, private boards, and statewide coordinating 
boards.  Nineteen trustees were from public boards, with all of them being 
publicly elected or appointed.  The ten trustees from private boards were all 
internally appointed.  The sample comprised of three females and 26 males, the 
length of service ranged from less than one year to more than 25 years, and nine 
had served as a board chair.  Nine trustees oversaw institutions from multiple 
levels of Division I, four oversaw institutions that did not sponsor football, and 22 
oversaw at least one institution from the FBS level, with 13 of those coming from 
power conferences.  The sample ultimately provided satisfactory representation of 
several categories, including the type of governing board, power conference 
status, or service as chair on the board.  However, it is acknowledged that the 
sample considerably underrepresented female trustees as only three women were 
interviewed.   
Table 1: Participant Characteristics 
Number Gender Selection 
Length 
of 
service 
Type of 
board 
Division I 
level 
Power 
conference 
institutions 
Service as 
chair 
1 Male Publicly appointed 
5-10 
years 
Statewide 
coordinating 
board 
I, I-FBS, 
& I-FCS No Yes 
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2 Male Publicly appointed 
5-10 
years 
Public system 
board 
I, I-FBS, 
& I-FCS Yes No  
3 Male Publicly appointed 
5-10 
years 
Public system 
board I & I-FBS Yes No 
4 Male Publicly appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Public system 
board I & I-FBS Yes No 
5 Male Publicly appointed 
5-10 
years 
Public system 
board 
I, I-FBS, 
& I-FCS Yes No 
6 Male  Publicly appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FBS Yes Yes  
7 Male Internally appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Private board I-FBS Yes Yes 
8 Male  Publicly elected 
More 
than 10 
years 
Public system 
board I & I-FBS Yes Yes 
9 Male  Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Statewide 
coordinating 
board 
I & I-FBS Yes Yes 
10 Male Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FBS No No 
11 Male Publicly appointed 
5-10 
years 
Statewide 
coordinating 
board 
I-FBS & 
I-FCS Yes No 
12 Male Internally appointed 0-5 years Private board I No No 
13 Male  Internally appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Private board I-FCS No Yes 
14 Male  Publicly appointed 
5-10 
years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FBS No No 
15 Male Internally appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Private board I No No 
16 Male Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FBS No No 
17 Male Internally appointed 
5-10 
years Private board I-FBS Yes Yes 
18 Male  Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FBS No No 
19 Male Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Statewide 
coordinating 
board 
I-FBS & 
I-FCS No No 
20 Male Internally appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Private board I No No 
21 Female Internally appointed 0-5 years Private board I-FCS No No 
22 Female Internally appointed 0-5 years Private board I No No 
23 Male Publicly appointed 
5-10 
years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FCS No No 
24 Male Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Public single 
institution I-FBS Yes No 
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board 
25 Male Internally appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Private board I-FBS No No 
26 Male Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FBS No No 
27 Male Internally appointed 
More 
than 10 
years 
Private board I-FBS Yes Yes 
28 Male Publicly appointed 0-5 years 
Statewide 
coordinating 
board 
I-FBS No No 
29 Female Publicly elected 0-5 years 
Public single 
institution 
board 
I-FBS Yes Yes 
 
Pilot Study   
The interview guide was influenced by a pilot study undertaken in 2009 to 
examine trustee viewpoints on intercollegiate athletics.  The main goals of the 
research were as follows: (1) review the process for enlisting interview 
participants, conducting interviews, and collecting and analyzing data; (2) 
determine the adequacy of the interview guide; and (3) assert whether the 
proposed study would sufficiently address the proposed purpose statement and 
respective research questions.  The pilot study was aimed to investigate how 
governing board trustees viewed the governance of intercollegiate athletics at 
their institutions.   
Given study participants would include members of governing boards of 
NCAA Division I institutions, the pilot study used purposive sampling to identify 
three former trustees of an institution that fit into this classification, the University 
of Minnesota. The criteria for sample selection included my familiarity with the 
interviewees during my role as a board professional for the University of 
Minnesota Board of Regents and because of the belief that they would represent a 
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wide variety of opinions and experiences related to intercollegiate athletics.  
Three potential participants were contacted directly to ascertain their willingness 
to participate in the interviews, ensure them of confidentiality of the process, and 
explain the interview procedures.  All three participants accepted the invitation. 
The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner using an 
interview guide (Seidman, 1991).  The interview questions were developed in 
accordance with literature on the topics of board governance and intercollegiate 
athletics, and my experience working for the University of Minnesota Board of 
Regents and understanding the manner in which that board provided oversight to 
athletics.  The interview guide was organized to focus initially on questions about 
general perspectives on intercollegiate athletics (e.g., What are your general 
observations about athletics at your institution and in American higher 
education?), then moving on to the public nature of athletics (e.g., How often did 
members of the public want to talk to you about athletics versus other university 
issues?), before concluding with more specific questions about how their board 
provided oversight to athletics (e.g., Did you feel comfortable with the board’s 
role regarding coaching hires and contract approval?).   
Data were collected through digitally recorded, semi-structured phone 
interviews that lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes. Phone interviewing (Shuy, 
2003) was selected as the recording method because of the likelihood that 
interviews in the proposed study would be conducted in this manner.   After the 
interviews were transcribed verbatim, the data was coded using an open coding 
process, which entailed a careful reading of the data to develop segments of 
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similar subjects (Bailey, 2007; Boeije, 2010).  The initial codes included visibility 
of athletics, board involvement, presidential engagement, academics, budgets, 
coaches, and contracts.  The open coding process was followed by axial coding, 
which involved combining the initial codes into the larger categories (Boeije, 
2010).  The axial codes developed were public interest, board practices, 
presidential leadership, and the uniqueness of athletics.  Through the open and 
axial coding process, the following three primary themes emerged: (1) the high 
profile nature of intercollegiate athletics among external constituencies; (2) 
presidential engagement and limited board role; and (3) the role of the governing 
board in defining the institutional significance of intercollegiate athletics.   
When examining the purpose statement of the study, the most prominent 
component was providing trustees the opportunity to express their viewpoints on 
the topic of intercollegiate athletics.  The pilot study demonstrated that trustees 
would most likely be willing to not only express their viewpoints, but also to 
discuss an area of considerable concern in higher education.  The first theme 
identified in the pilot study was the high profile nature of intercollegiate athletics, 
confirmed that trustees acknowledged the unique institutional place of athletics 
and therefore suggested that interview questions would yield relevant and in-
depth responses that would address the research question on trustees’ general 
viewpoints on athletics.  
The second theme identified related to the importance of presidential 
engagement on athletic matters and maintaining a limited role of the board in 
governing athletics.  This confirmed that trustees would be willing to delve into 
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the details of informal and formal governance structures and the importance of 
maintaining appropriate stakeholder roles.  The interview guide, therefore, was 
revised to include a line of questioning on the stakeholder role of the board and 
trustee recommendations for how athletics should be governed.  The third 
identified theme noted that although there was often a goal to treat athletics as any 
other component of the institution in policy and procedures, the trustees observed 
that athletics is institutionally distinct due to its high profile nature.  Subsequently, 
documenting this observation influenced the design of the study by partially 
focusing the interview questions on governing board oversight mechanisms for 
athletics as compared to other institutional units.     
The pilot study also influenced the phrasing of questions for the interview 
guide.  Direct questions were deemed to be appropriate in order to seek out 
specific thoughts on certain issues such as board roles in athletic governance.  
Therefore, the interview guide was developed to include such direct questions as, 
“What role does the board play in athletic governance at your institution?” 
However, it was also determined that the most content-rich answers from the pilot 
study participants came from open-ended questions that allowed for detailed 
exploration of relevant topics.  Hence, phrasing a question on general viewpoints 
on athletics by stating “Tell me about your general thoughts on intercollegiate 
athletics,” yielded greater content than questions defined to specific areas of 
athletics or athletic governance such as “Do you think boards should approve the 
hiring of head coaches?”  Ultimately, the interview guide was developed with the 
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intent of including both broad-based observational questions and inquiries into 
specific governance areas.  
Data Collection 
Interview guide.  Based on the pilot study an interview guide (See 
appendix A) was developed and used to facilitate the semi-structured interviews.  
Seidman (1991) argued an interview guide is developed to maintain a basic 
structure for each interview and to provide opportunities for interviewees to be 
prompted.  An interview guide typically develops over the course of a project, 
initially being constructed based on the literature and questions that would 
address the study’s purpose and related research questions, and then evolves 
depending on pilot testing, conversations with fellow researchers, and the initial 
interviews conducted as part of the study (Rapley, 2004). 
Patton (1990) maintained that using an interview guide ensures the best 
use of limited time and allows for a more systematic analysis of an issue across a 
wide spectrum of participants.  Interview guides for semi-structured interviews 
should contain an outline of topics to be covered, with questions or areas listed for 
each topic (Kvale, 1996).  Kvale (1996) pointed out that the interviewer must 
judge, based on their own interpretation of the value of the progression of 
questions, how closely to follow an interview guide’s sequencing or whether to 
veer off track to purse any individual responses.  Bailey (2007) elaborated on this 
approach by writing, “The flow of the interview, rather than the order in a guide, 
determines when and how a question is asked” (p. 100).   The questions 
developed for the interviews were primarily open-ended in order to stimulate an 
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extended sharing of information (Bailey, 2007).  However, the questions were 
short, simple, and free from academic jargon so as not to confuse or intimidate the 
participants (Bailey, 2007; Kvale, 1996).  For example, a basic and short question 
posed to the participants was, “How often do you talk about athletic issues with 
your president outside of meetings?” 
The interview guide was organized into two sections.  The first section 
was composed of background and demographic questions (e.g., “Tell me about 
your experience on the board of trustees?”).  The second section of the interview 
guide, titled Institutional Governance of Intercollegiate Athletics, was developed 
to adequately answer the research questions and consisted of the following 
questions: 
1. What are your general views on intercollegiate athletics? 
 
2. What is the appropriate role of intercollegiate athletics on your campus or 
campuses? 
 
3. What role does the board play in governing intercollegiate athletics at your 
institution?  
 
4. How should intercollegiate athletics be governed at your institution? 
 
5. What role should the board play in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics? 
 
6. What are the challenges experienced by the board in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics at your institution? 
 
The first two questions related to research question number one, which 
attempted to gather trustee perspectives on intercollegiate athletics in general and 
the role the athletic department plays on their campuses. The third, fourth, and 
fifth interview questions applied directly to research question two, which sought 
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to understand the stake, or appropriate role, that governing boards have in 
contributing to intercollegiate athletic governance.  The sixth interview question 
applied to research question five because inquiring about trustee challenges 
yielded information about general governance perceptions and trustees’ roles as 
stakeholders.   
The questions in the second section of the interview guide were open-
ended and allowed for dialogue between the researcher and participants (Bailey, 
2007).  In order to ensure that important topics were covered during the 
interviews, the interview guide contained a series of specific topics for the 
interviewer to address during conversations.  For example, question five, I 
thought it was important to gain an understanding of whether a trustee or 
governing board were challenged by such notable issues as major revenue sports 
and their exclusive status, coaching contracts, and athletic department finances.      
Semi-structured interviews.  The interview format used was semi-
structured (Kvale, 1996).  This type of interview allowed for flexibility regarding 
how an interview was administered, but still contained the interview to a 
predetermined set of parameters (Bailey, 2007; Kvale, 1996).  Semi-structured 
interviews are usually scheduled in advance, last a fixed amount of time, and 
contain dialogue and conversation between the interviewer and subject, rather 
than just questioning (Bailey, 2007).  Kvale (1996) described this type of 
interviewing as a conversation that has a structure and a purpose to “obtain 
descriptions of the life world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the 
meaning of the described phenomena” (p. 6).    
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Data collection procedures.  Participant interviews were scheduled in 
advance through phone or email correspondence.  After determining the lead 
board professional through research of institutional websites, an email was sent to 
the individual inquiring about the participation of trustees in my study (see 
Appendix B).  Not all initial emails were responded to, but due to time constraints 
and a belief that the frequency of responses was leading to a sufficient sample 
size, there was no follow up sent to nonresponsive recipients.  Replies to the 
initial email indicated an immediate willingness of trustee participation, a 
commitment to inquire with trustees about participation, a rejection of the request, 
or questions about the study.  The most frequent questions were about length of 
time commitment or the timeframe for completing the interviews.  Some 
correspondence required several emails or phone calls with board professionals to 
confirm the participation of trustees.  In a minimal amount of cases, lengthy 
correspondence led to them ultimately declining participation or 
unresponsiveness.   
Upon confirmation of trustee willingness to participate, board 
professionals were asked to provide contact information for either the trustee 
directly or an assistant. An email message was then sent to the trustee, or the 
trustee’s assistant, with information on how to schedule the interview and a copy 
of the informed consent form (see Appendix C).  The dates and times for the 
interviews were then arranged via email or phone, depending upon the 
preferences of the participant. 
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I began each interview by reading a statement regarding the purpose of the 
interview, how the interview data would be used, how the information will be 
maintained, and the confidentiality procedures to be utilized.  Informed consent 
for each participant was then verbally confirmed (see Appendix A).  After 
receiving consent, the recording was started and the interviews commenced.  All 
interviews were digitally recorded with a cellular phone application due to the fact 
that trustees were not located in one place, thereby limiting time and cost 
constraints.  Shuy (2003) acknowledged both advantages and disadvantages to 
telephone interviewing, observing that telephone interviewing produces greater 
cost-efficiency and significantly less logistical challenges.  As illustrated in Table 
2, the interviews ranged in length from 16 minutes to 45 minutes and varied in the 
number of questions asked.  The average length of interview was 29 minutes. 
 Each interview was framed around the central questions included in the 
interview guide under the category of Institutional Governance of Intercollegiate 
Athletics (see Appendix A).  However, such conditions as the willingness of the 
interviewee to elaborate in response to follow up questions or the tendency of 
some participants to wander between several topics in a single response dictated 
the flow of each interview.  For example, Trustee number one had the shortest 
interview of the study due to an unwillingness to elaborate on any answers even 
when prompted with several follow up questions.  On the contrary, Trustee 
number 16 was only asked eight questions in a moderate length interview due to 
the fact that the responses, while long and meandering, adequately covered the 
topics associated with the questions in the interview guide.  Though not 
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successful in every situation, the probing questions that were most effective were 
those that simply asked for elaboration on a topic already covered by a trustee 
(e.g., You have mentioned the importance of trust in your president.  Can you 
elaborate on what that means to you?). 
Table 2: Interview Summaries 
Number Interview length General observations 
1 16:04 
Answers were extremely brief; responses focused on his public system board having very 
little interaction with athletic issues; challenging interview due to the brevity of answers, 
even when follow-up questions were asked. 
2 40:32 Moderate-length answers; focused responses on governance and the work of his public system board in providing oversight to athletics. 
3 31:59 Trustee devoted significant time to answering each question in depth; focus placed on the trustee’s past experiences with athletics as a student-athlete and fan. 
4 26:06 In-depth responses; answers were often stream-of-consciousness monologue; examples of board interaction with athletics to illustrate viewpoints on athletics. 
5 23:40 
Focused on governance issues and the lack of influence the board had on certain athletic 
issues; focused comments on changing of conferences for one of the institutions governed 
by his public system board. 
6 23:44  
Responses were typically brief; focused on such things as the history of the institution’s 
relatively young athletic program and the board’s deference to the president on athletic 
matters. 
7 31:32 
Responses were thorough and focused on the roles of the board and the administration in 
providing oversight to athletics; Particular attention paid the differences between athletic 
governance at public and private institutions. 
8 25:50  
Served on his public system board for more than twenty-five years; focused responses on 
the lessons learned from his tenure; responses were thorough; importance of communication 
and consultation. 
9 44:43  
Candid reflection on the trustee’s time as a member of the board with a focus on anecdotes 
from his term as chair of the public system board; focused on the perceived overemphasis 
on athletics and a wariness of the board being too involved in athletic matters. 
10 25:45 
Comments were focused on the challenges associated with maintaining intercollegiate 
athletics at a non-power conference institution, with greater attention paid to the operational 
elements of athletics rather than governance issues. 
11 26:23 
Contained long responses that wandered between several subjects; responses focused on 
importance of the public leadership of the board given the high profile nature of 
intercollegiate athletics. 
12 21:04 Relatively brief answers to most questions; focused on the role of the board’s athletics committee and the board’s general level of interest in athletic issues. 
13 35:22 
Responses were comprehensive for most questions; comments focused on the specific ways 
the board interacted with athletics, including the athletics committee and consultation with 
the president. 
14 23:03 Comprehensive answers, but took an extremely activist stance in his responses, arguing for much greater involvement for trustees in athletic governance.   
15 22:05 Brief answers to the majority of questions; primary focus on the limited role of the board in contributing to the governance of the private institution’s low profile athletic department. 
16 26:54 
Responses focused on the financial challenges of maintaining a Division I athletic 
department at the trustee’s non-power conference institution; minimal attention was paid to 
the governance role of the board. 
17 23:32 
Responses were thorough and comprehensively answered the questions; most responses 
focused on the private board and the role the board’s athletic committee played in working 
with the administration to address athletic issues.  
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18 32:16  Majority of the interview devoted to the role of the board and the importance of communication and consultation with the president on athletic issues. 
19 33:52 
Responses at times meandered between several subjects, but generally focused on the role 
that the board and individual trustees play in providing athletic oversight; observed that 
being a public system board with multiple institutions yields challenges.  
20 29:19 
Majority of responses focused on the unique challenges associated with athletics at a non-
power conference, low profile private institution; devoted time to financial challenges of 
supporting athletics and the lack of involvement by the board on athletic issues. 
21 32:13 Responses cast a critical eye on governance structures and practices at her private institution, including frustration about the operations of her board’s athletics committee.   
22 42:45 
Non-linear interview due to trustee responses often veering off-course from the intended 
questions; framed answers around her long-time experience with the institution, even before 
becoming a trustee, as an alumnus, student-athlete, and booster. 
23 30:37 
Responses comprehensively answered the questions, with attention paid to the operations of 
the athletics committee and the importance of formal board oversight of intercollegiate 
athletics. 
24 25:27 
Focused remarks on his role as the board’s liaison to the athletic department and the 
implementation of this formal oversight mechanism; considerable attention devoted to the 
rationale for the board creating the liaison role. 
25 30:34 
Framed responses around the athletic oversight experiences of his private board; chronicled 
the manner in which the board undertook a comprehensive self-study of whether to maintain 
Division I athletics. 
26 26:27 Thorough responses with attention paid to governance matters such as relations between the board and the president and the importance of informal consultation.   
27 34:21 
Responses focused on experience as chair of his power conference private board; attention 
was given to the board focusing on governance responsibilities and avoiding 
micromanagement. 
28 24:17 Brief but direct answers to all questions; focused several comments on the structural changes made by his public system board to attempt to adequately address athletic matters. 
29 36:38 
Lengthy, but direct, answers to the majority of questions; focused several remarks on the 
challenges of attempting to provide oversight to a high profile, wealthy athletic program 
from a power conference.   
 
After the interviews were digitally recorded, they were transferred to a 
computer as MP3 files.  I then transcribed each interview verbatim. Before data 
analysis occurred, the interviewees were sent a copy of the transcript to allow 
them the opportunity to verify the content and clarify sentences.  Eighteen of 28 
interviewees (one trustee waived the ability to review the transcript) responded 
with confirmation of accuracy or revisions, primarily to clarify their statements.  
There were no interviewees that substantially added language to their transcripts.   
Data Analysis 
The process of analyzing data in a qualitative manner is deliberative and 
guided by the research questions (Boeije, 2010). Analysis is conducted to uncover 
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patterns, themes, and categories in order to make judgments about the meanings 
and importance of the data (Patton, 1990).  The specific analysis method that was 
implemented for this study was the ad hoc approach illustrated by Kvale (1996) 
as a combination of techniques utilized to generate meaning from interview text.  
Kvale (1996) observed that a researcher undertaking this approach will use a 
variety of sophisticated textual and quantitative techniques and may: 
read the interviews through and get an overall impression, then go back to 
specific passages, perhaps make some quantifications like counting 
statements indicating different attitudes to a phenomenon, make deeper 
interpretations of different statements, cast parts of the interview into a 
narrative, work out metaphors to capture the material, attempt a 
visualization of the findings in flow diagrams, and so on. (p. 203) 
The techniques utilized for this study were coding, both through open and 
axial methods, noting the frequency of words or phrases, and narrative structuring 
(Boeije, 2010; Kvale, 1996).  The culmination of these methods was visualized in 
a flow diagram in Figure 1.  Coding is an analytical exercise of taking a large 
amount of raw data and segmenting it in a conceptual way (Bailey, 2007; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Strauss & Corbin, 2008).   For this study, coding was 
implemented as a two-part process, with open coding conducted as the first step 
(Bailey, 2007; Boeije, 2010).  Boeije (2010) described open coding as the careful 
reading of all collected data and subsequent division into fragments, or categories 
dealing with similar subject material, and then labeled with a code through color 
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coding, marking with dots, or writing in the margins or through use of a coding 
software program. 
Figure 1: Data Analysis – Ad Hoc Methods 
  
The codes used in the open coding phase were derived as either in vivo 
codes, or labels attached to actual words used by the participants, or conceptual 
labels based on my interpretation of what was being said (Strauss & Corbin, 
2008). The open codes were generated through an initial reading of the 
transcripts, and then confirmed, subtracted from, or added to after a second 
reading that was undertaken line by line to determine the beginning and ending of 
each concept.  For example, there were multiple interviews where the initial in 
vivo code for a segment was solely leadership, but upon the second reading, such 
 
Open Coding (in vivo and 
interpretative categories): 
Support for athletics; Overemphasis 
Student experience; Committees; Facility 
projects; Finances; Compliance; Academic 
performance; Micromanagement; 
Leadership; Coaching contracts; 
Conference realignment; Presidential 
consultation; Scandals  
 
 
 
Axial Coding (focused 
categories): 
Importance of athletics to institutions; 
Governance role of the board; 
Relationship with institutional leadership; 
Athletic finances; Board challenges  
 
Narrative Structuring: 
Repeated storylines around conference 
realignment 
Counting of Phrases: 
•  Frequency of non-prompted references 
to Penn State scandal 
•  Limited references to stakeholder role of 
faculty in athletic governance 
Themes: 
•  Viewpoints on intercollegiate athletics (RQ1) 
•  Perspectives on governance (RQ1) 
•  Board roles in athletic governance (RQ2) 
•  Governance role versus micromanagement (RQ2) 
•  Informal consultation versus formal action (RQ2) 
•  Athletics expenditures (RQ3) 
•  Governance without power (RQ3) 
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codes as consultation and micromanagement were added to the analysis. The open 
codes identified were support for athletics, overemphasis, student experience, 
committees, facility projects, finances, compliance, academic performance, 
micromanagement, leadership, coaching contracts, conference realignment, 
presidential consultation, and scandals. 
    The second phase of the coding process was to employ axial coding, 
which further reduced the data by reassessing the initial open codes, both in vivo 
and interpretive, to combine them into larger categories (Bailey, 2007; Boeije, 
2010).  While open coding was implemented to fragment the data, axial coding 
ignited the process of connecting the data in a conceptual manner (Strauss & 
Corbin, 2008).  The development of a larger category such as governance role of 
the board through axial coding was conducted with the explicit purpose of 
assessing the data to correspond with the research questions.  For example, open 
codes such as committees, coaching contracts, and micromanagement were 
combined through axial coding into this more comprehensive governance 
category, which matched up with the second research question (What are trustees’ 
perceptions about the stake governing boards have in contributing to the shared 
governance of intercollegiate athletics?).  Through axial coding, the following 
categories were identified: importance of athletics to institutions; governance role 
of the board; relationship with institutional leadership; athletic finances; and 
board challenges.  
A separate component of the ad hoc methods analysis approach (Kvale, 
1996) stemmed from the initial readings of the transcripts during the coding 
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process.  The counting of phrases used in the interviews was incorporated into the 
data analysis due to the fact that I observed repeated references to the Penn State 
scandal.  As referenced, an in vivo code identified during open coding was 
scandals, in which each Penn State reference was included.  However, the 
frequency of this reference provided cause for the supplemental quantitative 
inquiry of counting the references to Penn State.  Despite the fact that neither 
Penn State nor other athletic scandals were referenced in any interview questions, 
the fact that over one third of the participants referenced Penn State was 
determined to be an important finding.   
A second case of counting phrases also resulted from the coding process.  
Although there was substantive discussion on the stakeholder roles of the board 
and the president as related to athletics, it was observed that very few trustees 
mentioned faculty.  Therefore, the number of instances that trustees referenced the 
stakeholder role of faculty in athletic governance was also inventoried, with only 
slightly greater than one-third of trustees acknowledging faculty as stakeholders.  
This contributed to the determination that trustees often had a lack of 
understanding of athletic governance roles.  
Narrative structuring (Bailey, 2007; Kvale, 1996) was also used to assess 
the meanings surrounding a specific issue faced by boards and how the issue was 
managed.  Kvale (1996) explains that narrative structuring, “focuses on the stories 
told during an interview and works out their structures and their plots....a narrative 
analysis may attempt to create a coherent story out of the many happenings 
reported through-out an interview” (p. 192).  Although an in vivo code was 
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created during open coding on conference realignment, it was observed that each 
trustee’s reference to this issue was more of a storytelling exercise about their 
institutional experience rather than a general description of board governance.  
Therefore, trustee comments on conference realignment were evaluated not in 
isolation, but rather as an exercise to interpret how boards dealt with an issue 
causing major upheaval in the college athletics landscape.  It was observed that a 
trustee referencing conference realignment was generally not a reflection on that 
specific issue, but instead told a narrative story of how their board’s policy, 
practices, and culture influenced institutional decisions. 
As detailed in Figure 1, the final component of data analysis was the 
identification of over-arching themes generated from the ad hoc methods of open 
and axial coding, the counting of phrases, and narrative structuring (Boeije, 2010; 
Creswell, 2008; Kvale, 1996).  This identification was conducted with the explicit 
intent of addressing the research questions and communicating the findings.  A 
total of seven themes were identified for the three research questions and are 
described in chapters five and six.  The themes identified for research question 
one included general support for athletics, concerns about overemphasis, and 
unfamiliarity with athletic governance.  For research question two, the themes 
range from board roles in the athletic governance to informal consultation versus 
formal action.  Finally, the themes for research question three were challenges 
around athletic expenditures and governance without power.  The findings in 
chapters five and six are communicated by describing the general findings 
through contextual analysis of the data and the use of quotations presented in 
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context of the analysis to illustrate the various themes (Kvale, 1996).  Quotations 
were selected according to theme relevance, the brevity of statement, and the 
effectiveness of capturing trustee sentiment on a general issue.  Quotations from 
all 29 trustees are used in the findings chapters. 
Trustworthiness 
Lincoln & Guba (1985) argued that trustworthiness is met through the 
following criteria: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
Credibility is defined by Lincoln and Guba as the presence of activities that 
increase the probability that plausible findings will be produced.  Credibility may 
be established through several methods, including prolonged engagement in a 
subject area, external checks on the inquiry process, the refining of hypotheses as 
the research process evolves, checking preliminary findings against archived data, 
or consultation with original sources on the preliminary findings (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). 
One strategy recommended to ensure credibility is peer debriefing, which 
is the process of exposing the inquiry to a disinterested peer in order to explore 
aspects of the study that might otherwise exist only in the researcher’s mind 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  This activity meets Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) 
description of an external check on the inquiry process. Debriefing can be done 
through discussion or having a peer conduct a parallel analysis of the data.  In 
order to recruit a sufficient sample size of willing participants for this study, it 
was determined that complete confidentiality for the participants was necessary.  
Governing board trustees are quite often either public officials or prominent 
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alumni of their institutions, and therefore potential participants had a compelling 
reason to require confidentiality of their participation.  Given that it can be 
difficult to conceal an interviewee’s identity when using quotes (Boeije, 2010), it 
was determined for this study that only the researcher could be involved in the 
analysis of data, thereby eliminating the implementation of peer debriefing. 
Given the critical need for guaranteeing complete confidentiality, the 
alternative method of member-checking was utilized to ensure credibility (Bailey, 
2007; Boeije, 2010; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Seidman, 1991).  Member-checking, 
which corresponds with Lincoln’s and Guba’s (1985) credibility method of 
communication of preliminary findings with original sources, involves the process 
of presenting the findings to participants to determine if they recognize the 
findings and judge them to be accurate according to their own experience.  
Lincoln and Guba argued that member-checking is the most important technique 
to be employed in establishing credibility due to the fact that it gives study 
participants the opportunity to review, react, revise, and add to the findings in a 
direct manner.  For this study, all trustees were given the opportunity to review 
and revise the transcripts of their interviews in order to ensure accuracy of the 
data.  In addition, all trustees with whom I had maintained direct email contact 
were given the opportunity to review and reflect on a summary of the findings.  
Twenty-one trustees were asked to review the findings summary, and eleven 
responded with comments.  All of the respondents communicated that they 
determined the findings to be recognizable and accurate in accordance with their 
transcripts and reflections on the subject. 
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Transferability is the ability to conduct a similar study and achieve similar 
results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).   Lincoln and Guba (1985) maintained that 
transferability to other potential studies is impossible to assert and can only be 
judged by other researchers.  However, they wrote, “It is, in summary, not the 
naturalist’s task to provide an index of transferability; it is his or her responsibility 
to provide the data base that makes transferability judgments possible on the part 
of potential appliers” (p. 316).  The transferability of this study, therefore, was 
enhanced through a detailed description of the methods utilized in the study, 
including the development of the sample, data collection, and data analysis.  In 
addition, the findings are comprehensively documented in Chapters Four and 
Five, thereby providing future researchers a well-defined pathway for replicating 
the study or supplementing with further research.  
Dependability is established by demonstrating that the techniques utilized 
in a study can be conducted in a quality manner with replicable results (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985).  Strategies for verifying dependability range from an auditing 
process undertaken by an external observer to a replication of the study by either a 
partner researcher or an impartial observer (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 
2003).  One way that dependability for this study was confirmed was through the 
completion of the pilot study, which demonstrated the reliability of the methods 
employed and created a replicable process.  The pilot study data collection and 
data analysis was implemented effectively, thereby providing a replicable model 
for this study.  Although this study has not yet been replicated, dependability is 
confirmed through the likelihood of replication if a subsequent study is repeated 
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in the same context with the same techniques (Shenton, 2003).  In addition to 
providing the contextual background and rationale for this study, there is thorough 
documentation of the sample and how it was developed.  For example, the study 
provided detailed information on the participants, how they were recruited, and 
the manner of interaction before, during, and after the data collection.  The study 
also included a complete description of the methods utilized at all stages of the 
research inquiry, thereby ensuring a dependable model for study replication.  
Finally, confirmability is recognized when others determine the findings 
of a study are sensible (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Strauss & Corbin, 2008).   For this 
study, confirmability was established through the demonstration of the research 
process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  The procedures utilized at all stages of the 
process, including subject recruitment and participation negotiation, interview 
content and techniques, data analysis, and follow-up communication with 
participants were comprehensively documented in the study. One additional 
strategy was through the preservation of an audit trail, which Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) noted was the primary technique for establishing confirmability.  The 
ability to conduct a confirmability audit is enhanced through the comprehensive 
maintenance of such study elements as raw data and procedural information about 
the research process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  All correspondence, digital 
records, field notes, and transcripts have been maintained to provide an audit trail 
for this study.   
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Summary 
This chapter presented the research design used in this study.  The study 
employed a form of qualitative methodology through the implementation of semi-
structured interviews of 29 trustees that govern NCAA Division I institutions.  
The chapter described the role of the researcher in the study and the effect of a 
pilot study on the study design.  After each interview was transcribed, the data 
was analyzed using an ad hoc approach that included coding procedures, counting 
of phrases, and narrative analysis to identify multiple themes for each research 
question.  The chapter concluded with a discussion of the level to which the study 
attained trustworthiness.  
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Chapter Four 
Perspectives on Athletics and Governance 
This study intended to explore the stake that trustees of higher education 
governing boards have in the governance of NCAA Division I intercollegiate 
athletics at their institutions.  Chapters four and five present the findings 
organized around the three research questions.  This chapter focuses and profiles 
trustees’ broad perceptions of intercollegiate athletics and athletic governance 
from an institutional and national perspective.  The next chapter will document 
trustee viewpoints on the stakeholder governance of athletics and roles assumed 
by governing boards, as well as documenting the challenges of overseeing a 
Division I athletic department.   
This chapter summarizes the findings that trustees were generally 
supportive of athletics at their institutions and that trustee connections to athletics 
as former student-athletes correlated with their level of support for athletics.  
Trustees expressed concern about the disproportionate emphasis placed on 
athletics compared to other institutional priorities, while at the same time 
expressing confidence in the manner in which athletics is governed.  Finally, 
trustees voiced concern with athletic scandals such as Penn State and the related 
effects on institutions.  To ensure confidentiality, the findings and discussion will 
refer to trustees by the number assigned to them in Table 3.1.   
Viewpoints on intercollegiate athletics 
Support for athletics. Consistent across all segments of the sample, 
trustees perceived that college athletics is an important social component of 
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American universities and were particularly supportive of the role that athletics 
plays on their campuses.  In answering questions about the role of athletics 
nationally and on their campuses, several trustees commented that college 
athletics is a unifying factor in campus life by bringing people together as fans to 
express pride in an institutional entity. In particular, they argued that all students, 
not just student-athletes, benefit from the social interactions that stem from 
experiencing intercollegiate athletics as a fan.  This opinion seemed to impart that 
attending athletic events and supporting institutional teams enhance the overall 
student life experience by creating opportunities for stress relief and formalized 
socialization.  Trustee number 13, a private institution board member from a 
university that has achieved notable athletic success in recent years, reflected on 
the importance of athletics to student life by stating: 
Athletics plays a big role in universities.  Not from an educational 
standpoint, but more from socialization and blowing off steam….It’s a 
bonding time and makes their memories of their college experience more 
fulfilled.  If you were just going to school and going to the library and 
coming home and that was it and then you got a job, I don’t know if you’d 
think fondly of your college years. 
In addition to the preceding quote, three other trustees specifically 
mentioned the role of athletics in enhancing campus life for the general student 
population.  Trustee number 7, a board member from a private institution with a 
prominent athletic department, observed, “I think they’re an important and 
exciting part of the university experience and university life.”  Trustee number 8, 
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a public system board trustee with one power conference institution, echoed the 
importance of athletics to the student experience by commenting, “There’s no 
doubt that success in athletics is good for morale.  It increases school spirit.  It’s a 
rallying point for students from all different backgrounds and different 
perspectives.”  Interestingly, all the trustees that focused on the school spirit, 
student attendance, and socialization aspects of athletics were from institutions 
that have had achieved recent success in athletic competition in either of the two 
prominent sports of football or men’s basketball.  Given the limited scope of the 
study, it would be impossible to contend that only students from institutions with 
prominent athletic programs benefit from the aforementioned characteristics of 
intercollegiate athletics, however it is a noteworthy finding. 
The viewpoint that college athletics can have a positive impact on the 
experience of the general student body is supported by some research (Mixon & 
Trevino, 2005; Schurr & Wittig, 1993).  Schurr and Wittig (1993) found 
attendance at athletic events was positively correlated with retention and four-year 
graduation rates.  Mixon and Trevino’s (2005) study of 81 Division I schools that 
sponsored football at the FBS level demonstrated that intercollegiate athletics 
served students by providing an outlet from the psychic challenges of college life, 
thereby enhancing graduation and retention rates.  There are critiques of the 
impact of athletics on the student experience, with Sperber (2000) arguing that the 
student sub-culture around college athletics is associated with negative aspects of 
student life including binge drinking and gambling.  Nelson, Lenk, Xuan, and 
Wechsler’s (2010) analysis of a national survey of university students and 
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administrators found that intercollegiate athletics was correlated with permissive 
drinking environments and tailgating parties, thereby adding to concerns about the 
socialization aspect of athletics. Wechsler and Davenport (1997) found that 
students who were involved in athletics, which could entail either participation or 
attendance, were more likely to engage in binge drinking than students not 
involved in athletics. 
Toma (2010) observed that the benefits of college athletic programs are 
typically attributed to improvements in such areas as admissions, fundraising, and 
institutional profile and branding.  Interestingly, only two trustees cited these 
factors as for supporting athletics.  Trustee number 4 responded to a question on 
the appropriate role of athletics on his campus by observing, “There’s no question 
that athletics have a positive role to play in the recruitment of students in general.  
I think they give you a brand.”  Trustee number 17 noted that athletics made his 
private institution visible by commenting, “The podium of major college sports 
league affiliation really ends up being the lens through which America looks at 
your school.  They can find you.”  The infrequency of comments such as this 
could be because the phrasing of the question on general perspectives on athletics 
typically used the words “on your campus,” which may have led trustees to think 
about internal factors important to current students rather than external issues 
such as recruiting and development.   
Trustee connections to athletics.  Questions regarding general 
perspectives on athletics revealed that self-identification by trustees of being a 
former student-athlete shaped their viewpoints about athletics.  The nine trustees 
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that identified themselves as former student-athletes were from all types of 
institutions, both from within and outside of power conferences.  Those trustees 
were universally supportive of athletics on their campuses and fondly recollected 
on their experiences.  Former student-athlete trustees covered such topics as the 
importance of athletics in providing socialization, the life lessons that athletics 
imparts, and the inherent pride in competing for one’s institution.  The former 
student-athletes typically focused on the positive experience of being a student-
athlete in terms of socialization with a community of teammates, thereby 
lessening the isolation that sometimes occurs for college students.  As noted in 
Table 3.2, Trustee number 22 spent considerable time discussing her connections 
to her institutional athletic department, including as a student-athlete.  In response 
to a question regarding the place of athletics on her campus, the trustee stated: 
My participation and my philosophy from being an athlete is that athletics 
is really critical….I felt that when I was on campus, I would not have been 
introduced to other people on campus if I hadn’t been part of a team.  I 
probably would have only known the people that were studying what I 
was studying.   
Trustee 14 observed that regardless of the specific sport, competing in athletics 
yielded considerable institutional pride through the experience of representing 
one’s institution.  He stated, “The discipline and rigor and excitement competing 
for your school translates down from football and men’s basketball all the way 
down to rowing.  I think it’s a valuable experience.” 
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Three of the trustees who were student-athletes noted the unique 
perspective that the status brought to their board participation.  Trustee number 
three observed that the fact he was the only former student-athlete on his board 
made him the most qualified to serve in the role of board liaison to the athletic 
department.  Trustees number 14 and number 18, incidentally from the same 
public single institution board, both acknowledged that their student-athlete 
experience gave them different perspectives than their colleagues and enhanced 
their positive viewpoints on athletics.  When asked about his general perspectives 
on athletics, trustee number 18 acknowledged the distinction of his athletic 
background in stating, “I’m going to come at this a bit differently having been a 
student-athlete.  I certainly know the benefits of athletic involvement and having a 
successful athletic program at any institution.”  As noted in Table 3.2, trustee 
number 14 repeatedly focused on the board being active in athletic governance, 
which appeared to stem from a belief that his experience as a student-athlete 
should lead to an enhanced role. 
Concerns about institutional and national overemphasis of athletics will be 
covered in the next section, but a corollary was found in regard to trustees who 
did not have experience as a student-athlete.  Several of the trustees who 
expressed concerns about athletics being stressed over other institutional priorities 
did not self-identify themselves as former student-athletes.  Trustee number 21, 
who did not have a background in intercollegiate athletics prior to becoming a 
board member, illustrated the concerned viewpoint by observing about the 
national landscape of college sports, “I think athletics needs to be part of a 
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balanced life.  I do think that in the United States, we as a society give too much 
credence to athletes and place them on pedestals versus scientists and teachers.”  
The findings provide no clear answer as to why trustees who were not former 
student-athletes were more focused on an outsized role of athletics, but it could be 
speculated that a good experience as a student-athlete might result in a bias 
toward positive perspectives on athletics at the institutions they govern.  
Trustees are stakeholders in the governance of intercollegiate athletics due 
to their membership in a body retaining institutional fiduciary responsibility, but 
the fact that several trustees voluntarily added a second level of stakeholder 
investment as former student-athletes is a unique component of stakeholder 
governance (Crane & Ruebottom, 2011; Post et al., 2002). Regardless of whether 
a specific stakeholder group is viewed as legitimate within the governance 
structure, organizations must recognize that stakeholders may emerge through 
self-identification (Post et al., 2012).  The self-identification by trustees of a 
specific stakeholder role as former student-athletes is consistent with the Crane 
and Ruebottom’s (2011) viewpoint that the traditional economic and contractual 
bases for stakeholder legitimization fail to account for the societal affiliations that 
potential stakeholders may have.  While the fact that trustees self-identified as 
student-athletes may not have officially altered their official governing board role, 
it did add a layer of stakeholder involvement through their social identity as a 
former participant in intercollegiate athletics. 
Former student-athlete and booster perspectives about positive aspects of 
intercollegiate athletics are supported in the literature (McDearmon, 2013; Schurr 
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& Wittig, 1993; Wolf-Wendel, Toma, & Morphew, 2001).  Wolf-Wendel, Toma, 
and Morphew (2001) observed participation in intercollegiate athletics imparted 
several important lessons that should be transferred to the non student-athlete 
student body, including working toward a common goal, sharing adversity, and 
recognizing the importance of diverse contributions to a team effort.  Schurr and 
Wittig (1993) found competing as a student-athlete yielded benefits such as 
enhanced academic performance and higher graduation rates when compared with 
the rest of the student body.   
French (2004) provided a sharp critique of the notion that participation in 
athletics leads to enhanced character development.  The author observed that 
despite the fact that universities claim to focus on developing well-rounded 
graduates, there is little evidence that they actually do.  French noted that athletics 
is a part of this charade, writing: 
Is it ironic or an indicator of how out of sync are the intercollegiate 
athletic programs that their administrators and coaches use the rhetoric of 
character education and appeal to the myth that participation in athletics 
ingrains virtues and values that are transferable to off-the-field life 
experiences to defend their programs when their university has, in practice 
long since abandoned such expectations for students in the curricula it 
requires in its myriad of majors. (p. 59)   
Although this study did not explore the connection between trustee perspectives 
and demographic components such as race or gender, Lapchick (2011) provided 
another critique of the positive aspects of student-athlete participation by 
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demonstrating that the experience for all student-athletes may not be the same in 
documenting that white men’s basketball players from teams competing in the 
NCAA tournament had a graduation rate of 91 percent, while the rate for African-
American men’s players was only 59 percent.  
Concerns about overemphasis.  Despite overwhelming support for the 
role of athletics on their campuses, trustees also expressed varying levels of 
concern that athletics were overemphasized and treated differently, both at the 
national level and on their own campuses.  Responses were generally vague about 
this perceived overemphasis, but assertions such as “it’s gotten out of control” or 
“there’s too much money in college athletics” were stated on a regular basis.  
Concerns seemed to be centered on the belief that athletics were driven by such 
interests as television exposure and financial incentives, rather than the traditional 
academic and research purposes of higher education.  
A common response from trustees was akin to, “I support college sports 
on our campus, but……”  Trustees observed that athletics was an important and 
visible component of a university, but it should not take precedence over the 
academic mission and that the board should not spend a disproportionate time 
dealing with athletics issues. When asked about his perceptions of athletics on his 
campus, trustee number 27, a private institution board member, took the 
opportunity to focus more on academics than athletics.  The trustee stated, “The 
point is we are very competitive academically as well as athletically. I think sports 
are a big, big part of our identity, but they’re not the defining identity.”  In noting 
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that recent athletic success had enhanced the profile of her institution, trustee 
number 21 observed that the institution was struggling with this trend by stating: 
The discussions have been held at faculty and staff levels.  Each of the 
different colleges are talking about it, and the governing board, and we are 
being very careful to not let athletics be the thing for which our university 
is known.  We do not want to get to that point.  The academics are too 
important.   
Trustees number 27 and 21 both added to their expressions of concern about 
athletics being prioritized over academics by explaining that their boards and 
institutions attempt to focus on the academic performance of student-athletes as 
much as athletic accomplishment.  
Although general support for athletics was present among all categories of 
trustees, the most negative statements about an overemphasis on athletics were 
primarily confined to trustees from either institutions that were not from power 
conferences or public statewide coordinating boards.  That non-power conference 
trustees expressed concerns about overemphasis was not surprising given the 
financial challenges associated with supporting Division I athletics and keeping 
up with the power conference institutions in the arms race of college athletics.  
The connection between financing Division I athletics at a non-power conference 
institution and the board being challenged by athletic governance is explored 
further in Chapter Five. 
Of the 16 trustees that served on boards overseeing no power conference 
institutions, 13 directly communicated concerns about athletics being 
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overemphasized, typically in response to questions about viewpoints on athletics 
from a national perspective.  In contrasting his experience as a student-athlete in 
the 1960s compared to intercollegiate athletics today, trustee number 25, who 
served on a private board from a non-power conference, observed, “There was 
nowhere near the intensity level on athletics when I was in school….At many 
institutions, it’s gotten out of control.  It’s the tail wagging the dog from an 
institutional standpoint, but nobody knows how to control it.”   
Public statewide coordinating board trustees expressing concern about the 
overemphasis on athletics could be reflective of the fact that those boards were 
more focused on overall academic governance and less tied to the athletic prowess 
of a specific institution.  Trustee number 19, whose board oversaw four non-
power conference institutions, observed that some trustees identified more with 
some institutions depending on geography, but the lack of one dominant 
institution resulted in the board focusing less on athletics than on academic and 
operational matters.  As noted in Table 3.2, Trustee number one’s interview was 
characterized by extreme brevity of answers.  However, the statewide 
coordinating board member whose board oversees six institutions competing at 
the Division I level was the only trustee to overtly criticize athletics, which he 
attributed to not only an overemphasis on athletics, but also to a lack of 
connection with the institutional athletic departments. Trustee number one stated, 
“I have a lot of criticism of collegiate athletics.  I think there’s way too much 
emphasis put on intercollegiate athletics at our universities.”  When asked about 
how his board interacts with athletics, the trustee responded, “It gets back to the 
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size of our board, and we simply cannot get involved at that level in the individual 
campuses.”     
Concern about overemphasis on athletics reflects public opinion that 
college sports more resembled professional rather than amateur sports, college 
coaches pay was out of proportion, and commercial interests took precedence 
over academic interests (Knight Commission, 2006).  University administrators 
and faculty have also expressed concern about the focus on athletics.  Taylor et al. 
(2011) found that college presidents voiced considerable concerns about athletics, 
with only 25 percent of college presidents at four-year public universities and 39 
percent of presidents at four-year, private universities believing intercollegiate 
athletics had a positive impact on their institutions.  The Knight Foundation 
Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (2007) also found that faculty at NCAA 
Division I FBS institutions believed athletics was structurally separate from the 
academic enterprise and driven by the entertainment industry rather than 
institutional academic mission.   
Despite the literature confirming that a variety of stakeholders believed 
there to be an overemphasis on athletics, this study showed that trustees were 
generally supportive of the role of intercollegiate athletics on their campuses and 
not interested in dramatically altering the profile of college sports.  This could be 
due to the fact that trustees either do not feel powerful enough or are not as 
exposed to the daily operational and academic challenges associated with 
intercollegiate athletics as are presidents and faculty.  Responses to the 
overemphasis on athletics through alternative approaches to athletic management 
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or oversight were not directly stated by trustees, though the following section’s 
summation of perspectives on governance and Chapter five’s synopsis of the 
stakeholder roles assumed by boards provide information on the various ways 
boards deal with the complexity of athletic governance.      
Perspectives on Governance   
Importance of trust in leadership.  The primary reason for confidence in 
the governance of athletics identified by trustees was trust in institutional 
leadership.  In most cases, the leadership was referenced as presidents, though in 
some situations trustees referred to other administrators such as athletic directors.  
Trust in leaders meant that trustees had confidence that leaders would 
appropriately deal with athletic issues and equally as important, make certain that 
the board was informed of important athletic matters.  From a stakeholder 
governance perspective, the importance of a culture of trust between the board 
and the president corresponds with Greenwood and Van Buren’s (2010) position 
that trustworthiness within an organization is a fundamental aspect of positive 
relationships between organizational stakeholders. 
Due to the institutional responsibility for athletics assumed by presidents, 
trustees emphasized how important it was to have presidents engaged in the 
oversight of intercollegiate athletics, which typically entailed the day-to-day 
administration of the athletic department.  Multiple trustees observed that 
presidents should not delegate oversight of athletics to athletic directors. 
Presidents must be present during athletic discussions in order to facilitate board 
confidence in athletic management. Trustees repeatedly stated that there must be 
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communication between the board, particularly board leadership, and the 
president so that all parties have the same understanding of issues of importance 
in athletics.  In discussing the communication between the board and the president 
regarding athletic issues, trustee number 27 observed: 
The relationship is very important, because if the board sees athletics one 
way and the president sees it another, that’s a recipe for major conflict.  So 
rapport, communication, and mutual understanding is really critical for the 
success of the board, success of the administration, and success of the 
athletic program. 
Trustee number seven, who had served as the chair of his private board, 
observed that the presence of confidential quarterly meetings between the 
president and the full board and weekly meetings between the president and board 
leadership provided a foundation for communication and trust on athletic issues.  
The trustee explained, “I think the open communication process, which provide 
opportunities for the president to proactively communicate on issues of concern 
and in the headlines, and for trustees to ask about anything they want to, has 
resulted in trustees generally feeling well-informed.”  The observation about 
confidential meetings allowing for greater communication may correlate with the 
ability of a private board to conduct more business in closed session than a public 
board.  Chapter five will explore in greater depth whether private boards are 
afforded more opportunity to communicate openly with the president on athletic 
matters, thereby establishing a greater sense of trust in leadership.     
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In addition to the importance of confidence in the president’s 
understanding of athletics, trustees commented on the value of having a president 
that believed in the mission of athletics.  Trustee number 13, in particular, 
observed that presidents who place a high priority on athletic and academic 
performance were better served at dealing with the inherent tension between 
athletics and the academic side of institutions.  The trustee described the 
appropriate leadership in athletics from his current president by contrasting it with 
the experience of the institution’s previous president.  He stated: 
We have a new president, and we feel very good about how he feels about 
athletics.  Our previous president was very academic and athletics to him 
was just sidelight….Our current president understands the value of 
athletics and the mix between athletics and academics and what it does to 
our exposure and reputation.  But he also has a huge mission of academics 
first, and he’s been able to communicate that to the faculty, and the 
relationship is a lot better. 
Only one trustee expressed criticism of his institutional president and the 
relationship with the board regarding athletics.  Trustee 14, who advocated for a 
greater board role in athletic oversight as noted in Table 3.2, expressed the 
opinion that the president was threatened by board involvement in athletics.  
When asked if his board gets too involved in the operations of athletics, he 
maintained that it has occurred due to a lack of cooperation between the board and 
the president, thereby leading to a lack of trust.  Trustee number 14 observed: 
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From my perspective, presidents can’t have it both ways.  And I think our 
president tries to do that…Our president doesn’t work collaboratively with 
us.  He’ll give us the impression of collaboration, like a recent athletic 
director search when he ended up letting us, because we insisted, 
interview the candidates.  He’ll just do what he wants.  It’s kind of a 
mixed message he sends. 
The importance of confidence in institutional leadership in all aspects of 
higher education management is supported by the literature on governing boards 
(AGB, 2012; Hirsch, 2001; Nason, 1982).  Nason (1982) succinctly argued, 
“Institutions will not thrive unless the board has confidence in the president” (p. 
87).  From an athletic perspective, this confidence is typically stated as the 
unequivocal policy statement that the chief executive officer is in control of 
athletics (AGB, 2012).   Trustees observed that confidence is bred through 
presidents keeping the board informed on important athletics issues.  This 
viewpoint corresponds with Hirsch’s (2001) observation that the role of 
administration is to provide the board with information needed for oversight, 
translate policies into programmatic initiatives, and ensure that initiatives are 
brought to implementation. 
The study supports literature on governing board best practices regarding 
the importance of communication flow between boards and presidents on athletic 
issues (AGB, 2012; NCAA, 2006), but also lends credence to the belief that 
boards and presidents must strike the right balance regarding academics and 
athletics.  The academic enterprise has historically been at odds with the priorities 
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of intercollegiate athletics, thereby creating opportunities for tension between 
governing boards and presidents (Gerdy, 1997; Thelin, 1994).  A divide between 
athletics and an institution’s academic community may heighten the risk for over-
commercialization and athletic compliance issues in athletics (Knight 
Commission, 2000; NCAA, 2006). While trustees repeatedly stressed the 
importance of trusting presidents to manage athletics, comments were often 
partnered with an affirmation of academics maintaining a priority status. 
Despite trustees placing a high level of importance on trusting their 
institutional leadership to manage athletics in a proper manner and keep the board 
informed of important matters, it could be questioned whether an extreme amount 
of confidence and delegated authority is appropriate when considering the high 
profile nature of intercollegiate athletics.  AGB (2012) succinctly stated that while 
presidents are clearly delegated the daily management of athletics, “The 
governing board is ultimately accountable for athletics policy and oversight and 
should fulfill this fiduciary responsibility” (p. 6).  While having trust in a 
president to appropriately manage athletics does not entail that a board is shirking 
its fiduciary responsibility, chapter five will further explore the relationship 
between the president and the board through discussions of micromanagement, 
formal board authority, and informal consultation.  
From a stakeholder perspective, the study lends some support to the 
position that prioritization among stakeholder claims may occur (Ryan, 1990).  
Trustee comments reflecting deference to presidents implied an ordering of 
stakeholder input on athletic issues.  For example, trustees conveyed the sense 
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that they do not necessarily need to be involved in the daily decisions around the 
management of athletics, but they would expect to be provided information 
regarding issues deemed important by institutional leadership.  An important 
contribution to the literature on stakeholder theory is the suggestion emanating 
from the study that the majority of trustees, despite ultimate institutional fiduciary 
responsibility resting with governing boards, were willing to defer authority and 
take a lower ranking stakeholder role. Regarding the content of stakeholder issues 
rather than the ranking of the stakeholders themselves, affirmation of the 
precedence of academics over athletics supports a ranking of stakeholder claims. 
Unfamiliarity with athletic governance.  Despite most trustees 
possessing a high level of confidence in the governance of athletics, multiple 
trustees appeared to have a lack of understanding of the various levels of 
institutional governance structures.  Some trustees expressed little understanding 
of the roles of the various stakeholders in the governance of their institutional 
athletic departments, particularly faculty members.  Only ten of the 29 trustees 
interviewed mentioned faculty members in discussing the governance of athletics.  
Of those ten trustees, only trustee number 24, who served as his board’s athletic 
liaison, devoted any time discussing the faculty oversight role with athletics.  The 
typical response was simply an acknowledgement of a faculty role without any 
details provided.  
The comments of two trustees stand out regarding a perceived lack of 
knowledge about the faculty role in athletic governance.  Trustee number 8, who 
had served on his public system board for over 25 years and had just completed a 
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four-year term as the chair of the board’s athletic committee responded to a 
question on understanding of institutional athletic oversight by responding, “I 
think there is faculty athletic committee.”  Trustee number 17 chaired his board’s 
athletics committee, yet admitted, “Faculty, I’m not exactly sure how to define 
their role in athletics.”  Although the most likely reason for this lack of 
understanding is an absence of education for trustees on stakeholder roles, an 
additional culprit of ignorance of faculty involvement in athletic governance 
might be due to the fact that faculty-driven reform efforts, both at the institutional 
level and by national coalitions, have achieved minimal results (Ridpath, 2008).  
New concerns have arisen that the faculty voice will be lessened by the latest 
round of NCAA governance restructuring, which seeks to provide greater 
autonomy to the power conference, thereby potential resulting in a weakened role 
for faculty at an institutional level (Berkowitz, 2014). 
One explanation for an overall unacquaintedness with the various 
stakeholder roles in athletic governance could be in the inherent nature of board 
membership.  Trustees acknowledged that unfamiliarity with athletic governance 
structures and important athletic issues is often a byproduct of a board governance 
system that delegates the responsibility for various issues to standing committees, 
thereby limiting topical exposure to a limited group of trustees.  While this issue 
could be present on all types of boards, trustees that made explicit comments 
about a lack of understanding of certain areas of governance were exclusively 
from private boards.  Due to a greater average number of board members, private 
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boards often rely on committees to fulfill fiduciary responsibilities rather than 
through full board meetings or committees of the whole (AGB, 2010b). 
Another issue potentially hampering trustee understandings of athletic 
governance is the transitional nature of board membership.  While length of term 
and term limits vary between both public and private boards, keeping trustees 
adequately informed can be challenging due to continual rotation of membership.  
A board that heard a comprehensive presentation on athletic governance five 
years ago might now have a membership that has changed by half.  In responding 
to a question on the comfort level of the board as related to athletic governance, 
trustee number 7 commented: 
The biggest issue is that we have trustees who have been on the board for 
one and two years and trustees who have been on the board for ten and 
eleven years.  We may have done major review of topics like compliance 
for the whole board, and it’s been delegated to a committee.  So someone 
who just came on to the board may not feel on top of those issues. 
Reflecting on the prior section regarding trustee concerns about 
overemphasis of athletics and the related prioritization of academics over 
athletics, it is interesting that so few trustees mentioned the role of faculty in the 
governance of athletics.  Faculty, as discussed in Chapter Two, retain authority 
for determining educational policy in a shared governance system (AAUP, 1967).  
Regarding athletics, the responsibility of the faculty is typically defined as 
ensuring the academic integrity of the athletic program (Bailey & Littlejohn, 
1991; Brand 2007).  A conclusion can be drawn that some trustees offered blatant 
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contradictions by mentioning the importance of academics while at the same time 
failing to account for the role of the faculty.  This suggests that trustees generally 
fail to understand the manner in which academic oversight of athletics is typically 
implemented. 
Inherent to a successful stakeholder governance structure is an attention to 
the roles and viewpoints of all organizational stakeholders (Charron, 2007; 
Hasnas, 2013).  Therefore, perceived unfamiliarity of athletic governance by 
trustees, an important stakeholder group in themselves, leads to a questioning of 
whether stakeholder governance can be effectively implemented when boards are 
ignorant of governance roles.  As discussed, trustworthiness between stakeholders 
groups is essential to effective governance (Greenwood & Van Buren, 2010), and 
a lack of awareness of roles and responsibilities among various groups certainly 
does not display a high level of trust.  In illustrating the importance of obligation 
of deference to all stakeholders, Hasnas (2013) wrote, “managers of an 
organization do not have an exclusive fiduciary responsibility to any one 
stakeholder group, but are obligated to ensure that the value created by the 
organization is distributed among all the normative stakeholders of the 
organization” (p. 55).        
The impact of athletic scandals.  Despite a general sense of confidence 
in the institutional governance of athletics, trustees consistently expressed a 
concern with scandals in college athletics.  A particular focus was directed toward 
the recent sexual abuse scandal at Penn State University (Freeh, 2012).  Although 
I did not ask specific questions about Penn State or any other athletic scandal, 
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twelve of the 29 trustees interviewed mentioned Penn State in their responses.  
While the Penn State scandal had remained in the news cycle of college athletics 
when the interviews were conducted, the fact that nearly one-third of trustees 
commented on Penn State without prompting was deemed to be an important 
finding and indicated a preoccupation with avoidance of scandals.    
The focus on Penn State in trustee responses was found among trustees 
from all types of boards and governance experience level.  However, eight of the 
twelve trustees that mentioned the Penn State scandal were from public boards.  
This could be attributed to the fact that public board trustees are not only 
accountable to their institutions, but also to the greater public in ensuring that 
situations such as the Penn State scandal are avoided.  Trustees from public 
boards are also more likely to associate with the Penn State trustees and the 
challenges they faced in that situation.  Trustee number 16, who serves on a 
public single institution board, responded to a general question on board oversight 
of athletics by stating, “I don’t envy Penn State, with everything going on there, 
and the position the trustees were in.  I felt sympathetic to the trustees.”   
Multiple trustees referenced Penn State as an acknowledgement that 
athletics can be a huge liability in terms of institutional risk, most considerably to 
the financial well-being and institutional reputation. Other trustees referencing 
Penn State did so by expressing fear that athletic departments become too 
powerful and not bound to institutional compliance rules and regulations. When 
discussing how his views on athletics have changed since becoming a board 
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member, trustee number six noted the importance of ethics in the oversight of 
athletics.  The trustee commented: 
You have to have proper tone and commitment to ethical behavior and 
compliance in athletics that you have across the rest of the university 
system.  And god forbid you end up with the type of things that have 
happened at Penn State and elsewhere.  Where something becomes so 
good and so great that it can’t have any ultimate supervision.  
Trustee number 29, who served on a public single institution board, reflected the 
comments of the previous trustee on what she has learned as a trustee.  She 
observed, “As a trustee, that’s one of my greatest worries and fears, that athletics 
becomes so powerful that we lose our transparency, we protect poor behavior, all 
those things that happened at Penn State.”  
Two trustees observed that the fallout from the Penn State scandal 
provided an impetus to assess board oversight of athletics and identify any 
potential governance problems.  In discussing the importance of formal board 
oversight of athletics, trustee number 23, a member of a public board, observed, 
“When you get a Penn State report, our president and his team take the 
recommendations and give us a state of the union on where we stand and 
incremental recommendations or actions they might take.”  Trustee number 12 
referenced the specific conditions of the Penn State scandal and the resulting self-
examination of institutional policies by stating, “Citing Penn State, we had to go 
back and look at what we were doing, hopefully so we could prevent that from 
happening.  What was our oversight about not only who was reporting to who, but 
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also protecting people who might report something?”  Colleges and universities 
throughout the United States have taken a similar approach in responding to the 
Penn State scandal by examining institutional policies related to this situation.  
Fifty-five of 69, or nearly 80 percent, of schools competing in Bowl 
Championship Series conferences, the highest level of college football, either 
reviewed or strengthened policies regarding minors on campus (Associated Press, 
2013).   
The observation that trustees were focused on the Penn State scandal is 
supported by the literature on higher education governance by confirming that 
boards are likely to be focused on compliance during a highly regulated period in 
higher education (Lake, 2013).  From a stakeholder governance perspective, the 
focus on the lack of accountability assumed by the governance structure of Penn 
State in preventing the scandal testifies to a critique of stakeholder theory that 
organizations lacking accountability to directors or owners leads to ineffective 
organizations (Sternberg, 1997).  In other words, if all stakeholder claims are 
viewed as legitimate, there may be a lack of accountability to the authority of any 
one group, thereby increasing organizational risk.   
Summary 
The findings for research question one demonstrated that trustees are 
generally supportive of athletics at their institutions, most specifically due to the 
perceived influence of intercollegiate athletics on institutional pride and the 
student experience.  Trustee connection to athletics as former student-athletes was 
determined to have an effect on how supportive a trustee was of athletics at their 
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institution. There was, however, considerable concern expressed about the fact 
that a disproportionate emphasis is often placed on athletics compared to other 
institutional priorities.  Trustees expressed general confidence in the manner in 
which athletics is governed, with trust in administrative leadership identified as a 
major factor.  Trustees voiced the greatest concern with athletic governance 
around scandals such as Penn State and the related effects on institutions. 
The most unique element of the findings discussed in this chapter was the 
inherent conflicts in the sentiments expressed by trustees related to research 
question one.  Despite the fact that trustees generally expressed support for 
athletics at their institutions, they also consistently voiced a concern about 
overemphasis of athletics both institutionally and nationally.  Similarly, while 
trustees articulated a considerable level of confidence in athletic governance, 
particularly by discussing the trust they had in institutional leadership, they 
concurrently displayed a lack of understanding of the overall governance structure 
of athletics at their institutions.  In addition, the trust in executive leadership was 
paired with a preoccupation on scandals in intercollegiate athletics and the related 
apprehension about risk to their own institutions. 
 Chapter Five, which presents the findings related to research questions 
two and three regarding the stake governing boards have in contributing to 
athletic governance and the associated challenges of intercollegiate athletics, will 
provide greater context into the manner in which these apparent conflicts manifest 
in a shared governance system.  For example, trustees commented on the relative 
benefits of formal versus informal governance mechanisms, thereby exploring 
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questions related to the level of trust in administrators and the need for prescribed 
methods of board oversight designed to mitigate the risks associated with 
athletics.  Most importantly, trustees identified several challenges to boards 
occupying effective roles in the shared governance of intercollegiate athletics, 
thereby leading to questions of whether stakeholder governance is an effective 
model for board involvement. 
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Chapter Five 
Stakeholder Roles and the Challenges of Intercollegiate Athletics 
This chapter presents the findings that addressed the second and third 
research questions.  First, trustee perspectives about stakeholder governance of 
athletics and the roles that governing boards assume both on a formal and 
informal basis are presented.  Second, challenges of operating a Division I athletic 
department, including finances and the distribution of power in college athletics, 
are reported.	  
Trustees as Stakeholders in Athletic Governance  
Trustees were asked about the manner in which their boards acted as 
stakeholders in the governance of athletics.  The line of questioning attempted to 
not only determine the structural tendencies of boards in providing oversight to 
athletics, but also to inquire about the relative importance of formal and informal 
governance actions related to athletics.  Responses in this section varied from 
detailed descriptions on the role of athletic committees to thoughtful discussions 
on the difference between governance and management.  
Board roles in athletic governance.  Trustees identified several roles 
their boards assumed in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.  In particular, 
trustees commented on formal oversight mechanisms, including athletics 
committees, athletics liaisons, and approval authorities.   
The athletics committee.  The most common method of governing boards 
contributing to the shared governance of athletics cited by trustees was the 
presence of a board athletics committee.  The purpose of an athletics committee 
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varied between trustees, but typically was described as the mechanism through 
which trustees would receive information reports on athletics.  Student-athlete 
academic performance, athletic program budgets, and departmental compliance 
were the primary topics of information conveyed to athletic committees.  The 
structure of athletic committees was typically described as functioning as any 
other board committee, with a segment of the board sitting on the committee on a 
rotational basis.   
Trustees cited several reasons for implementing athletic committees.  
Trustees noted that typical board committee structures, with committees devoted 
to academic affairs, finance and budget, human resources, and facilities, tend to 
overlook athletic issues.  Due to the high profile nature of intercollegiate athletics 
at their institutions, utilizing an athletic committee to address athletic matters was 
cited as a positive factor in fulfilling board governance responsibilities. 
 The perceived ineffectiveness of other standing committees of the board 
being able to adequately address the complexities of intercollegiate athletics was 
repeatedly communicated. Trustees did not elaborate on the factors associated 
with athletics that require a separate committee, but generally observed the 
inadequacy of relying on other mechanisms such as other committees and full 
board meetings.  Trustee number five, a member of a public system board, 
discussed the factors for starting a special board committee on athletics by noting: 
What happened at many institutions like ours is that we had our standing 
committees, but their agendas were so full, that athletic issues become 
subsumed by the broader issues these committees face.  We have an 
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educational policy committee and a finance committee and the audit 
committee, but given all the things that are on their plate, it’s hard to have 
real in-depth oversight of athletics.  
In discussing the rationale for removing athletics from an existing committee on 
campus life issues to create a separate athletics committee, Trustee number 12 
observed, “There’s not a specific issue, only that athletics encompasses so much 
and it’s so broad that we felt like we devoted complete attention to athletics and 
not share it with something else.” 
Trustees also noted that including an athletics committee in the formal 
board structure allowed for better oversight of institutional compliance functions 
for athletics, promotion of athletic-related issues and accomplishments, and more 
comprehensive supervision of athletic budgets.  Trustee number 15, a private 
board member from a non-power conference institution that had a low profile 
athletic program, commented on the unique promotional reasons for elevating the 
athletics committee from being a sub-committee.  The trustee noted: 
One of my main focuses with the athletics committee was to make our 
board members aware of what our athletes were doing and the importance 
of athletics to the university and to student life….We give really energetic 
reports at meetings, because if we give energetic reports people will 
become engaged, come to games, and be more interested in athletics. 
Trustee number 15’s rationale of using the committee as an engagement, rather 
than an oversight, mechanism is not listed as a reason for the implementation of 
an athletics committee by AGB (2004).   
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 Despite the general trust that trustees have in presidents regarding the 
governance of athletics, as chronicled in Chapter Four, one trustee observed that 
the presence of an athletic committee helped compensate when trust had broken 
down over athletic issues.  As noted in Table 3.2, trustee number 13 focused his 
responses on his private board’s relationship with the president.  Regarding the 
athletics committee, he observed that the creation of the committee corresponded 
with the board expressing the desire to play a stronger role in athletic issues due 
to a lack of confidence in the president.  Trustee number 13 commented:  
The president we had at the time was not really an athletics guy.  He 
would always tell us that he represents athletic issues to the board, but he 
never talked about it.  We just felt that the board needed a better 
understanding of what was going on in athletics….We felt like we needed 
to be closer to it. So we started an ad hoc athletics committee several years 
ago.  The board decided we liked it, so now it’s a permanent committee of 
the board. 
While the trustees that served on athletic committees were unanimous in 
their support the committees’ function within board governance structures, board 
members also expressed concerns about the presence of an athletic committee that 
risked serving as a de facto athletic booster group.  The perception that an 
athletics committee fueled athletic boosterism on a board enhanced trustee fears 
that the board would neglect its proper oversight responsibilities.  Trustee number 
21, who did not sit on her board’s athletics committee, commented on the 
challenges of a booster-oriented athletics committee: 
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The athletics committee, truthfully, feels like a boys club to me…My 
impression is they can have blinders on and they approach things 
sometimes as that part of university life is the most important, and I think 
the rest of the board tries to balance that out….I would hope that the 
committee, as much as they love basketball and football and everything 
else, could be objective and tough if something arose that we need to deal 
with swiftly.” 
Trustee number 22, who served on her board’s athletic committee and self-
identified as an athletic booster, noted that the committee’s focus on fundraising 
led her to question the function of the committee.  The trustee observed, “My 
misgivings about the athletics committee are that we are just a bunch of 
fundraisers and donors around the table….I would say that we are a fundraising 
arm, and I’m not sure we could be evolved into something else.” 
Trustee comments on the benefits of having an athletic committee were in 
accordance with governing board literature that notes the importance of 
committees undertaking the unique work of higher education institutions (Ingram, 
1980; Pelletier, 2012).  Ingram (1980) pointed out, “A board’s need for 
information is too specialized to expect all trustees to be experts on all policy 
issues” (p. 69).  Trustees speaking favorably of athletic committees were also in 
agreement with the recommendations of AGB (2004), which observed that 
athletic committees may be helpful in highlighting athletic issues not adequately 
addressed by other committees.  AGB noted that having a committee was 
beneficial because athletic matters tend to “become ‘lost’ when handled by more 
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than one standing committee” (p. 12).  AGB also observed that an athletics 
committee may help facilitate trust between the board and the president by 
writing, “If the relationship between the president, the athletics director and his or 
her staff, and the chair of the athletics committee goes well, the full board can be 
confident that the most important things are being attended to” (p. 12).  
The recommendations of AGB (2004) regarding the consideration of an 
athletic committee also lend credence to trustee concerns about boosterism and 
institutional overemphasis on athletics.  AGB observed, “The creation of an 
athletics committee can send the wrong signal regarding intercollegiate athletics; 
it inadvertently could reinforce perceptions that the governing board is 
disproportionately preoccupied with intercollegiate athletics” (p.12).  The booster 
approach to an athletic committee has resulted in institutional scandals, including 
the case of Auburn University, which was placed on probation by its regional 
accrediting agency for micromanagement of athletics by athletic boosters who 
served on the board’s athletics committee and failure to provide ultimate authority 
to the president to oversee athletics (Fish, 2006; Gerber, 2005).  
AGB’s Survey of Board Responsibilities for Intercollegiate Athletics 
(2012) found that 46 percent of boards surveyed had a standing committee on 
athletics, while 52 percent did not.  A similar proportion was generally reflected 
in this study, with approximately half of the governing boards included having a 
standing athletics committee at the time of the interviews.  Specifically, eleven of 
the 23 governing boards had an athletic committee, nine did not have an athletics 
committee, one was in the process of creating a committee, one had an ad hoc 
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athletics work group, and one recently decided to eliminate the athletics 
committee after several years of one being in place.   
Compared to the AGB (2012) study, which did not break down the athletic 
committee by type of institution, this study demonstrated that private boards may 
implement athletic committees more than public boards.  Private boards included 
in this study were much more likely to have a standing athletics committee, with 
eight of the nine boards either having a committee or engaging in the process of 
creating one.  Only four of fourteen public boards had or recently had in place a 
committee or work group devoted solely to athletics.  This could be reflective of 
the fact that private governing boards typically delegate more work to 
committees, with private boards having on average eight standing committees and 
public governing boards only having five (AGB, 2010b; AGB, 2010c).   
Examining the presence of committees from a stakeholder governance 
perspective, Post et al. (2002) argued that having dedicated board committees 
focus on a specific issue allows for board members to identify and address critical 
stakeholder issues and viewpoints.  The implementation of an athletic committee 
could serve the purpose of providing a venue for all stakeholders, including 
trustees, institutional leadership, student-athletes, and other interested parties to 
adequately address the complex issues associated with intercollegiate athletics.  
However, when the purpose of a stakeholder approach to governance is the 
consideration of interests of all stakeholders (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Vinten, 
2001), it is important to question whether the complete delegation of authority to 
board committees is serving that function.  This study suggests that stakeholder 
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governance may not be implemented effectively if numerous trustees are ignorant 
of athletic issues because they are only being dealt with in the athletic committee. 
The athletics liaison.  A unique role identified in this study was trustees 
acting as a formal liaison to the athletic department.  The two trustees who self-
identified as board-designated liaisons, described the role as an alternative to the 
implementation of a full athletic committee.  The trustees described their liaison 
roles as allowing for a direct relationship between the governing board and the 
athletic department.  Liaison responsibilities identified included meeting with the 
athletic director, attending other athletic-related meetings, and regularly reporting 
to the full board on athletic issues.   
The two trustees that served as athletic liaisons both came from public 
boards, one from a system board and one from a single institution board.  Trustee 
number three, who served on a public system board, was appointed as the liaison 
to the athletic department and the athletic fundraising association, thereby 
assuring governing board contact with such stakeholders as athletic boosters and 
donors.  The trustee explained that the advantage of the role as having a board 
member who can develop a more in-depth understanding of athletics and 
communicate that to the board.  Trustee number three observed, “The athletic 
director provides me, as the athletic liaison, a report of athletic accomplishments, 
which I provide to the board at each meeting.”   
Trustee number 24 served as the liaison to the athletic department for his 
public single institution board.  When asked to describe the role, he immediately 
responded with a comment on what the role did not include by stating: 
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I don’t have any authority.  The only authority the trustees have is when 
they act as a body.  Furthermore, the athletic director reports to the 
president of the university and is part of the general management chain of 
the university.  So I don’t see the liaison role as being supervisory. 
He went on to note that the implementation of the role stemmed from concern that 
the board was not adequately receiving information on athletic issues. The trustee 
explained: 
It’s really a communication path.  And that’s useful because athletics can 
have a big impact on the way people perceive the university, for the 
positive or the negative.  Having a good flow of communications between 
management and athletics is a good thing.   
The identification and discussion of trustee athletic liaisons contributes to 
the understanding of board governance of intercollegiate athletics because this 
role has not been included in higher education or board management literature.  
AGB’s (2012) study of governing board practices related to athletics neglected to 
include discussion of athletic liaison roles. Due to the limited scope of this study, 
it is unknown whether the implementation of an athletic liaison position is widely 
used among governing boards.  However, the potential positive effect of a liaison 
position is supported by literature on governing boards.  Kezar (2006) observed 
that governing boards tend to isolate themselves to various institutional interests 
and that effective boards “listen to various stakeholders and engage the entire 
system of governance” (p. 998). Trustee number 24’s description of the athletic 
liaison role is an example of engaging stakeholders in the governance of athletics 
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as he described such activities as regularly meeting with the athletic director, 
assisting on athletic presentations to the board, and attending meetings of the 
athletic department’s fundraising organization. 
Despite potential advantages, the implementation of an athletics liaison 
position could lead to questions regarding clarity of roles and responsibilities.  
AGB’s Statement on Board Responsibility for Institutional Governance (2010) 
stated, “Clarity does not preclude overlapping areas of responsibility, but each 
group should understand whether its purview, as well as that of others in the 
governance process, is determinative, consultative, or informational” (p. 5).  
Although trustee number 24 observed that the athletic liaison role does not delve 
into management, the fact that he meets regularly with the athletic director and 
boosters makes it absolutely critical that the responsibilities of the position are 
clearly articulated in board governance documents.  Trustee number 24 
commented that the decision to have an athletic liaison was controversial on his 
board and that he “would only do it if we got clarity around what the role was.” 
From a governance perspective, the appointment of a board athletics 
liaison could be viewed as effective implementation of instrumental stakeholder 
theory in that an individual stakeholder is deployed as means for improving the 
communication and partnership between the board and the athletic department 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Letza et al., 2004).  However, this approach could 
also be subject to critique when applied to a stakeholder governance framework in 
that the delegation of responsibility to an individual board member may inhibit 
transparent and effective governance (Mason et al., 2006).  Mason et al. (2006) 
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argued that the instrumental involvement of board stakeholders may be 
problematic by observing:  
The inclusion and management of stakeholders at board level must be 
transparent, clearly established and open to public scrutiny.  If the 
governance process is complicated by the presence and poor management 
of stakeholders, the effectiveness and legitimacy of the entire process is 
open to doubt. (p. 289)   
In other words, the reliance on individual stakeholders as athletic liaisons 
operating in what could be perceived as a nontransparent manner could 
compromise the overall effectiveness of athletic governance.  
Formal approval authority.  Another manner in which boards have a 
formal role in the governance of athletics is through a board’s authority vested in 
itself to approve certain athletic expenditures.  Although there was some 
discussion among trustees regarding the approval of athletic facility projects, the 
most commonly referenced method for exerting such authority was through the 
approval of employment contracts for athletic department personnel.  Trustees 
observed that contracts, either for new hires or extensions to existing personnel, 
were brought to the board dependent on a variety of conditions.  These included 
whether the contract was for a specific position identified as requiring board 
approval or at or above a minimum dollar threshold.  Responses on this subject 
generally focused on the contracts for coaches of the high profile sports of 
football and men’s basketball.    
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Of the 23 governing boards included in this study, eleven approved 
contracts for athletic department personnel dependent on position or dollar 
threshold, while twelve did not.  The distinction did not break down between 
public versus private boards as seven public boards approved contracts and seven 
did not.  Among private boards, four approved contracts and five did not.  These 
figures provide some new information on board oversight roles as compared to 
the AGB (2012) study, which did not specifically ask about board approval 
authority, but rather only discussed whether the chief executive approved 
coaching contracts in advance.  The AGB study is unclear as to whether “in 
advance” means prior to board approval, board review, or some other 
categorization.   
Trustees from boards who approved coaching contracts were generally 
positive about the implementation of board authority in this manner.  Trustees 
observed that approving contracts, particularly for football and men’s basketball, 
provided the board with oversight authority in an area that can have significant 
financial ramifications due to the size of contracts.  In discussing the various ways 
that his board dealt with athletic issues, Trustee number 11 observed that the 
magnitude of coaching contracts was a consistent issue.  He commented, “Like 
any public university system, we’re constantly confronted with the pressure of 
multi-million dollar contracts for the major sports.” 
Trustee number 19, who served on a public statewide coordinating board, 
cited another reason for approval authority over contracts by referencing the 
ability for board priorities and expectations to be included in contractual 
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agreements.  In discussing an upcoming board vote on a contract extension for 
one of the system’s athletic directors, the trustee explained that academic 
performance standards were included in contracts because of the involvement of 
the board.  The trustee observed: 
We developed a standard coaching contract that addresses the academic 
support, and that was one area that I pushed very hard was to increase the 
amount of bonuses for academic performance of the teams.  And we also 
have the athletic director tied to that.  So as his or her department 
improves their academic performance, it’s a way to earn some incentive 
dollars.   
Trustee number 18 made a similar point in noting that trustees should not only 
approve contracts, but also work with the administration on the front end to 
develop parameters for acceptable contract language.  The trustee stated, “At the 
end of the day, is the entire package that they have negotiated acceptable?  There 
may be some things you like or don’t like, but at the end of the day is it something 
the full board can live with?”    
The relationship between maintaining public confidence in the board and 
approval of contracts was emphasized by trustees.  Understandably, this 
viewpoint was shared only by public institution trustees whose fiduciary 
responsibilities extend to maintaining the public trust in the institutions they 
govern.  This approach is a manifestation of Argandona’s (1998) notion of the 
common good being the foundation of stakeholder theory in which an 
organization’s obligations are to all stakeholders, most notably the public as 
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funders of public universities in this case.  As noted in Table 3.2, Trustee number 
11 was very focused on the public leadership of his statewide coordinating board.  
The trustee observed:  
It seems to me with these multi-million dollar contracts that the buck stops 
with the final authority, and that’s the board.  I would not have trouble 
delegating that to our presidents from the standpoint of them having the 
capability of doing it.  But I think as a matter of public responsibility, the 
board needs to be able to tell the public that we’re the ones that voted on a 
two million dollar contract.  Our universities barely receive any financial 
aid from the legislature, yet we let the universities go and spend million 
bucks on a coach. We’ve had to answer for that….The presidents have to 
answer to this because they’ve recommended it to us.  Yet we are public 
officials and the responsibility lies with us.   
The trustees that were members of boards that did not approve coaching 
contracts were generally deferential to contractual matters being a component of 
the administrative role of presidents and athletic directors.  Two trustees 
referenced corporate sector experience in which boards of directors are 
responsible for the hiring of a chief executive officer, but delegate the remainder 
of personnel decisions to management.  Trustee number six explained this 
approach by stating, “I would liken it to my business experience.  Other than the 
CEO, which is the board’s responsibility to hire, evaluate, and terminate if 
necessary, the senior officers are the CEO’s decision with consultation with the 
board.  We use that same model.”  Trustee number 21 echoed this perspective, 
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responding when asked about the board approving coaching contracts, “No, we 
don’t do that.  From a governance perspective, our board should be hiring and 
firing the CEO and shouldn’t be dealing with anybody else.”  
Two trustees serving on public boards that delegate athletic personnel 
hiring and contract approval also expressed a wariness of navigating the highly 
visible territory of major coaching decisions.  Given the highly engaged 
constituencies surrounding high profile teams, particularly in football and men’s 
basketball, these trustees observed that direct approval authority for coaching 
hires could lead to the governing board being blamed for poorly performing 
teams.  Trustee number two, a public system board trustee, elaborated on this by 
stating, “I’ve had conversations with other trustees who have been in favor of 
reviewing the details of the coaching contracts.  I’ve said that we don’t want to do 
that because then we hire the coaches and if it doesn’t work out, it’s our fault.”   
Trustee number nine, a public statewide coordinating board member, 
commented that the public interest and scrutiny accompanying board involvement 
in athletic personnel matters led to clear lines being drawn between governance 
and management.  While some trustees acknowledged that their boards had an 
expectation that presidents would at least keep them informed regarding coaching 
hires and contract negotiations, Trustee number nine desired no involvement in 
athletic personnel matters.  He explained this perspective by stating: 
We’re real careful on the contracts.  We don’t want the presidents talking 
to us about the contracts.  The board can’t be seen as hiring football or 
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basketball coaches.  As soon as people think that, I’m going to have 500 
people giving me opinions on football coaches. 
The attention paid to athletic personnel matters, particularly the 
compensation of high profile coaches, and the subsequent approval authority 
reserved by some boards included in this study is not surprising given the research 
on this subject.  Research has shown that coaching compensation was the greatest 
single factor in the exponential growth of athletic spending and that football and 
men’s basketball coaches salaries were viewed as being excessive (Knight 
Commission, 2007; Knight Commission, 2009).  Interestingly, the trustees who 
expressed positive opinions about their board’s exercise of approval authority for 
athletic personnel matters did not frame their opinions around the constraint of 
coaching salaries.  Despite the commonly held opinion that coaching contracts are 
excessive as compared to other institutional employees (Knight Commission, 
2007; Knight Commission, 2009), trustees did not claim that their involvement in 
the process helped to transform the compensation market for coaches.  Trustees 
instead focused their remarks on the importance of demonstrating public 
leadership in this area and emphasizing such priorities as academic incentives in 
personnel contracts. 
Those trustees that expressed trepidation about their boards approving 
contracts reflected the governance recommendations on the subject of board 
approval of contracts.  Specifically, there was considerable concern given to not 
encroaching on the authority granted to presidents and athletic directors to 
manage intercollegiate athletics. This reflects a concern expressed by AGB (2010) 
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that “boards should make a conscious effort to minimize the ambiguous or 
overlapping areas in which more than one governance participant or campus 
constituency has authority” (p. 4). 
Stakeholder theory generally maintains that while stakeholder input is 
critical, not all stakeholders need to be a part of the formal decision-making 
structure (Phillips, 2003; Post et al., 2002).  In the context of board approval 
authority over contracts, a traditional stakeholder approach would suggest that 
presidents should seek input from board members, but retain the responsibility of 
final decision-making.  Post et al. (2002) summarized this input role of 
stakeholders by writing: 
The reasonable attempts of various classes of stakeholders to exert a 
governance impact on the corporation have to be recognized as legitimate.  
The proposals involved, however – just like the proposals of conventional 
directors and shareowners – need not always be accepted, or given 
detailed study. (p. 246) 
The literature on stakeholder theory also illustrated the challenges of 
delegated authority regarding decision-making (Blair, 1998; Charron, 2007; 
Sternberg, 1997).  Blair (1998) highlighted one critique of stakeholder theory in 
that governance problems may arise when decisions are made by parties that do 
not assume ultimate responsibility and the associated risk associated with the use 
and control of institutional assets.  In the case of approval authority over athletic 
matters, it could be argued that because the board retains overall fiduciary 
responsibility for institutions, boards should exert authority to approve contractual 
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matters that bear considerable financial and reputational risk.  The importance of 
this exertion of institutional authority was clearly articulated by some trustees, 
particularly those from public boards that maintain a responsibility to protect 
public resources. 
Governance role versus micromanagement.  Regardless of whether a 
board had a structure that included an athletic committee or formally approved 
athletic personnel contracts, trustees spent a considerable amount of time 
discussing the concept of the board maintaining an appropriate stakeholder 
governance role versus delving too substantively into institutional management.  
The following findings discuss how trustees and boards strived to fulfill their 
governance role as related to intercollegiate athletics and the avoidance of 
micromanagement of athletic issues.   
Trustees commented that maintaining an appropriate governance role 
around athletic issues was achieved by boards staying focused on institutional 
mission and policies, and the fulfillment of reporting requirements.  Eight trustees 
specifically noted the distinctions between the day-to-day management of 
athletics being delegated to presidents and board-related work focusing on 
whether athletic policies sufficiently support the work of the administration.  
Some trustees observed that the official work of their boards regarding athletics 
predominantly dealt with administrative reporting in meetings.  For example, two 
trustees commented that while the academic performance of student-athletes was 
an administrative responsibility, boards set clear expectations that information on 
this subject would be reported on a regular basis.   
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Individual trustees repeatedly stressed the importance of presidential 
management and defined board expectations while discussing how their boards 
maintained a governance-focused role.  Essentially, boards delegated oversight of 
athletics to presidents, but communicated expectations through board governance 
documents that they should receive information on a defined set of athletic issues 
(e.g., policies denoting which contracts are to be approved by the board).  When 
asked how his governing board’s committees provide oversight to athletics, 
trustee number 26 observed: 
In terms of how we govern athletics, the athletic director reports to the 
university president and day-to-day operations are led in that manner.  The 
trustees are focused on the fundamental principles of governance, strategy, 
fundraising, and budgets, and inspecting commitments around the 
academic performance and overall performance of the athletic program.  
When asked whether his views on college athletics had changed since becoming a 
board member, trustee number two echoed the previous quote about the 
importance of the board receiving appropriate information from the 
administration.  The trustee commented: 
Our role as the board is to make the policy and see that the policy is being 
followed, but not to micromanage things….It’s very necessary to have 
institutional control and have meaningful reports about athletic activities 
so there are no surprises in the newspaper.  It’s very important to know 
that the policies that have promulgated are being followed.  
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 The focus on presidential authority and maintaining an appropriate 
distance from micromanagement was clearly articulated by two trustees from 
public institutions, likely due to the fact that inappropriate involvement in 
athletics would yield a high level of visibility.  Trustee number nineteen, who 
served on a statewide coordinating board, noted that the relationship between the 
board and the president may be challenged if presidents believe that the board 
moves from governance to management.  The trustee commented, “It’s a very 
critical relationship and it’s something we need to look at even more because 
there’s a concern from some presidents that we are too involved in their day-to-
day management.”  Another statewide coordinating board member, Trustee 
number nine, observed that guaranteeing presidential control of athletics was an 
important achievement during his time in a board leadership role by explaining: 
A few years back, they created athletic corporations at our major 
institutions.  These are separate organizations, and the athletic director 
would become chairman of the corporation. What it led to is athletics 
believing that they were their own organization.  Those athletic boards 
would make decisions, and then they would inform us of what those 
decisions would be.  In an open meeting I reminded them that the athletics 
corporation was nothing more than advisory groups to our presidents, and 
that we had the authority to abolish the athletic corporations at any 
moment and return full authority to the state.  Because there’s one person 
in charge of athletics at our institutions, and that’s the president.  That 
was, in my role as chairman, probably the most important thing that I 
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helped accomplish in terms of athletics, was communicating to the 
athletics folks that nobody was going to put up with their bullshit about 
who was in charge of what.  
While trustees were cognizant of the problem of micromanagement of 
intercollegiate athletics, there was minimal concern that it was an issue for their 
governing boards.  Some trustees observed that the line between management and 
governance was considered with every issue that came before the board, 
regardless of whether it was related to athletics.  This corresponds with the 
literature on governing boards that identifies avoidance of micromanagement as a 
foundational element of effective higher education boards (AGB, 2007; de Russy, 
1996; Kearns, 1998; Sample, 2003).  Three trustees commented that the 
occurrence of board members inappropriately crossing the line into athletic 
management only happened in the past but was no longer a problem.  Trustee 
number eight, who had served as a public system board member for over twenty 
years, remarked: 
There were reports back in the 1960s and 70s of members of the board 
actively recruiting coaches and being involved in those kind of processes.  
But that hasn’t happened since I’ve been on the board.  I don’t know if 
you could get a good athletics director today that would put up with that 
kind of activity.  
Some trustees noted that not having an athletic program with considerable 
interest from fans and the public might play a role in trustees avoiding 
micromanagement.  At institutions where athletics is a major component of the 
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public’s institutional awareness, trustees commented on the intense public 
scrutiny of how their boards interact with athletics, quite often asking for trustees 
to take on a more active role in management decisions.  However, two trustees 
from institutions where athletics was much less visible conveyed the sense that 
maintaining an appropriate governance role was easier because of the lack of 
public interest. Trustee number 25 responded to a question on whether the 
presence of an athletics committee increased the occurrences of stepping over the 
line into micromanagement by observing:  
We’ve pretty easily been able to stay on the governance side. Part of that 
may be because we’re not a very high-profile program.  There are a core 
group of folks that are passionate about our athletic program, but we’re 
not a Michigan or an Ohio State where the state lives and dies with every 
touchdown.  
Trustee number 26 answered a similar question on the work of his board’s 
athletics committee by remarking, “I would tell you that we have been fortunate 
because we have a fairly new athletic program….So we don’t have a culture of 
crossing the line and not understanding role clarity.”  
The preceding quotations regarding the relative level of interest in an 
athletic program and the corresponding effect on board governance demonstrates 
that stakeholders may assume different roles dependent on the organization.  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that stakeholders are identified by their 
interest in an organization and the resultant functional interest that an organization 
has in them.  Clearly, the interest level of fans, alumni, and booster groups is 
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exceedingly higher at institutions with high profile athletic departments, primarily 
found among power conference institutions.  In turn, the functional interest of 
institutions in those stakeholders will yield actions to address the high level of 
interest.  Therefore, it is not surprising that trustees identified the variance of 
stakeholder influence in their comments.   
The literature on governance versus management tends to focus on 
governing boards overstepping their authority into management areas and failing 
to observe the line between policy and administration (AGB, 2010; Hoye & 
Cuskelly, 2007; Kerr & Gade, 1989).  Governing boards, due to being composed 
of people with substantial management experience, often yield to the enticement 
of micromanagement rather than focusing on governance (AGB, 2007; 
Longanecker, 2006).  AGB (2004) noted that athletics in particular may compel 
boards to overstep their role by writing, “That intercollegiate athletics can attract, 
generate, or lose large sums or money and often is the institution’s most visible 
component compels institutional leaders to pay close attention.  Consequently, 
boards should exercise appropriate oversight while avoiding micromanagement, 
viewing athletics with a dispassionate perspective” (p. 3).  
Despite the tendency of the literature to focus on governing board 
micromanagement (AGB, 2010; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Kerr & Gade, 1989; 
Longanecker, 2006), trustees did not believe that their boards exceeded their 
governance role around athletics.  Trustees repeatedly referenced the concept of 
ensuring presidential authority. The results of this study correspond with the 
governance recommendations of the NCAA (2006) and AGB (2007), which were 
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unequivocal in stating that the administrative management and oversight of 
intercollegiate athletics rests in the hands of institutional presidents.  However, 
there is not consensus among higher education organizations that governing 
boards should delegate all authority to presidents, who are the institutional 
delegates to conferences and the NCAA, for the management of athletics.  The 
American Council of Trustees and Alumni (2014) urged trustees to take an active 
role in athletics, writing, “It is critical for trustees actively to oversee their 
intercollegiate athletics programs, rather than allow outside organizations such as 
the NCAA and athletic conferences to dictate governance prerogatives.  Trustees 
cannot expect participants in this multibillion-dollar industry to police 
themselves” (p. 6). 
Informal consultation versus formal action. Trustees routinely 
identified informal consultation with university leadership about important 
athletic issues as a key component of the stakeholder role of governing boards.  
This consultative role was described by trustees as being outside of the domain of 
formal board meeting structures or approval authority, but instead focused on a 
culture of communication between administrators, predominantly presidents, and 
trustees.  Informal consultation occurred in a routine way before board meetings 
when an athletic-related vote was scheduled or in more unique situations where 
the administration wanted to ensure trustees understood an important athletic 
issue. 
Reflecting on the importance of this informal approach to governance, 
several trustees emphasized the magnitude of knowing that the president will 
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reach out to trustees regarding athletic issues when appropriate. As noted in Table 
3.2, trustee number 18 devoted considerable time in his interview to the 
importance of communication with the board on athletic issues.  When asked 
about the relationship between the board and the president regarding athletic 
matters, Trustee number 18 commented:  
As issues come up, our president does pick up the phone and 
communicate.  If we have questions, he’s more than willing to answer our 
questions and discuss the issue and compare notes, compare thoughts.  I 
believe it’s his decision at the end of the day, but I think he does take into 
account our perspectives.   
Trustee number eight, whose board oversees a public system with one institution in 
a power conference, observed that informal consultation is critical because it 
allows for alignment of views when items come before the full board in a public 
setting.  The trustee explained: 
There will be communication between the president, athletics director, and 
key trustees to make sure we’re all together, singing out of the same 
songbook before something goes to the full board, in order to avoid having 
unexpected questions come up. 
Though he had a lengthy record of service on his public system board, 
trustee number eight did not acknowledge that informal consultation with the 
intent of removing obstacles before formal decision-making may be construed as 
negating the intent of open meeting and records laws, commonly-known as 
sunshine laws (McLendon & Hearn, 2006).  Cleveland’s (1985) analysis of 
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sunshine laws as applied to higher education noted that consultation prior to 
decision-making has not typically been prohibited by such legislation, but that 
governing boards and administrators must continually be conscious of the public 
perception of how decisions are made.  Trustee number 26, who served on a 
public board, observed about presidential consultation: 
Our president is fairly comfortable picking up the phone and trustees 
picking up the phone to her to say let’s catch up and talk about a few 
things.  We obviously play by the rules of state sunshine laws, but we have 
no problem talking about critical success measures around athletics. 
Informal consultation mostly occurred during coaching searches and 
contracts negotiations of high profile programs.  Not surprisingly, trustees 
perceived it was extremely helpful to have their institutional presidents keep them 
informed on a regular basis during a major coaching search that attracted public 
and media interest.  In discussing the board’s role in coaching searches or contract 
negotiations, trustee number four remarked that presidents recognize the unique 
nature of high profile sports by stating: 
With football and men’s basketball, and I’m not certain if this is part of 
our governance structure or just because presidents are pragmatic and not 
stupid, they would run those by us because of the expenditures.  When we 
gave our basketball coach a raise in the last basketball season, I know I 
had a call from the president saying this is what he’s demanding, this is 
what we’re going to offer, that kind of thing.  But I’ve never gotten a call 
about women’s cross country or men’s tennis. 
     	  
 
115	  
One board member expressed frustration about situations where a lack of 
consultation occurred prior to important decisions, thereby indicating a 
breakdown in the stakeholder governance of athletics.  Trustee number 22, who 
served on her institution’s athletics committee, was disturbed about a coaching 
contract extension that was shared adequately with neither the athletics committee 
nor the full board.  The trustee commented: 
In terms of contracts and management, those are pretty much decided by 
the athletic department, the CFO, and the president. We are not really 
informed as to what that is about.  As a board member, I feel it’s a little 
problematic….For me to pick up the paper and read that they just signed 
our men’s basketball coach to a new contract and they speculate what his 
salary is going to be.  I think that communication line could be better than 
it is currently. 
Trustee number 22’s reference to a lack of consultation on a contractual issue 
betrays what Hasnas (2013) believes to be a central purpose of stakeholder theory, 
which is to bring the interests of all organizational stakeholders into balance.  The 
lack of informal consultation with the trustee may simply mean that stakeholder 
governance failed regarding this specific situation or it could suggest that the 
organizational expectations around consultation are deficient. 
It was clear that several trustees placed enormous value on the informal 
consultation with institutional leaders, presidents in particular, on athletic issues.  
However, an important question is whether consultation on athletic issues is more 
important than the board exerting its authority in this area through meeting time 
     	  
 
116	  
devoted to athletics or formal actions on athletic issues.  In other words, is it more 
critical for the board’s stake in the governance of intercollegiate athletics to be as 
an active, public participant in decision-making or as a knowledgeable advisor to 
the administrators who manage athletics, most pertinently institutional presidents? 
One reason that trustees cited formal board involvement being more 
important than informal consultation was that formal mechanisms gave the board 
greater opportunity to provide oversight on issues related to risk management and 
compliance in the athletic department.  Given the potential for misconduct in 
athletics and the associated institutional problems that may follow, trustees 
emphasized the importance of having a deliberate, formal process for boards to be 
involved in athletic issues.  Trustee number seven, who was finishing a twelve-
year term on his private institution board, the last six of which he had served as 
either vice chair or chair, devoted considerable time in his interview to the 
fiduciary responsibilities formally executive by the board and the audit and 
compensation committees.  The trustee explained: 
The reputational risk associated with athletics is pretty high right now and 
it’s a big issue for every board.  I think the board needs to have some kind 
of formal process to review the athletic department and at least have some 
kind of process to give input, whatever they want on a regular basis.  I 
think if you leave it to the casual occurrence, you’re not fulfilling your 
fiduciary responsibility. 
Trustees that valued informal consultation with institutional leadership 
over formal oversight mechanisms voiced a common theme that formal board 
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meetings are not productive or often enough to lessen the importance of 
communication outside of board meetings.  Board meetings were either too 
infrequent or lacking in substance, thereby contributing to the belief that spending 
time outside of formal board responsibilities on athletic issues was imperative to 
effective oversight. Trustee number 18, a public single institution board member, 
commented: 
Meeting only six times a year, if you’re not having more frequent dialogue 
and interactions with the university, in this case with the president and his 
leadership team as it relates to athletics, then you’re probably not doing a 
good job providing proper oversight. 
Trustees observed that formal opportunities to discuss athletic issues in 
board meetings often lacked substance. Instead of providing opportunities for 
trustees to markedly contribute to institutional decision-making on athletic-related 
issues, formal interactions with athletics were characterized as merely 
opportunities for superficial reporting from administrators. As noted in Table 3.2, 
Trustee number 14 repeatedly argued for greater board involvement in athletics 
by trustees.  The trustee downplayed the formal work of his board’s formal 
athletics committee, stating, “I think our athletics committee is a dog-and-pony 
show.  It doesn’t have much substance to it….I believe that the informal dialogue 
supersedes anything that takes place from a formal standpoint.” 
The lack of substance in formal board reports on athletics was more 
prevalent in comments from trustees of public boards.  Public trustees noted that 
sunshine laws impeded substantive discussion on the challenges posed by athletic 
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matters.  Issues such as the financial requirements to support Division I athletics 
or escalating coaching salaries were observed by trustees as topics extremely 
difficult to broach in a public setting.  As noted previously in this chapter, a 
prevalence of utilizing informal consultation due to the challenges of sunshine 
laws may lead to public scrutiny of board governance.  
Trustee responses regarding formal versus informal governance suggests 
that the experience of being a trustee of a private board is a much different 
experience than service on a public board, whether single institution, system, or 
statewide coordinating.  For example, not only were private boards much more 
likely to implement the formal structure of an athletics committee to provide 
oversight to intercollegiate athletics, private board trustees tended to place greater 
importance on formal governance mechanisms than informal consultation.  One 
inference from these results is that public conversations on intercollegiate 
athletics are challenging due to the massive public interest in college sports.  
Trustees commented on this distinction between private and public boards 
in dealing with intercollegiate athletic issues, noting that operating in an 
environment of sunshine laws and public scrutiny makes formal conversations 
around intercollegiate athletic governance challenging.  Trustee number 24, who 
served on a public single institution board, commented, “I think the formal reports 
are for the public record.  A lot of what you see in public universities, meetings of 
the trustees are pretty formalized because of the open meetings act.  A lot of the 
high value content occurs informally.” In commenting on the benefits of dealing 
with athletics on a private board, trustee number seven observed: 
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There’s a lot of things that are hard to work through if they’re played out 
on a public microphone and then you get people commenting on it that 
aren’t necessarily focused on the excellence of the institution.  I guess 
that’s the price for getting public funding. 
The findings are consistent with the higher education literature 
emphasizing consultation as one of the foundations of shared governance 
(Birnbaum, 2004; Kaplan, 2004). Kezar (2004) observed the importance of 
informal leadership and consultation over formal governance structures by 
writing: 
A governance system can operate with imperfect structures and processes, 
but if leadership is missing and relationships and trust damaged, the 
governance system will likely fail for lack of direction, motivation, 
meaning, integrity, a sense of common purpose, ways to integrate multiple 
perspectives, open communication, people willing to listen, and 
legitimacy. (p. 44)  
The study also indicates that the majority of trustees are in agreement with 
Birnbaum’s (2004) conclusion that “soft” governance, or the connections and 
interactions that happen outside of the formal system, produce greater results than 
“hard” governance, or organizational structures, policies, and procedures that 
define authority.   
The study documents an application of instrumental stakeholder theory 
(Jones, 1995; Letza et al., 2004).   This form of stakeholder governance views 
stakeholder interests as “means” to improving organizational effectiveness rather 
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than “ends” to formal governance decisions (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Letza et 
al., 2004;).  Similarly, regardless of whether a governing board is formally 
involved in athletic-related decisions, a culture in which informal consultation is 
expected on important athletic issues leads to trustees acting as instruments in the 
stakeholder governance of athletics. 
A significant component of an athletic governance structure based on 
informal consultation, at least when related to governing boards, is the 
corresponding reliance on trusting the administration to communicate with 
trustees on athletic matters.  As noted in Chapter Four, several trustees conveyed 
a sense of trust in institutional presidents to effectively manage intercollegiate 
athletics.  However, it was also observed by multiple trustees that their board’s 
formal involvement in athletics stemmed from a lack of trust in their presidents.  
A critique of stakeholder theory offered by Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) is 
that dependent stakeholders, in this case trustees, can only rely on the 
trustworthiness of the organization to keep them engaged and to limit egregious 
behavior.  Minus formal mechanisms for providing oversight to athletics, trustees 
are completely bound to the willingness of institutional presidents to keep them 
informed on athletic issues, thereby potential compromising effective stakeholder 
governance.   
The study charts new ground in the literature on higher education 
governance and stakeholder management regarding the difference between public 
and private boards in their ability to employ formal mechanisms of governance.  
While AGB (2010b) provided distinctions between public and private boards in 
     	  
 
121	  
terms of composition and general practices, this study offered new perspectives 
on the manner in which public and private boards are realistically able to provide 
oversight to the high profile area of intercollegiate athletics.  The results 
demonstrated that public boards face greater challenges in substantively 
discussing athletic-related matters in a formal meeting setting than do private 
boards, thereby leading to the conclusion that public board trustees valued 
informal consultation greater than formal board interactions.  
Board Challenges in the Governance of Athletics 
Trustees identified various challenges their boards faced in contributing as 
stakeholders in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.  Challenges related to 
athletics at their own institutions, but also noted broad national trends that 
complicated their ability to fulfill a stakeholder role in athletic governance.  
Responses in this section were categorized into the two broad themes of financial 
implications of supporting a Division I athletic department and the perceived lack 
of influence held by boards in decision-making on athletic issues.   
Athletic expenditures.  The challenge in providing oversight to 
intercollegiate athletics most often cited by trustees was related to the massive 
financial commitment needed to support a Division I athletic enterprise.  Trustee 
comments focused on concerns around the inequitable position of smaller athletic 
programs trying to maintain a pace of spending with more powerful institutions.  
There was also conversation of more wealthy athletic departments being criticized 
for generating too much profit and not giving back to other components of the 
institutional mission. 
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Of the 15 trustees that serve on boards overseeing no power conference 
institutions, ten made comments regarding the financial challenges in maintaining 
a competitive athletic department. These trustees conveyed the belief that the 
economics of intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level does not result in a 
level playing field.  Whereas institutions from the power conferences are often the 
beneficiaries of multi-million conference media disbursements and massive ticket 
and premium seating revenue, the majority of trustees governing non-power 
conference institutions noted that their governing boards spend considerable time 
devoted to athletics on determining how the athletic enterprise will be funded.  
The expectation of smaller institutions having to compete on the field, in the 
classroom, and in recruiting with institutions maintaining a considerable financial 
advantage was labeled as a primary institutional challenge as related to athletics.  
The issue of institutional subsidies to support intercollegiate athletics was 
repeatedly brought up by trustees as a focal point of board involvement in athletic 
matters.  The trustees from less prominent athletics programs, mostly from non-
power conferences but not exclusively, believed the amount of institutional 
funding devoted to athletics was a constant source of discussion and quite often, 
tension, among board members.  Trustee number ten expressed a commonly-held 
viewpoint that increasing institutional funding devoted to athletics was leading his 
institution down an unsustainable path by stating, “My views on athletics have 
changed significantly since being on the board and realizing the monetary cost of 
athletics to the university….I believe that only the very biggest of the universities 
can afford to be Division I, especially in football.”  Interestingly, trustee number 
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ten observed that altering his institution’s approach to athletics through a de-
emphasis on football was unlikely due to the board and the president not wanting 
to be responsible for what would likely be an unpopular decision with boosters 
and alumni.   
When asked about issues that have causes his board consternation, trustee 
number thirteen, who served on a private board from a non-power conference, 
commented that the level of institutional subsidy was a constant topic for the 
board.  The trustee observed: 
The consternation for the board is all around money.  Athletics at most 
institutions, especially small institutions like ours, is not 100 percent self-
funded.  So the institution pays a portion of the money that goes to support 
athletics.  And that’s always been a bone of contention among board 
members and particularly the previous president, about what percentage of 
athletics total expenditures should the university kick in. 
Trustee number 13 additionally noted that the conversation about the financial 
support needed to sustain a successful Division I athletic department was driven 
by the board rather than the administration and that the board eventually reached 
consensus on the appropriate level of institutional subsidy.   
The absence of a self-supporting athletic program, or one that does not 
receive any institutional subsidy, was not isolated to the lesser profile athletic 
institutions.  Despite the influx of revenue flowing from television contracts and 
ticket revenue, trustees that govern power conference institutions also noted that 
institutional support was required to maintain a high performing athletic 
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department.  Trustee number five, who served on a board of a public system with 
one institution in a power conference, commented: 
The policy of the system is that schools are supposed to be self-sustaining.  
And that’s not necessarily been the case.  Our main campus has had to 
borrow for facilities and some of the other institutions have had to borrow 
from their reserves for operating deficits.  The self-sustaining concept has 
been a goal but has not been achieved. 
Trustee number 17, whose private institution is from a power conference and 
recently achieved a great deal of athletic success after substantial institutional 
investment in facilities and coaching contracts, observed that accomplishment had 
come at a high price.  The trustee commented, “We’ve benefitted by keeping 
up….Our applications are through the roof.  Our SAT scores are up.  Our 
donations are up. Everything’s good.  But we’ve had to plug a bunch of money 
into the program.” 
One trustee observed that problems may arise within institutions that have 
self-supporting athletic programs.  Trustee number 29, who served on a public 
single institution trustee from a power conference, observed that her institution’s 
wealthy athletic department annually has had surplus revenue, thereby leading to 
tension with academic departments, particularly those with funding challenges., 
After being posed the question of whether too much money in athletics has a 
downside at her institution, the trustee recounted a situation in which non-athletic 
events in athletic facilities produced additional revenue for the athletic 
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department, which caused consternation among board members.  Trustee number 
29 commented:  
There’s a lot of internal angst and very robust conversations that the 
money should flow to the general fund….And of course the athletic 
director is very possessive of any kind of income that comes through the 
building should go to athletics.  And there are other parts of the university 
that really resent it.  It’s bad for morale, and all those other issues that 
come with it.  When you’re successful, people start arguing over the 
money.  
Some trustees also believed that understanding the financial issues in 
intercollegiate athletics was challenging.  Athletic budgets were not only complex 
but trustees were often provided insufficient information to substantively 
contribute to discussions around athletic finances.  Trustee number 22, 
interestingly turned a question about whether trustees veer inappropriately into 
management issues by expressing frustration about the lack of information that 
the administration provided to trustees on athletic department finances.  The 
trustee noted:   
On the finance part of it, I think by handling it at the administrative level, 
a lot of the contentious issues are not debated.  They’re not really 
discussed…. I feel like as a member of the athletic committee, I should 
have that data.  I should know the athletic department gets X million 
dollars.  Even if it’s just in pots.  I just feel like I’m totally ignorant in this 
area and I shouldn’t be. 
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Trustee number 28, who served on a public statewide coordinating board with no 
power conference institutions, explained that his board’s response to the 
complexities of athletic finances was the implementation of a policy requiring that 
athletic department budgets are brought to the board for approval.  The trustee 
observed: 
Our thinking is both of our athletic departments have been operating with 
significant deficits.  We’re not interested in having academic subsidize 
athletics. So what we’re looking at isn’t how much money is given to 
football or basketball or bowling, we’re looking at whether or not they’re 
operating in the black.   
Trustee observations of the challenges associated with athletic finances 
were consistent with the literature, particularly studies focused on the overall 
financial health of Division I athletic departments (Denhart & Vedder, 2010; 
Fulks, 2013).  Given that a minimal percentage of NCAA Division I athletic 
departments have not received institutional subsidies (Fulks, 2013), it is not 
surprising that trustees consistently cited the financial obligations of supporting a 
Division I athletic program as one of the most considerable challenges faced by 
boards. The study is also consistent with the Knight Commission’s (2009) survey 
of NCAA Division I-FBS college presidents, which found that less than a quarter 
believe that intercollegiate athletics was sustainable in its current form and that 
over 85 percent feel that compensation for football and men’s basketball coaches 
is excessive.  The financial challenges associated with sponsoring Division I 
athletics are likely to be exacerbated with the recent NCAA governance reform 
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that gives greater financial autonomy to the power conferences, thereby widening 
the gap between those institutions with abundant resources and those without, 
both inside and outside of the power conferences (Wolken, 2014).  Trustee 
number ten was interviewed prior to the NCAA governance reform taking place, 
but he correctly predicted the autonomy decision and noted further challenges for 
his non-power conference institution by observing, “We can’t fight the fight.  If 
the big boys decide to take off, then they will.  If they decide to pay $2,000 per 
student-athlete for side money, we can’t do that.” 
Trustee acknowledgment of the complexity of athletic financing was not 
surprising given the board governance literature devoted to intercollegiate 
athletics.  AGB (2010) observed that the multifaceted manner in which athletic 
departments are financed makes it hard for boards to fulfill their ultimate 
responsibility of maintaining institutional fiscal integrity.  Regarding the manner 
in which boards should approach the topic of athletic finances, AGB (2012) 
observed:  
The board needs to know the extent to which the funding for athletics 
comes from the institution’s general fund, student fees, or support from 
affiliated foundations or state government, and how such funding 
comports with board policy.  The board should understand the extent to 
which funds that might otherwise go to academic programs are directed 
instead to athletics. (p. 19)   
Governance without power.  Trustees also discussed various scenarios in 
which they felt the board lacked power in providing oversight to their institutional 
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athletic departments, thereby weakening the effectiveness of this stakeholder 
group in the shared governance of athletics.  The perceived absence of authority 
was attributed to such factors as the external influence of media, the power 
wielded by high profile coaches, and external control over the recent trend of 
conference realignment decisions.  Generally, trustees conveyed a sense of 
disillusionment that despite board interest in enhancing athletic oversight, a host 
of factors prevented legitimate involvement in athletic-related matters. 
Trustees commented on the power wielded by media, particularly 
television networks, in controlling the national dialogue regarding college 
athletics and operational matters in athletics.  For example, institutions have had 
minimal influence over game times for the prominent sports of football and men’s 
basketball, which are completely decided by television networks in accordance 
with lucrative broadcast contracts (Drum, 2013). Trustee number two elaborated 
on the manner in which this has evolved over time by stating: 
At the national level, a lot more money is spent on athletics, and put into 
the game.  Television has had a great influence.  When I was growing up, 
you could always count on the Saturday afternoon football game.  Now 
it’s whenever ESPN wants to put it on. 
When asked of his viewpoints on the national landscape of college athletics, 
Trustee number 25 reiterated the power of television networks by noting: 
It’s being primarily driven by the need for television to have content.  
When you have 150 channels all on 24 hours a day, and 15 of them are 
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sports channels, they need content.  It’s really been driven over the last 
twenty years by television, led by ESPN.   
Media organizations are stakeholders in the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics and have an expressed role in how athletic programs are publicized and 
funded.  As pointed out in this study, a prioritization among claims may occur in a 
stakeholder governance system (Ryan, 1990) and it is not surprising that trustees 
view the media as being prioritized given the high notoriety of intercollegiate 
athletics.  However, a prioritization of claims should not necessarily entail an 
exclusion of influence in decision-making.  Neither of the two previously quoted 
trustees mentioned the fact that decisions around game times and the overall 
power of the television networks are codified by the conference media rights 
packages, which are approved by the conference boards made up of institutional 
presidents (Drum, 2013).  It is unclear if this means that trustees are being 
completely excluded from conference media negotiations, presidents are not 
consulting with boards, or a shared sentiment of presidents and trustees that 
individual institutions are at the will of conference commissioners. 
Trustees also noted the challenge of coaches in the major sports of football 
and men’s basketball being the most highly compensated and powerful 
institutional employees.  This perspective is not surprising given that across the 
United States, the highest paid public employee in 27 states is a football coach 
and in 13 states a men’s basketball coach (Fischer-Baum, 2013).   Trustees were 
frustrated when presidents and boards simply were incapable of speaking out 
against or disciplining coaches that were popular due to considerable success in 
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athletic performance.  The perceived immunity of high profile coaches 
complicated the chain of authority embedded in traditional university governance 
structures.  Despite the fact that coaches report to athletic directors and presidents 
to governing boards, trustees observed that board support for a president or 
athletic director may be meaningless in disputes with powerful, popular coaches. 
Comments on the inability to challenge powerful coaches was not isolated 
to trustees from power conference institutions, but those that addressed this issue 
all referenced very successful coaches who were received extremely high 
compensation.   Trustee number 21, who served on a private board from a non-
power conference, observed that her institutional president made a clear case that 
“we needed to reward our basketball coach and keep him happy because there 
was a belief that the success of the program was due to him.”  Trustee number 
nine, who chaired a statewide coordinating board with multiple power conference 
institutions, illustrated the challenges of dealing with coaches by recounting a 
conversation with his institutional presidents about how the board would provide 
unconditional support regarding athletics.   
One of the presidents says, if my basketball coach walks into my office 
tomorrow, and demands something that I can’t or won’t do, or I think is 
bad for the university, and he walks out and quits, I have to resign by 5 
o’clock, period.  But the board said no, we would support you because you 
would be right.  The president then said if I did that and caused the coach 
to leave, I would have no ability to govern the university.  
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An interesting case study on the power dynamics in college athletics 
involved the massive amount of conference realignment that occurred in recent 
years.  From 2010 to 2013, nine power conference institutions switched 
conferences, a new Division I-FBS conference was created, and many other 
institutions switched conferences at all levels of Division I (Forde, 2013).  
Fourteen trustees governed institutions that either switched conferences during 
their time on the board or had the existence of their current conference threatened 
by other institutions moving.  These trustees recounted a variety of scenarios of 
how their boards were involved in the decision-making process, from passively 
observing developments to actively lobbying other institutions for their 
institution’s conference seat. The vast majority of trustees discussing this issue, 
however, observed that their boards maintained a very limited role in conference 
affiliation decisions due their influence being restricted.  
Only one trustee described a very active board role in decisions around 
institutional athletic conference affiliation.  Trustee number 17, whose institution 
was in a conference that was being threatened with elimination due to other 
members leaving, recounted a lengthy ordeal in which the board took a leadership 
role in preserving the existing conference.  When asked about the board’s specific 
involvement, the trustee responded, “We led it.  To the point where I had to jump 
on a plane and show up at board meetings of other member institutions.  As 
chairman, I was on the phone for six straight weeks, twenty hours a day.”  The 
activist role regarding conference affiliation decisions described by trustee 
number 17 was very much in line with his other answers that described a private 
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board that was very active in many aspects of athletic governance, including 
leading fundraising efforts for new athletic facilities.     
 Most trustees described their role in conference realignment decisions as 
being advisory to presidents.  Given that presidents typically serve as board 
members for their respective athletic conference councils, trustees either explicitly 
or implicitly delegated authority to presidents to enter into conference affiliation 
decisions.  Trustee number nine, whose statewide coordinating board oversaw 
multiple institutions involved in realignment discussions, observed that his board 
provided explicit authority and instructions to the institutional presidents.  He 
stated , “Our primary job was to be a buffer between the CEO’s and the rest of the 
world, but also to provide the CEO’s with the comfort that they were the people 
who were going to make the final decisions.  But we wanted to be consulted if 
anything changed.”  As noted in Table 3.2, this comment by trustee number nine 
was very much in line with limited involvement in athletic matters by his board.    
Despite having final approval authority over the ultimate conference 
affiliation decisions, trustees noted that they felt as though they were essentially 
rubber-stamping a decision that had already been finalized.  Three trustees cited 
the conference requirement of confidentiality agreements for those involved in the 
negotiations as hindering the opportunity for boards to actively partake in 
decision-making process.  So while presidents sometimes informed board 
leadership and select trustees about the status of affiliation negotiations, the 
sentiment of some trustees was their boards as a whole were ill informed and 
substantively excluded from the process. 
     	  
 
133	  
Trustee number 22, who served on a board overseeing a private institution 
that was embroiled in a lengthy conference realignment discussion, characterized 
the board’s role as very minimal in stating, “In terms of decision-making, we did 
not decide what the conference was going to be.  We were brought up to speed 
and ultimately there was a vote and we did decide, but all the nuances and 
strategy were developed by the administration.”  Trustee number five, whose 
public system board oversaw an institution that moved between power 
conferences, directed his frustration at the conferences, rather than institutional 
presidents, commenting: 
To the extent that these conferences are imposing very onerous 
confidentiality requirements on universities, I think in many respects it 
conflicts with good governance….I think that this strikes at the heart of 
how can a university be governed if a board does not have basic 
information.   
The trustee expressed additional frustration with the manner in which the board 
was forced to make the final decision by stating: 
For the most part, the trustees were not brought into it.  Not until the last 
minute on one night, and then we were supposed to vote the next day.  I 
just think it’s not the way to run a railroad or a university….I think the 
bigger issue from a national perspective, is should the tail be wagging the 
dog?  Should these conferences be dictating the information flow to 
boards?  
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Trustee perspectives on a perceived lack of power in contributing to the 
governance of athletics is consistent with the sport management literature (Miller, 
Eder, & Sandomir, 2013; Smith & Ourand, 212; Staples, 2013).  Television 
networks such as ESPN are largely thought to be the most powerful influence in 
the major sports of football and men’s basketball (Miller et al., 2013).  Media 
listings of the most powerful people in college sports focus heavily on conference 
commissioners and television network executives, rarely mentioning university 
staff (Smith & Ourand, 2012; Staples, 2013).  Regarding conference affiliation, 
although Sweitzer (2009) observed that switching conferences is often carried out 
for reasons outside of athletics, including overall institutional prestige, the vast 
majority of recent conference changes have occurred because there is a financial 
advantage to both the institution making the switch and the conference adding a 
new member (Staples, 2012). 
This study documents a set of athletic issues (i.e., the setting of game 
times) that trustees, acting as stakeholders, believed they were not able to 
sufficiently contribute to decision-making.  From a stakeholder perspective, the 
concept of functioning in a governance role without a corresponding level of 
power is at odds with the tenets of stakeholder theory (Letza et al., 2004; Mason 
et al., 2007; Post et al., 2002).  Despite the acknowledgment that there may a 
prioritization of stakeholder claims (Crane & Ruebottom, 2012; Ryan, 1990), a 
fundamental component of stakeholder governance is that decision-making is 
framed around the influence and opinions of all stakeholders (Post et al., 2002).  
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The findings presented in this chapter call to question whether stakeholder 
governance is an appropriate model for governing boards to participate in 
intercollegiate athletic oversight.  An alternative question may not be whether 
stakeholder governance is an appropriate functional model, but rather how 
governing boards might assume a more influential role.  Crane and Ruebottom 
(2012) concluded their review of stakeholder theory by observing: 
From an instrumental perspective, where firm responses might be based 
on rational interest-based calculations of the power, legitimacy, and 
urgency of the claims of different identity groups, then the question arises 
as to which identities are most likely to recognized as powerful and 
legitimate by firms, and how societal constituencies might be able to build 
such stakeholder capital. (p. 85) 
This study has summarized findings related a variety of governance mechanisms, 
both informal and formal, in which boards attempt to build such stakeholder 
capital and establish an appropriate and influential stakeholder role in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics.  Chapter six will devote considerable 
attention to the governance structures and roles described in this study to better 
ascertain the effectiveness of boards participating in the shared governance of 
athletics. 
One interesting finding related to board challenges was the fact that very 
few trustees mentioned gender equity and Title IX compliance as an area of 
consternation for their boards.  Five trustees mentioned Title IX as a topic that 
their boards or athletic committees devoted attention to, but only two trustees 
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cited it as a specific challenge for their boards.  This lack of attention is noted due 
to the preponderance of organizations, including AGB (2004), the NCAA (2006), 
and the Knight Commission (2001), that cited gender equity in athletics and Title 
IX compliance as an athletic governance area that requires comprehensive 
institutional and board engagement.  
Summary 
This chapter presented the findings and discussion on the second two 
research questions. The first theme identified under research question two dealt 
with the various roles that boards assume in providing oversight to intercollegiate 
athletics.  Trustees commented on the advantages and risks associated with the 
implementation of athletics committees, the appointment of trustees as athletics 
liaisons, and the board exercising formal approval over athletic related matters. A 
second theme identified by trustees was the importance of maintaining an 
appropriate governance role and avoiding micromanagement of athletics. A final 
theme identified for research question two was the debate about whether informal 
consultation on athletics is more important than formal board structures and 
processes. 
Two themes were identified for the third research question.  The first 
challenge associated with athletic governance was related to the complex financial 
obligations of supporting Division I athletics.  A second theme emerging under 
the third research question was the sentiment that governing boards are limited in 
power in dealing with athletic issues by external entities such as television 
networks and athletic conferences. 	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Chapter Six 
Conclusion  
This purpose of this study was to examine the perceptions of trustees of 
NCAA Division I institutions on intercollegiate athletics and the manner in which 
higher education governing boards act as stakeholders in the shared governance of 
athletics.  Qualitative interviews were conducted with 29 trustees from 23 
different governing boards that oversaw at least one institution at the NCAA 
Division I level.  This chapter will provide a summary of the findings, develop or 
draw out theoretical and empirical implications, suggest recommendations for 
policy and practice, discuss study limitations, and offer recommendations for 
further research.   
Summary of Findings 
Trustees displayed a balanced view in conveying their general 
perspectives on intercollegiate athletics, with near unanimity in believing that 
athletics was a positive component of their colleges and universities.   A variety 
of factors, predominantly from an anecdotal basis, were cited as contributing to 
these positive viewpoints, including an enhanced student experience, engaged 
alumni, and national branding for their institutions.  At the same time, trustees 
routinely commented that intercollegiate athletics tended to play an oversized role 
on their campuses in comparison to the primary academic mission.  This 
contradiction between support for athletics and concerns about overemphasis 
reflects the literature on both public opinion of intercollegiate athletics and 
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concerns expressed by higher education administrators (Knight Commission, 
2006: Taylor et al., 2011). 
A second contradiction voiced by trustees related to their overall 
perspectives on intercollegiate athletic governance.  While trustees predominantly 
articulated a considerable level of confidence in athletic governance and 
institutional leadership, they concurrently revealed a lack of understanding of 
their institutional governance structures, with particular inattention paid to faculty 
roles.  Similarly, a trust in executive leadership to appropriately manage athletics 
was paired with a preoccupation on scandals in intercollegiate athletics and the 
correlated risk to both institutions and trustees themselves. 
The study suggests that the manner in which a governing board operating 
as stakeholders and contributing to the shared governance of athletics will vary, in 
some cases dramatically.  As stated in Chapter Two, the definition of stakeholders 
for this study was groups or individuals that affect organizational achievement or 
are affected by organizational achievement (Freeman & Reed, 1983), which 
included individuals involved in athletic governance such as trustees, athletic 
administrators, presidents, faculty, students, and donors. This study demonstrated 
that the important question is not whether governing boards are stakeholders that 
affect or are affected by the institutional governance of intercollegiate athletics, 
but instead how they should be involved in this governance structure.   
In attempting to answer the question of how governing boards are 
appropriately interwoven into athletic governance, the findings indicate that there 
are strengths and weaknesses built into the various models of board oversight of 
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intercollegiate athletics.  For example, whether a board has a committee on 
athletics depends on a variety of factors, including whether the existing committee 
structure can manage athletic issues, historical problems that have caused a board 
to be concerned about athletic oversight, or apprehensions about the 
administrative leadership in this area. The study also suggests that the type of 
institution may be a factor in decisions around committee structure, with nearly 
all private boards having an athletics committee and fewer than half of public 
boards having a committee, likely due to private boards delegating more likely to 
delegate issues to committees (AGB, 2010b; AGB, 2010c).   
The involvement of boards in athletic personnel decisions including 
coaching searches and contract approvals was another area in which a variety of 
approaches were identified in the study.  The policies and practices regarding 
approval authority ranged from trustees contributing to decisions on coaches that 
need to be dismissed and the pool of candidates for replacement, to boards 
explicitly asking to not be included in any consultation regarding athletic 
personnel decisions.  When weighing their involvement in personnel decisions, 
boards must ask whether acting as a formal stakeholder ensures appropriate high 
level oversight or endangers the board by creating the appearance of 
micromanagement and the opportunity for the board to assume blame if a hiring 
decision goes awry.   
The interview questions on governance structure and board authority for 
athletic decision-making led to a discussion with trustees about the relative 
significance of formal governance mechanisms versus informal consultation.  
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Upon being asked about their opinions on this subject, a majority of trustees 
observed that informal consultation trumps formal governance when it comes to 
intercollegiate athletics. The findings suggest a level of support among trustees 
for Birnbaum’s (2004) conclusion that “soft” governance, or the connections and 
interactions that happen outside of the formal system, produce greater results than 
“hard” governance, or organizational structures, policies, and procedures that 
define authority.  A repeated theme voiced by trustees, even those that put greater 
value on formal governance mechanisms, was the expectation that they be kept 
informed on issues in athletics, particularly those that could have serious 
ramifications on institutional reputation, such as athletic scandals and high profile 
personnel decisions.  From a governance perspective, although being informed 
does not necessarily constitute involvement in decision-making, the repeated 
comments from trustees suggested that information flow is often lacking. 
The informal, consultative approach promoted by Birnbaum (2004) is an 
application of instrumental stakeholder theory, in which stakeholders are viewed 
as “means” of governance rather than “ends” in decision-making (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Letza et al., 2004).  Rather than a formal board 
decision on an athletics matter being the end result of the governance process, the 
informal consultation acts as the means for the board fulfilling a stakeholder 
governance role.  Greenwood and Van Buren (2010) critique of this approach to 
governance by arguing that trustees are beholden to the trustworthiness of other 
organizational actors to engage them in consultation, thereby ensuring a passive 
rather than active stakeholder role.  Therefore, it is appropriate to inquire whether 
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a reliance on the consultative approach often associated with shared governance 
in higher education leads to trustees and boards fulfilling an effective stakeholder 
role. 
The judgment of how effective a board fulfills a stakeholder role in the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics, which occurred when trustees expressed a 
satisfaction with not only their roles but the manner in which the board was 
interwoven into institutional decision-making regarding athletics, appeared to be 
derived from the internal governance culture of the board and the related 
confidence in institutional leadership.  For example, it was clearly conveyed by 
some trustees that a consultative governance culture in which the president would 
provide timely, informal updates on athletic matters yielded sufficient opportunity 
for the board to learn about the issues, offer input on potential actions, and 
determine whether formal board involvement was needed.  The suggestion was 
that these trustees trusted their presidents to involve the board when necessary.  
On the other hand, multiple trustees conveyed frustrations about a lack of 
consultation on athletic issues, which ultimately led to requests for more formal 
involvement by the board.  The difference in these two approaches provides a 
level of substantiation to Greenwood and Van Buren’s (2010) contention that 
effective stakeholder governance is dependent upon the actions of organizational 
participants towards each other, thereby lessening the importance of 
implementing a specific formal governance structure. 
The findings related to athletic committees and formal versus informal 
governance suggests that the experience of being a trustee of a private board can 
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be a much different experience than that of a public board, whether single 
institution, system, or statewide coordinating.  Although the sample size is 
limited, the findings showed that the private boards involved in the study were 
more likely to implement the formal structure of an athletics committee to provide 
oversight to intercollegiate athletics.  The discussion around this topic suggested 
that private board trustees might place greater significance on formal governance 
mechanisms than informal consultation.  One inference from these results might 
be that public conversations on intercollegiate athletics are challenging due to the 
massive public interest in college sports, particularly when factoring in that an 
overemphasis on athletics sometimes creates a rift between the academic 
community and the administration.   
Jones (1995) asserted that an important component of the stakeholder 
model of governance is the establishment of a culture of trust and responsibility 
among all of the stakeholders involved in an organization.  Given the unique 
challenges that are imposed on presidents in managing intercollegiate athletics 
and on trustees in upholding their fiduciary responsibility in this area, the 
development of trust between the various stakeholders was clearly an important 
theme communicated by trustees.  A comment by trustee number 27 emphasized 
the importance of trust between the president and the board by stating: 
The relationship is very important, because if the board sees athletics one 
way and the president sees it another, that’s a recipe for major conflict.  So 
rapport, communication, and mutual understanding is really critical for the 
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success of the board, success of the administration, and success of the 
athletic program. 
This comment and others by trustees seemed to indicate that the implementation 
of a culture in which expectations are clearly developed and ultimately followed 
around stakeholder roles is equally, if not more, important than whether a board 
has an athletics committee or approves coaching contracts.   
The development of a culture of trust and responsibility can be fostered in 
a myriad of ways and is clearly dependent on environmental factors for each 
board and each institution.  For example, private boards with a significant number 
of members often delegate significant authority to existing standing committees.  
For some private boards, the existence of an athletics committee and substantial 
involvement by the administration in the work of the committee might be 
sufficient to engender the trust of the board as a whole that proper attention is 
being paid to athletics.  On the contrary, the development of a culture of trust for a 
board elected by the public expected to provide oversight on all major 
institutional decisions, including those associated with intercollegiate athletics, 
may require that formal decisions involve the entire board.  
Despite trustees conveying a relative level of comfort with the internal 
governance of intercollegiate athletics at their own institutions, partially due to the 
development of a culture of trust among stakeholders, the challenges voiced by 
trustees dealt with issues more externally driven than internally created.  The 
governance without power findings were primarily derived from trustee 
comments about the inability of internal governance mechanisms to appropriately 
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manage several areas of modern intercollegiate athletics.  Trustees conveyed a 
sense of frustration in dealing with the influence of the media, the market-driven 
nature of power coaches and their associated salaries, and the recent movement of 
institutions between athletic conferences, instigated largely by conference 
commissioners rather than the institutions themselves (Staples, 2012). 
Not only did the study indicate that trustees were challenged by factors at 
the system level of intercollegiate athletics, an additional commonly voiced theme 
from trustees was that presidents had a tremendously difficult task in managing 
the complexities of modern college athletics.  Trustees recounted the presidential 
challenges of dealing with such issues as power coaches and reigning in the 
escalation of spending.  Trustee comments supported the literature, including 
Hoffman (2013), who discussed the challenges assumed by presidents in this 
realm by writing:  
Efforts by presidents are constrained by a gridiron marketplace 
characterized by an intensely competitive environment that emphasizes 
winning and commercial interests….There have been few if any college 
and university presidents of FBS programs that have been able to 
individually steer substantive changes at their own institution and only a 
few have worked collectively to implement new policies. (p. 17) 
Granting the challenges assumed by governing boards and presidents in 
influencing the national dialogue on college athletics and the associated inability 
of a collective of institutions, either through the NCAA or other structures, to 
impart legitimate reform, this study illustrated that a stakeholder approach 
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through institutional shared governance may be limited in dealing with the 
complexities of intercollegiate athletics.     
Empirical and Theoretical Implications 
From an empirical perspective, this study built upon the work of AGB 
(2012), which provided the first broad overview of governing board approaches to 
athletic governance by chronicling such elements as whether boards have a policy 
on athletics, whether they delegate responsibility for athletics to the chief 
executive, or whether they have a standing committee on athletics.  While the 
AGB study was a crucial step in understanding the manner in which governing 
boards provide oversight to athletics, this study provided a first-hand account of 
trustee viewpoints on governance issues related to intercollegiate athletics.  For 
example, although the AGB study found that a little under half of surveyed 
governing boards had a standing committee on athletics, there was little context to 
what that structural governance decision means.  On the contrary, this study 
provided an in-depth exploration of the advantages and risks associated with the 
existence of an athletics committee as voiced directly by trustees. 
An example of a specific empirical observation from this study was the 
documentation that trustees believe an informal culture of trust between boards 
and presidents is equally, if not more, important than formal governance 
structures and processes.  The finding that a majority of trustees identified 
informal consultation as being more beneficial than formal governance processes 
is an important empirical contribution to the literature on higher education 
governance.  Another example of empirical evidence contributing to the 
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understanding of the governance of athletics was the finding that trustees, 
particular those from non-power conferences, are challenged by the financial 
needs of supporting Division I athletic departments.  The fact that two-thirds of 
the fifteen non-power conference trustees stated that athletic finances are a 
primary challenge in providing oversight to athletics provides supporting 
evidence to the perception that the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” in 
college athletics remains a significant issue.  
The study applied stakeholder theory to an area of organizational 
governance, higher education governing boards, not previously explored in this 
context.  However, the primary contributions to the literature on stakeholder 
theory manifested in three primary ways, all associated with limitations to the 
effectiveness of stakeholder governance.  First, the study identified limitations to 
stakeholder theory when participants either do not understand other stakeholder 
roles or fail to trust other stakeholders.  Second, and most importantly, the 
implementation of stakeholder theory was found to be a limiting approach to 
organizational governance when externalities are dominant forces.   
Stakeholder theory has primarily been written about in the context of 
corporations, with minimal attention paid to nonprofit organizations, such as 
colleges and universities, which include neither the clear goal of profitability nor 
owners in the traditional sense of shareholders (Speckbacher, 2008).  However, 
there has been a great deal written about the manifestation of stakeholder 
governance in higher education.  The predominant approach to in this realm is 
known as shared governance, which is described as a tri-partite system in which 
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governing boards, administrators, and the faculty have defined roles in 
institutional decision-making (AAUP, 1967; Gayle et al., 2003; Rhodes, 2001; 
Simplicio, 2006).   
This study is unique in that stakeholder theory is explored in relation to a 
stakeholder group in higher education, governing boards, that have ultimate 
institutional fiduciary responsibility, yet lack explicit authority regarding the 
management of the high profile area of intercollegiate athletics (AGB, 2004; 
AGB, 2007).  When applied to intercollegiate athletics, shared governance 
typically has entailed presidents maintaining authority to manage the athletic 
department and faculty being tasked with assuring the integrity of student-athlete 
academic programs (AGB, 2007; Bailey & Littlejohn, 1992; Brand, 2007; NCAA, 
1998).  Despite governing boards not universally fulfilling a specific role in the 
governance of athletics, this study contributes to the literature by demonstrating 
that trustees are interested stakeholders that desire involvement, sometimes 
through formal governance structures and other times through norms of informal 
consultation.   
Despite the recognition that trustees are interested stakeholders, the study 
suggests that there are conditional elements to boards effectively engaging in the 
stakeholder governance of intercollegiate athletics.  An important contribution to 
the literature on stakeholder theory is the observation of the deficiencies of a 
stakeholder model of governance when participants do not trust other 
stakeholders.  A level of comfort with the delegation of authority to institutional 
presidents for the operational management of athletics was consistently conveyed 
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by trustees, thereby displaying a level of trust in administrative leadership to deal 
with the complex issues associated with modern college athletics.  The 
recognition that presidents manage athletics was associated with trustees from all 
types of governing boards and among boards that had formal mechanisms of 
athletic governance and those that did not. 
However, multiple trustees commented that a lack of communication on 
athletic issues led to a deficiency of trust in their presidents to effectively manage 
athletics.  This perception came both in situations where boards had committees 
devoted to athletics and among those that did not.  In two cases, trustees observed 
that a frustration about communication and consultation on athletic issues led to 
their boards creating formal structures to deal with athletics, either through a 
committee or by appointing an athletic liaison.  Another trustee who served on an 
athletic committee expressed concern about the lack of consultation on athletic 
decision-making, thereby indicating that formal structures are not a panacea for 
effective stakeholder governance. 
The study suggests that some trustees identified the development of a 
culture of trustworthiness to be of greater importance to stakeholder governance 
than the formal processes of organizational decision-making.  Greenwood and 
Van Buren (2010) devoted considerable attention to the concept of organizational 
trustworthiness and the effect on stakeholder relationships, maintaining that the 
manner in which organizations respond to stakeholder trust is crucial to 
organizational effectiveness.  This study goes beyond the analysis of Greenwood 
and Van Buren (2010), which focused on the relationship between organizations 
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and dependent stakeholders who have limited power, by determining that a 
culture of trustworthiness is important both from stakeholders at the top and 
bottom of organizational power, as well as between stakeholders with a similar 
level of power. 
The study also indicates that certain actions may be taken when 
stakeholder trust breaks down.  In multiple situations, trustees discussed the 
implementation of formal governance structures to remedy a trust deficiency due 
to presidents inadequately communicating on athletic issues.  Indeed, governing 
boards have the authority to develop governance structures and determine their 
role in institutional decision-making, but the fact that multiple boards chose 
formal responses rather than informal consultation is an important finding.  This 
indicates that assertion of formal stakeholder roles may be the standard response 
when stakeholder governance breaks down.  A culture of informal consultation is 
therefore more characteristic of effective governance structures and may not be a 
typical response for improving trust deficits.     
A lack of understanding of stakeholder roles in the governance of athletics 
is as notable as the deficiency of trust.  Trustees generally expressed little 
understanding of other athletic governance roles, particularly displaying an 
ignorance of the roles of faculty members.  This particular stakeholder role is 
important because faculty are entrusted in athletic governance with maintaining 
the integrity and standards of the academic programs associated with student-
athletes (Bailey & Littlejohn, 1991; Brand, 2007; Cooper, 1992).   
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There has been attention paid to the importance of recognizing all 
stakeholder roles in implementing effective governance (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Hasnas, 2013).  Hasnas (2013) argued that leaders must distribute 
stakeholder value throughout the organization.  Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
similarly observed that managers within an organization have the responsibility to 
provide resources for and receive benefits from all legitimate stakeholders.  The 
study observed a general failure to recognize the legitimacy of faculty as 
stakeholders in the governance of athletics.  This finding was exemplified by the 
observations of two trustees, both prominent in dealing with athletic issues, who 
commented on faculty roles without acknowledging their role or importance.   
The unique contribution to the literature on stakeholder theory was that 
trustees not only failed to respect the legitimacy of faculty roles in the governance 
of athletics, there was a near complete ignorance by trustees of the faculty 
presence as stakeholders.  While approximately one third of trustees mentioned 
faculty in some capacity, only one trustee substantively discussed faculty roles in 
regard to athletics.  This finding demonstrates contradictions with other trustee 
comments regarding the importance placed on the academic performance of 
student-athletes.  Multiple trustees, primarily when describing the responsibilities 
of their athletic committees, noted the board’s role in ensuring the integrity of 
student-athlete academic performance.  While an athletic committee or other 
board mechanism may certainly have procedures for monitoring the performance 
of student-athletes, it is quite remarkable that trustees repeatedly failed to 
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acknowledge the authority for student-athlete academic integrity typically granted 
to institutional faculty (Bailey & Littlejohn, 1991; Brand, 2007; Cooper, 1992).    
This leads to a question as to whether stakeholder governance can be 
effectively implemented when key stakeholders lack understanding of or are 
ignorant or disrespectful of other stakeholder roles.  The foundation of 
stakeholder governance, as discussed in Chapter Two, is that this system works 
well when all of those individuals or groups who have a “stake” in the actions of 
an organization are able to contribute to organizational decision-making and 
receive value from mission-related activities (Kangas, 2011).  Not only does the 
ignorance of faculty involvement display a deficiency of respect for their 
important stakeholder role in athletic governance, there is the related concern that 
the lack of understanding could lead to ineffective governance decisions.  In the 
same way that a trust deficit between trustees and the president may lead to a 
board creating new formal structures to enhance athletic oversight, an ignorance 
of faculty roles could lead to boards being overly engaged in the academic matters 
of the athletic department, which conventionally is the responsibility of the 
faculty.    
A particularly notable contribution to the literature on stakeholder theory 
is recognition that a stakeholder governance model may be compromised in 
dealing with powers external to organizations. The majority of this study focused 
on the structures, processes, policies, and culture surrounding decision-making 
internal to institutions in order to assess the effectiveness of a stakeholder 
approach to athletic governance.  Specifically, the study focused on formal 
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governance mechanisms such as athletics committees, approval authorities, and 
informal norms related to presidential consultation on issues of importance.  
Despite the varying ways that governing boards implement these formal and 
informal processes and the spectrum of trustee viewpoints on the implementation, 
it can be concluded that boards are able to contribute as stakeholders to the shared 
governance of athletics when applied to internal oversight. 
Where the fulfillment of a stakeholder role by governing boards in the 
shared governance of intercollegiate athletics may fall short is regarding systemic, 
national issues in college sports.  This is illustrated by the study’s findings on 
trustees expressing a sense of powerlessness related to certain aspects of athletic 
governance.  For example, trustees from non-power conferences conveyed 
frustrations with an ongoing process of trying to maintain a financial pace with 
power conference programs.  Despite the interviews being conducted prior to 
recent NCAA governance changes allowing for institutions to pay full cost of 
attendance for student-athletes (Terlep, 2015), some non-power conference 
trustees acknowledged that decisions made by power conference institutions 
would undeniably affect how they approached their situations.  Other external 
influences cited by trustees included the power that television networks have in 
determining football schedules and the market-driven nature of coaching contracts 
that put boards and institutions in an extremely ineffectual bargaining position.    
Another specific issue highlighting the challenges of external influences 
cited by several trustees was the recent wave of conference realignment (Forde, 
2013).  Aside from one example of a governing board that actively inserted itself 
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into the decision-making process, the trustees from institutions that had recently 
switched conferences conveyed that they either had no role or a limited 
consultative role in conference affiliation decisions.  The general belief is that 
decisions were made by conference commissioners, who typically work at the 
behest of conference member presidents, based on economic factors such as 
revenue from television rights (Lavigne, 2014; Thamel, 2011).  Despite the 
necessary approval in realignment decisions from the conference boards, 
comprised of presidents, and ultimately institutional governing boards, trustees 
noted that the decisions were typically made by the conference commissioners by 
the time they reached those points of approval. 
The aforementioned case of an internal system of shared governance being 
trumped by external factors is not isolated in higher education to intercollegiate 
athletics.  In recent years, traditional funding sources for public higher education 
such as state legislatures have increasingly attempted to tie funding to 
performance-based metrics in such areas as learning outcomes and graduation 
rates (Dee, 2006; McLendon & Hearn, 2013).  At the federal level, President 
Obama proposed a system by which funding for student aid would be based on a 
rating system for public and private colleges and universities that measures 
various outcomes such as graduation rates, affordability, and access for low 
income students (Jaschik, 2013).  Another prominent area of external influence on 
the policy and practices of colleges and universities has been related to sexual 
assaults on campuses, with federal legislation introduced in 2014 that would 
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punish institutions for underreporting or inappropriately dealing with sexual 
assault cases (Bahr, 2014). 
These examples, athletic and otherwise, highlight the fact that governing 
boards, despite being the ultimate institutional authority at colleges and 
universities, are sometimes rendered as weak, if not powerless, in certain areas of 
institutional decision-making.  Whether it is a decision on athletic conference 
affiliation or the need to direct funding to student conduct offices to deal with 
sexual assault cases, institutions are heavily influenced by externalities.  In light 
of these external influences, it is entirely reasonable to assess whether the 
traditional governance model of shared responsibilities among several 
stakeholders remains effective. 
Welcomer’s (2002) analysis of external influences to organizational 
stakeholder networks demonstrated that the more an organization was receptive to 
the interests of external stakeholders, the more likely it was that those 
stakeholders reciprocated that respect and consideration.  Related to this study, 
stakeholders such as conference commissioners are clearly powerbrokers in 
college athletics external to governing boards, which would suggest that boards 
must be receptive to these externalities by acknowledging their power. The 
importance of receptivity to external stakeholders espoused by Welcomer (2012) 
is coupled with a guiding principle of stakeholder governance that stakeholders 
are defined not only by their legitimate interest in an organization, but also by the 
organization’s interest in them (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  Therefore, whether 
the stakeholder relationship involves internal stakeholders or external influences, 
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the presence of trust, respect, and receptivity to stakeholder interests is paramount 
and may yield effective governance. 
A question emerging from this study is whether the absence of trust and 
receptivity due to the influence of external stakeholders can be overcome though 
the implementation of a stakeholder governance model.  Despite the fact that the 
formal role of a governing board in any major decision involving athletics may be 
limited, be it conference affiliation or the hiring of a head football coach, board 
trustees ultimately have the ability to dictate the process and terms by which 
negotiations proceed and agreements are reached.  Therefore, presidents, as the 
primary representative of the organization and subordinate of governing boards, 
have a decided interest in satisfying the interests of trustee as stakeholders.   
Conference affiliation decisions and conference media rights agreements 
are prime examples of external influence being imposed on institutions and the 
opportunity for a robust internal response being limited due to the power of such 
externalities as conference commissioners and television networks.  However, 
those limits on power do not necessarily constitute a condemnation of a 
stakeholder governance system as much as an indictment of an ineffective shared 
governance culture.  While they may believe that their authority is limited due to 
external power, boards have the ability to develop the policies, practices, and 
communication expectations for decision-making that address both internal and 
external issues.  For a board that believes its president is not appropriately sharing 
information in the midst of conference affiliation negotiations, a request for more 
informal consultation may be considered.  When a board lacks understanding of 
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media rights agreements, a response may be to request a presentation on the 
subject at a formal board meeting.  Regardless of the issue, an enhanced 
understanding of subject matter should lead to greater respect for all stakeholders, 
including external forces, and an improved culture of stakeholder governance.    
Recommendations for Policy and Practice 
The following recommendations are directed toward trustees and 
governing boards as considerations for policy and practice in providing oversight 
to intercollegiate athletics. 
Develop expectations for practice.  While trustees expressed general 
support for the role of athletics on their campuses, there was considerable concern 
expressed about the balance between athletics and academics and the potential for 
scandals such as Penn State.  In order to alleviate these concerns, it is critical for 
boards to engage in dialogue with presidents about which issues require board 
consultation and which issues the board should be more formally involved.  On a 
transactional basis, boards should set clear expectations about when trustees need 
to be informed of major coach hiring, firing, and contract negotiations, regardless 
of whether final approval comes to the board.   
As discussed in Chapter Five, several trustees mentioned the Penn State 
scandal as a cautionary tale for boards.  One of the important lessons learned from 
the aftermath of the scandal is that Penn State administrators repeatedly failed to 
inform the Board of Trustees of potential sexual abuse incidents (Freeh, 2012).  
Several universities have created and revised policies to address the specific issue 
of protecting minors on campuses in the wake of the scandal, but equally 
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important for boards to consider is the manner in which athletic compliance issues 
are communicated to trustees, both informally for notification of potential 
problems and formally as part of regular reporting.    
The development of expectations for practice may be particularly helpful 
in dealing with influences in college athletics that are external to institutions. An 
example of which that that caused significant consternation for several trustees in 
recent years has been conference realignment.  In particular, trustees discussed the 
challenges associated with either not being informed of potential conference 
moves for their institutions or not playing a formal role in final decisions.  While 
conference realignment may continue, of greater significance is the future of the 
NCAA and the fact that the new governance structure of the organization allows 
for greater autonomy for the power conference institutions to determine their own 
rules (NCAA, 2014b).  Several trustees expressed hope that their boards would be 
involved in decisions about institutional positioning and the future of the NCAA.  
Despite concerns being voiced about the lack of governing board influence in 
some of these external, systematic issues, trustees need to set clear expectations 
about board role.  Questions that could be posed to the president include, “Should 
the president consult with board leadership before and after every conference 
board meeting?” or “Should the board develop an institutional position on the 
future of NCAA governance?”  
Be aware of the consequences of formalizing board oversight.  As 
demonstrated by the trustee interviews, there was no consensus on whether boards 
should have a standing athletics committee or approve coaching contracts.  
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Athletic committees, for example, were assessed as providing an important 
opportunity for trustees to formally discuss athletic issues while at the same time 
creating opportunities for micromanagement and boosterism.  In this study, two 
trustees from the same private board, one on the athletics committee and one not, 
held different viewpoints on the effectiveness of the committee.  Trustees need to 
assess on a regular basis whether athletic issues can effectively be handled by 
other board committees or whether there are any deleterious effects of having a 
committee.  Of particular importance is the assessment of whether an athletics 
committee is not reflective of a stakeholder approach to governance due to the 
fact that those trustees not serving on the committee are not able to contribute as 
stakeholders to the oversight of athletics. 
Formalizing board oversight through explicit board authority on athletic 
items or board committee structure can also have the undesired effect of 
undermining presidential control of intercollegiate athletics.  Ensuring that 
presidents have complete authority to manage institutional athletic departments 
should be at the forefront of board activity related to intercollegiate athletics and 
any board activity that might call this into question should be evaluated.  For 
example, boards that have official liaisons to the athletic department must take 
great care to ensure that administrative reporting lines are not weakened or 
confused. 
Focus on core board responsibilities.  Chapter Two highlighted such 
critical board responsibilities as determining institutional mission and ensuring 
financial solvency.  As governing boards weigh the manner in which they should 
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provide oversight to intercollegiate athletics, focusing on these typical board 
responsibilities is essential.  Multiple trustees acknowledged that athletics is a 
realm of higher education that is very easy for boards to step over the line from 
governance to management.  Every time the board examines an area of 
intercollegiate athletics, trustees must ask whether the focus is at the right level.  
Regarding the traditional academic mission of colleges and universities, 
governing boards should examine whether intercollegiate athletics is operating in 
accordance with that mission, particularly through annual reporting of such 
elements as student-athlete academic performance and compliance with NCAA 
rules and federal gender equity laws.   
The challenges associated with financial sustainability of Division I 
athletic departments were clearly an important consideration of several trustees in 
this study.  Governing boards must be included in the discussion around the 
financial solvency of intercollegiate athletics, particularly when considering that 
very few NCAA Division I athletic departments are able to operate at a profit. 
Governing boards should not necessarily spend time on the details of the athletic 
budget, but they should fulfill their fiduciary responsibility by engaging 
presidents on the acceptability of institutional subsidies and long term financial 
planning for athletics. 
Limitations of the Study 
The is study aimed to provide an enhanced understanding of the manner in 
which governing boards participate as stakeholders in the shared governance of 
intercollegiate athletics, thereby contributing to the literature on stakeholder 
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theory and higher education governance.  However, there clearly were limitations 
to the methods utilized in the study.  The following will elaborate on the 
shortcomings of the sample development and the inherent weakness relating to 
meeting the standard of creditability.  
The strength of this study was the use of unfiltered, first-hand accounts of 
the participating trustees.  However, due to the fact that the process for recruiting 
interviewees involved using formal gatekeepers (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) by 
querying board professionals for potential participants, those board professionals 
utilized bias in concluding which trustees would be most willing to participate and 
provide informative responses.  Despite the fact that the recruitment 
communication (see Appendix B) included the following language, “I am not 
looking for any particular set of viewpoints on athletics, but just individuals who 
you think would have interesting thoughts on the subject,” patterns developed in 
the profile of trustees offered as willing participants.  Board professionals tended 
to provide the names of trustees who either served on an athletics committee or 
had an interest in intercollegiate athletics.  In addition, the sample was 
overwhelmingly male with only three females interviewed out of a sample size of 
29.  
The limitations associated with trustee recruitment lead to the conclusion 
that the sample captures neither the diversity of trustee viewpoints on 
intercollegiate athletics nor the breadth of knowledge among trustees on this 
subject.  For example, the majority of trustees conveyed a general understanding 
of national and institutional issues surrounding intercollegiate athletics and 
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expressed a level of comfort with the role of athletics on their campuses.  Given 
the national dialogue and associated concern about such issues as student-athlete 
compensation, concussions, and power conference autonomy, trustees devoted 
considerably scant attention to expressing concerns about the future of college 
athletics and what that would mean to their campuses.  
In reflecting on the use of board professionals as formal gatekeepers to 
potential interview subjects, I maintain that this was the most appropriate, and 
likely to succeed, manner of recruiting trustees.  In my experience, governing 
board members place a great deal of trust in board professionals to help them sort 
out professional requests for their time and experience.  However, the focus on 
recruiting a sufficient sample size made me reluctant to challenge 
recommendations of willing participants and ask for different profiles.  While I 
certainly could not have known in advance the viewpoints of potential interview 
subjects, I could have negotiated with some board professionals about finding 
trustees who had less direct experience with athletics on their governing boards. 
A second limitation of the study resulted from the need to maintain 
complete confidentiality for participating trustees through no attribution of 
institutional or personal names.  I came to the conclusion that confidentiality 
would be required through my completion of the pilot study in which participants 
asked for assurance of confidentiality and my general experience in working with 
the very public nature of governing board membership.  Therefore, I assured all 
potential interviewees that there would be no attribution in the final document.  I 
also made the determination that redacting institutional and personal names from 
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the transcripts would not yield an acceptable of level of confidentiality due to the 
potential attribution of publicly known issues being described.  Therefore, the 
possibility of peer review of the data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was deemed not 
acceptable for this study.  Despite inclusion of a member-checking (Bailey, 2007; 
Boeije, 2010; Seidman, 1991) process that presented the findings to the study 
participants, the absence of an external review of the data clearly affected meeting 
the standard of credibility.    
Recommendations for Further Research 
To address the limitation posed by utilizing formalized gatekeepers 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011), a recommendation for further research would be a 
qualitative study on a single board in which either all or the majority of trustees 
were interviewed to examine the manner in which the full board viewed the 
governance of intercollegiate athletics.  This current study provided a micro 
version of this proposed approach with several pairs of trustees representing the 
same board.  These trustees expressed opposing viewpoints on a host of subjects, 
including the effectiveness of the athletics committee and the role of the board in 
conference realignment decisions.  An in-depth study of a single board would 
potentially expand on these differences of opinion and provide a more thorough 
examination of the manner in which a full board wades through the complex 
world of intercollegiate athletics. 
A second recommendation for further research would be an examination 
of whether governing board involvement in intercollegiate athletic issues differs 
from that of other areas of board governance.  For example, would trustees have a 
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different perspective on board involvement in hiring a football coach than that of 
vice presidents?  Would there be a differing level of interest in the financing and 
construction of a research building and a basketball arena?  A qualitative 
comparison study undertaken in this manner could provide important information 
on whether athletics truly is a unique component of higher education as it 
typically is portrayed. 
Summary 
This qualitative study examined the stakeholder role of higher education 
governing boards in providing oversight to intercollegiate athletics contributed to 
the literature on higher education and organizational governance by providing the 
opportunity for trustees to offer their perspectives on athletics, which previously 
had not been documented.  Theoretically, the study explored the implementation 
of organizational stakeholder theory in higher education, known as shared 
governance, providing both confirmation of the importance of a culture of trust 
and communication to effective implementation, along with a critical assessment 
of the efficacy of this approach when applied to the governance of intercollegiate 
athletics due to the power of external factors.  Finally, the study offered 
recommendations for policy and practice, observing that boards must develop 
expectations for how they work with administrators in this area, assess the risks of 
formalizing board oversight, and focus on core board governance responsibilities. 
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Interviewer Script: 
This study is being conducted to fulfill the requirements of a Doctor of 
Philosophy degree in the Department of Kinesiology at the University of 
Minnesota. The purpose of this study is to provide trustees the opportunity to 
discuss their viewpoints on intercollegiate athletics and to examine the manner in 
which governing boards contribute to the shared governance of intercollegiate 
athletics. 
This interview will provide you the opportunity to express your experience as 
being a trustee in dealing with athletics at your institution and your feelings about 
intercollegiate athletics’ place in higher education. 
Your privacy and confidentiality will not be compromised through your 
participation in this study.  No personal or institutional names will be included in 
the dissertation study.  I will be the only person to listen to or transcribe the 
interview.  You will have final approval over the transcription, and I will be only 
other person to view the transcription.  The data will be stored on my personal 
computer with no personal identifying marks for each interview.   
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary.  You may 
discontinue your participation in the study at any point. 
Do you consent to participate in this study?  
________________ 
QUESTIONS 
Background/Demographic Information 
• Tell me about your experience on the board? 
 
o How long you have served 
o Leadership positions 
o Committee assignments 
 
• Describe your board? 
 
o Appointment process for members and their terms 
o Number of members 
o How often you meet 
 
• Describe the institution or institutions you govern? 
 
o Public / private 
o Comprehensive research / liberal arts 
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o Level of NCAA competition 
 
Institutional Governance of Intercollegiate Athletics 
 
1.  What are your general views on intercollegiate athletics? 
 
o National perspective 
o Student-athlete or participant in sports while in school 
o Fan of college sports  
o How your views have changed since becoming a trustee 
 
2. What is the appropriate role of intercollegiate athletics on your campus or 
campuses? 
 
o Front-porch analogy / way to access the institution 
o Incorporated appropriately into institutional mission 
 
3. What role does the board play in governing intercollegiate athletics at your 
institution?  
 
o Athletics committee 
o Athletics policy 
o Formal reports 
o Approval authority / contracts 
 
4. How should intercollegiate athletics be governed at your institution? 
 
o Chief executive role 
o Involvement of the faculty 
o Independence of the athletic department 
 
5. What role should the board play? 
 
o Formal and informal 
o Consultation with the chief executive 
 
6. What are the challenges experienced by the board in the governance of 
intercollegiate athletics at your institution? 
 
o Athletic finances 
o Coaching contracts 
o Trustees as boosters 
o Major revenue sports  
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APPENDIX B – RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
 
Selected board professionals received the following email regarding potential 
trustee participation in the study: 
 
 
 
Dear Ms. ________: 
 
My name is Jon Steadland and I am a staff member in the Office of the President 
and a Ph.D. student at the University of Minnesota.  I am currently beginning a 
dissertation project on the role of governing boards in providing oversight to 
intercollegiate athletics.  While this subject has gained great attention in recent 
years, most recently with a report released last fall by the Association of 
Governing Boards, the goal of my research is to talk directly with board members 
from different institutions around the country regarding their viewpoints on how 
athletics is governed at their institution.  I believe that this study will allow for an 
in-depth exploration of athletic governance to contribute to our understanding of 
how boards deal with this issue. 
 
The subjects of my proposed study are board members from Division I 
institutions, public and private.  I am inquiring whether there might be a member 
of the University of ____________ Board of Trustees that would be willing to do 
an approximately 30-45 minute phone interview on this subject at some point in 
the near future.  The interviews and resulting dissertation will be entirely 
confidential and will not involve attribution of any personal or institutional 
names.  I am not looking for any particular set of viewpoints on athletics, but just 
individuals who you think would have interesting thoughts on the subject.  
 
If you think this might be a possibility or have additional questions, I would be 
interested in having a phone conversation or additional email correspondence to 
explore this further.   
 
Thank you for your consideration of this request. 
 
Sincerely, 
Jon Steadland 
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APPENDIX C – INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
The following form was sent to potential participants prior to their participation in 
the study: 
 
CONSENT INFORMATION SHEET 
Higher Education Governing Boards and Stakeholder Governance of 
Intercollegiate Athletics 
You are invited to be in a research study on the shared governance of intercollegiate 
athletics. You were selected as a possible participant because you are a trustee of a 
governing board that oversees one or more NCAA Division I institutions..  
We ask that you read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing 
to be in the study. 
This study is being conducted by: Jon Steadland, Ph.D. Candidate, School of 
Kinesiology, College of Education and Human Development, University of Minnesota. 
Background Information: 
 
The purpose of this study is: provide trustees of higher education governing boards 
the opportunity to discuss their viewpoints on intercollegiate athletics and to examine 
the manner in which governing boards contribute to the shared governance of 
intercollegiate athletics. 
 
Procedures: 
 
If you agree to be in this study, we would ask you to do the following things: 
Participate in a phone interview and provide final approval of the interview transcript. 
Risks and Benefits of being in the Study: 
There are no identified risks to your participation in this study. 
The benefits to participation are the opportunity to contribute to the academic 
understanding of intercollegiate athletic governance. 
Compensation: 
You will not receive any compensation for participating in this study. 	  
Confidentiality: 
 
The records of this study will be kept private. In the dissertation, I will not include any 
information that will make it possible to identify a subject, including personal or 
institutional names. Research records will be stored securely and only I will have 
access to the records.  
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate will 
not affect your current or future relations with the University of Minnesota. If you 
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decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time 
without affecting those relationships.  
Contacts and Questions: 
The researcher conducting this study is: Jon Steadland.  You may ask any questions 
by contacting me at 612-839-3222 or jsteadla@umn.edu.    
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to 
someone other than the researcher(s), you are encouraged to contact the Research 
Subjects’ Advocate Line, D528 Mayo, 420 Delaware St. Southeast, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota 55455; (612) 625-1650. 
You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. 
 
 
